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ABSTRACT 
Authoritarian learning has received scant attention in academic literature. This analysis 
emphasises how authoritarian regimes in the former-Soviet Union (FSU) learn from one 
another to consolidate authoritarianism. The argument is that regimes use similar tactics 
and institutions to consolidate authoritarianism. The study uses the cases of Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine to offer comprehensive analysis of authoritarian 
consolidation. Using a methodology of case studies, longitudinal analysis and discourse 
analysis, I show that these regimes have become more authoritarian, using similar tactics 
and building comparable institutions. The research suggests that the cases share similar 
characteristics that seem unlikely to have appeared in each state by themselves. Learning is 
the most applicable explanation for this. The investigation uses hypotheses that make a 
strong case for authoritarian learning. The thesis argues that existing authoritarian 
typologies should explain a few cases which share similarities. Currently, literature uses a 
chosen rubric universally to explain many cases. This weakens typologies, exhausting 
effectiveness in explaining different authoritarian regimes.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
In 2003 a new type of phenomenon occurred in the Former Soviet Union (FSU). Its 
apogee arose a year later in 2004. The ‘colour revolutions’ that transpired in Georgia (2003) 
and Ukraine (2004) brought significant numbers of protestors onto the streets of Tbilisi and 
Kiev, demonstrating against alleged electoral fraud after a presidential election. The Kiev 
demonstrations (especially) snowballed into massive protests with demonstrators in Kiev 
setting-up a tent city on the central Maidan Square. Protests in both states escalated to such 
an extent that they precipitated regime collapse in Georgia and the Ukrainian election’s 
being reheld. The new electoral results in Ukraine ousted Leonid Kuchma and his chosen 
successor (Viktor Yanukovych) from power in favour of the ‘Orange coalition’ leader Viktor 
Yushchenko. 
Authoritarian regimes across the FSU saw the ‘colour revolutions’ as a call to arms to 
defeat democratisation and consolidate authoritarianism to maintain power. Having 
witnessed the collapse of the Georgian and Ukrainian regimes, they set about finding ways 
to undermine and stop potential domestic ‘colour revolutions’. The most prominent 
examples of how authoritarian regimes overcame demonstrations and potential ‘colour 
revolutions’ were Belarus (2006 and 2010) and Armenia (2008). I am concerned here with 
authoritarian learning and how these regimes use learning to consolidate authoritarianism. 
The Belarusian regime learnt that by using force, police charges, tear gas and corralling 
demonstrators (in 2006) would save it from the same fate as the Ukrainian regime in 2004. 
This investigation is concerned with how authoritarian regimes learn from one another to 
use the same tactics, institutions and ways for consolidation.  
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In the second decade of the 21st century authoritarian regimes in the FSU have 
consolidated (Silitski, 2010b: 341; Cameron and Ornstein, 2011a: 3). They have usurped any 
democratic institutions that existed in the region, turning them into authoritarian 
institutions that help regime consolidation. This authoritarian increase is part of a larger 
world development towards authoritarianism, which is aided by two of the world’s great 
powers being non-democracies (China and Russia). Both have espoused an alternative to 
democracy (Ambrosio, 2009: 3), through the promotion of authoritarian models, mixed (in 
China’s case, especially) with rapid economic growth. Having these alternative authoritarian 
models to the liberal-democratic paradigm, allows other regimes to copy them, making 
current prevalent democratic standards less certain (Gat, 2007: 59). These models have 
strengthened the possibility for authoritarian states to emerge and grow (Ambrosio, 2009: 
3). Russia, as the designated successor state to the Soviet Union, has tried to incorporate its 
‘near-abroad’ (the other FSU states), into its sphere of influence through promotion of 
regional organisations, like the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) (Cameron and 
Ornstein, 2011a: 5).  
 Existing academic literature on Russian foreign policy contends that Russia uses 
foreign policy to manipulate (Allison, 2004: 464) and maintain a sphere-of-influence (Stent, 
2008: 1102; Averre, 2009: 1703). To protect its stability and preserve regional interests, 
Russia attempts to keep ‘friendly’ FSU regimes in power (Stent, 2008: 1100). By having a 
sphere of influence, Russia promotes its claims to be a world power (Trenin, 2009: 4-5). 
Other states in turn seek support from Russia for regime preservation and for ways of 
curbing democratic concepts from gaining a foothold in their own states (Averre, 2008: 36). 
I will assess the contestation as to whether Russia is promoting authoritarianism in the FSU.  
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I do not include the Baltic States within the FSU region. Whilst, the Baltic States were 
Soviet republics, they had previously been independent and so democratic recollection still 
existed (Pettai and Kreuzer, 1998: 149-150). Now they are considered democratic, through 
their membership of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO). They share a cultural and political affinity with Central European states, making 
them distinct from other FSU states (Onken, 2007: 24). Map one (below), shows the states 
to be assessed in the longitudinal analysis section. These are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.  
Map One: The FSU States 
Source: Koyzis, 2009 
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The collapse of the Soviet Union drastically affected the newly emerging FSU states. 
The disintegration of the political institutions and the economies of the successor states in 
the early 1990s, brought demands for a return to strong leadership (reminiscent of the 
Brezhnev era in the Soviet Union). The public in the successor states hoped this would 
protect them from further economic shocks and political instability. Strong-man leadership 
resonated across the region, quickly becoming an integral aspect of most of the regions 
political systems (Pei, 1994: 2). In Central Asia, for instance, most incumbent presidents 
have remained in power since the collapse of the Soviet Union. I do not contend that Russia 
coerces other FSU states into becoming authoritarian, but, since the ‘colour revolutions’ it 
has tried to curb democracy in the region (Brudny and Finkel, 2011: 813; Recknagel, 2010). 
Nor do I confuse Russia’s natural influence in it’s ‘near abroad’ with authoritarian learning. 
Russia, as the regional hegemon, will naturally promote its interests in neighbouring states. 
This is not the same as authoritarian diffusion. However, Russia does promote itself as a 
model for others (Lukyanov, 2010).  
  Political learning is how politicians and the public learn from decisions. During the 
‘Arab Spring’ (the people protest that occurred in North Africa and the Levante leading to 
the overthrow of governments in Egypt and Tunisia), protestors learnt tactics and means of 
participating to find effective ways to overcome authoritarian regimes (Heydemann and 
Leenders, 2011: 648: 651). Governments faced with mass-protest, followed examples other 
regimes in learning ways of regime preservation (Volpi, 2012: 3). The King of Morocco 
(Mohammad VI), seeing the conflagration in Egypt and Tunisia, reformed the constitution to 
placate protestors (El Amrani, 2012). Learning is a process where ideas are disseminated 
from various areas. Learning is understood here to be how people overcome authoritarian 
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regimes and how authoritarian regimes can overcome protests and consolidate power 
(Heydemann and Leenders, 2011: 649).  
I state that the FSU regimes are authoritarian. Linz (1964: 297) defines 
authoritarianism as a regime limiting pluralism by not allowing citizens to compete for 
office, or participate in electing representatives. Levitsky and Way (2002: 52) argue that the 
FSU regimes cannot be classified as democracies, or truly dictatorial. If democracies are 
where government is chosen through open elections, nearly all adults can vote, political and 
civil liberties are preserved and those elected govern, then the FSU regimes cannot be 
classified as democratic (Levitsky and Way, 2002: 53). By referring to FSU states as 
authoritarian, the analysis means a restrained authoritarianism, rather than the 
totalitarianism of the Soviet Union. I stipulate that totalitarian regimes engage in mass 
ceremonies, with ranks of civilians (or the army) waving flags and holding torches “chanting 
combative slogans and sentimental hymns, cheering to the words of their fatherly leaders” 
(Schedler, 2013: 48). A prime example is North Korea, where the authorities stage massive 
shows of ‘support’. Authoritarian regimes, by contrast are less ideologically driven. These 
regimes (like, Russia) use youth groups and ‘staged’ protest movements to control the 
streets and curb potential opposition demonstrations (Robertson, 2010: 180).  
Current literature on authoritarian learning in the FSU has only assessed Russia. The 
magnum opus is Ambrosio’s work (2009). He concentrated on Russia to 
“understand...political dynamics and future implications of this...authoritarian resurgence” 
(Ambrosio, 2009: 4). The current Russian regime has created a political system of limited 
competition, with state control of the economy and the media (White, 2011: 657; 
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Mikhelidze, 2011). The Kremlin insulates the political system from democratic 
encroachment (Ambrosio, 2009: 4). It has engaged in bolstering, subversion, insulation, 
coordination and redefinition (Ambrosio, 2009: 19-24), to protect the regime and other 
regional authoritarian regimes from democratic infringement (Ambrosio, 2009: 4-5). 
However, Ambrosio’s work displays certain limitations. It does not look past Russia which 
serves as the sole case study (Ambrosio, 2009: 6). I will emphasise that an authoritarian 
trend occurs across the FSU and will expand the number of cases ascertaining whether 
learning occurs.  
METHODOLOGY 
To comprehend how authoritarian regimes learn from one another, I will find 
applicable research methods to emphasise the concept of learning. The analysis will be 
qualitative. I agree with Bunce and Wolchik (2010a: 44-45) and Ambrosio (2009: 13) that it is 
difficult to measure learning quantitatively. However, I will use statistics for part of the 
analysis. Though difficult to quantify learning, it is possible to highlight authoritarian trends 
quantitatively. If whole regions become authoritarian, then quantitative data can draw 
inferences. A longitudinal analysis will illustrate potential assumptions. But, to sketch firm 
conclusions, a qualitative methodology needs to be central to the study.  
I will provide a literature review to comprehend authoritarian learning. This will 
provide clarity to the researcher and reader and promotes thinking and aids the collection 
of data (Pain, 2012: 304; Smythe and Spence, 2012: 14). Similarly, it also highlights why the 
topic needs further expansion (Aveyard, 2007: 2). It is the most appropriate way to 
comprehend the intricacies of “qualitative analysis” and “explore...narratives” (Wiles et al, 
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2011: 590). A literature review provides the basis for formulating an argument, allowing the 
researcher to stipulate salient issues (Smythe and Spence, 2012: 14).  
Discourse analysis primarily is the study of language. But, it allows the researcher to 
understand a social context, thus making inferences on an issue (Schiffrin, 2001: 56; de Melo 
Resende, 2012: 3). It allows scholars to comprehend why a particular set of language 
interpretations are being used, allowing interpretation of an issue through the language 
utilised. By doing various discourse analytical comparisons, researchers can track similarities 
in language and interpret a topic’s meaning and discern whether the cases use comparable 
language (Brinton, 2001: 139). To interpret the discourse emanating from the chosen cases, 
I need to provide variables to track trends (Myhill, 2001: 162). I will take a critical discourse 
analysis approach. This allows the researcher to interpret language under analysis, making 
inferences from it that fit preconceived hypotheses (Van Dijk, 2001: 352). As I am concerned 
with understanding political institutions one needs to understand elite power relations and 
that politicians are highly adept at using language for purposes other than what they mean 
(Van Dijk, 2001: 356; Wilson, 2001: 400). Critical discourse analysis provides this. The 
discourse analysis chapter will show how I devised various variables to spot authoritarian 
trends and will emphasise similarities in language.  The process of authoritarian learning in 
the four case studies (Belarus, Kazkhstan, Russia and Ukraine), will be assessed through elite 
speeches and government affiliated newspapers (Rossiskaya Gazeta, Izvestiya, Sovetskaya 
Belorussia, Panorama, Vremya and Uryadovy Kurier). By analysing language found in 
government discourse and these newspapers, I will infer that authoritarian learning occurs.  
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Case studies will be used to accentuate the learning process through the use of the 
multiple-case study approach (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 235). According to Yin (2003: 13) “a case 
study is an empirical inquiry” exploring “a phenomenon within its real life context”. Eckstein 
(2002: 123) argues that the case study is a technique “for gathering evidence”. According to 
Gerring (2004: 341) it is an “intensive study of a single unit...where the scholar’s aim is to 
elucidate features of a larger class of similar phenomenon”. The case study method can run 
the risk of selection-bias, particularly in small-N studies, where researchers select cases 
pertinent to conclusions they wish to draw (Collier and Mahoney, 1996: 57).  
However, the case studies chosen here do not draw preconceived conclusions and 
could plausibly provide different conclusions than the ones I wish to infer. Yet, a small-N 
study helps the researcher build conjectural models from which to construct viable 
conclusions (Esping-Andersen and Prezworski, 2000). As Ragin (1987: 225) contends, small-
N studies can be selective because they are in-depth and conclusive, allowing the researcher 
to find a wealth of evidence. I argue that incorporating examples from other FSU states 
(map one), in a longitudinal analysis will help ascertain trends in the four selected case 
studies. This will allow the research to follow the multiple-case study method. Likewise, 
having in-depth case studies draws tangible conclusions (Collier and Mahoney, 1996: 57). By 
treating variables as similar, I overcome selection-bias and counterfactual issues (Bergh, 
2005). To understand authoritarian learning and provide answers to the research and sub-
research questions it does not necessarily matter which cases are chosen. To ascertain a 
concept, the choice of case studies is not necessarily an issue. Yet, I am doing a small-N 
study, so it is not possible to be completely random (Seawright and Gerring, 2008: 295). The 
investigation has chosen four case studies (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine) that are 
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different and do not suffer from selection-bias, providing adequate understanding of 
authoritarian learning.  
Russia has become an opponent of Western democracy. It engages in strengthening 
relationships with other authoritarian regimes, acting as a ‘guardian’ state and constraining 
democracy in the region (Ambrosio, 2009: 5). Belarus is included, as will be shown it is an 
outlier in the study and provides a different authoritarian typology to other FSU regimes  
(Wilson, 2011a: 177). Kazakhstan is chosen because its authoritarianism is dissimilar to 
Russia and Belarus. The regime has become entrenched whilst maintaining a facade of 
openness (Schatz, 2009: 208; Isaacs, 2010b: 17). Lastly, Ukraine provides an interesting 
comparison to the other three cases. It is not as authoritarian as the other cases but is in 
danger of becoming as authoritarian (Wilson, 2011b)1.  
Whilst, Ukraine offers some differentiation, I will use a most similar systems design 
(MSSD). The four case studies are similar on the dependent variable (process of learning), 
but differ on the independent variable (what affects the learning) (Meckstroth, 1975: 137). 
The independent variables are: corruption, institutions, government policies, freedom of the 
press, and the strength of civil society and homogenisation of elites. I will utilise cases that 
are similar, but the phenomenon has different consequences for each case. Whilst, each 
case study has a distinctive political system, they have many similarities on the independent 
variables. I will use a loose application of MSSD, accounting for similarities in “background 
characteristics” between states (Anckar, 2008: 390). I am not using a most different systems 
                                                 
1
 I wrote this paper in 2012 and 2013 and could not predict such a sequence of events occurring in Ukraine. 
However, I still argue that this corroborates the concept (as shown later) in the paper that Ukraine fits into the 
competitive authoritarian model as its institutions remain weak. I will refer to this later in the paper.  
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design (MDSD) as I will employ a small-N analysis and the cases have similarities. I am 
interested in understanding the dependent variable, which is applicable for MSSD, whereas 
MDSD focuses on the independent variable (Anckar, 2008: 390, 394). In choosing Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, the analysis controls certain variables, by providing similar 
case studies.  
The quantitative section of this investigation uses longitudinal analysis. Longitudinal 
analysis uses a regression model to create time-series data over a designated period. By 
using this research method I can pin-point specific issues and chart processes (Frees, 2004: 
2). I will use data from Freedom House based on Freedom in the World (FitW), Nations in 
Transit (NiT) and Freedom of the Press (FotP). Freedom House has been accused of 
compiling data arbitarily, grouping states together under a single label heading, rather than 
explaining differences between regimes (Giannone, 2010: 69). Ideologically, Freedom House 
has an agenda. Scores for regimes that do not espouse Western values (for instance, 
democracy and human rights) are discriminated against and in the past it has served as 
judge and jury, giving states preferential scores if they are allies of America (Giannone, 
2010: 69, 70, 73-75). Consquently their data can be construed as tainted and this should be 
considered.  
Yet, despite its failings the data is extensive and remains popular among social 
scientists for its broad analysis (Giannone, 2010: 69). Armstrong (2011: 661) contends that 
although Freedom House data has some statistical issues and can be ideologically driven, its 
data is rigorous. It may group disparate and distinctive states together, but in terms of 
statistical analysis, the data is succinct and viable (Armstrong, 2011: 662). In regards the 
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ideological implications of Freedom Houses data, Steiner (2012) contends that academics 
assess Freedom House’s relationship with the American government and so infer that the 
data is somehow tainted. However, evidence for this is at best anecdotal. An analysis of 
Freedom House data over a time period shows that available data often criticises states that 
are considered American allies (Steiner, 2012). In using Freedom House data, I took the 
decision that its comprehensibility and extensive research outweighed the negative issues. 
It remains the most used and inclusive data-set for what I wish to do. I felt that possible 
methodological issues were outweighed by the inclusive data provided.  
THE ARGUMENT FOR AUTHORITARIAN LEARNING AND CONSOLDATION  
How authoritarian regimes consolidate is integral for our understanding of an increasing 
number of political regimes. With alarming alacrity regimes are moving away from Western 
tenets of democracy towards political systems that possess democratic facades, but operate on 
very different political footings to what is considered democratic in existing academic literature. 
By analysing concepts of learning, diffusion and linkage and leverage, I will show how these 
regimes combine learning through dialogue and the use of shared tactics and institution 
building to consolidate authoritarianism. I contend that authoritarian learning is elite driven 
resting on elite dialogue. Ultimately, institutions are built by people and shaped by people’s 
perceptions of society and daily events, but are elite instigated as these groups control the 
state. This is especially pertinent in the FSU where institutions were created in the successor 
states to the Soviet Union. Whilst (as I argue later) these institutions have a democratic facade 
they have been co-opted by regimes to consolidate authoritarianism. Even if a regime were to 
collapse I envisage that existing institutions would hamper any evolution by new elites towards 
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state reform2. Dialogue between elites provides the greatest understanding to authoritarian 
learning. Their interaction allows regimes to share ideas on tactics, institution building, the 
copying of legislation and authoritarian consolidation. This is the study’s perception of the 
concept of authoritarian learning.  
The thesis’s argument is that authoritarian regimes learn from one another. Through 
dialogue these regimes share (and learn) ideas, tactics and institutions for the consolidation 
of authoritarianism. I will show through a discourse analysis that these regimes do use 
similar tactics and institutions for consolidation. From there the study can make the 
argument that if regimes use comparable tactics and institutions then learning must occur. 
It is difficult to prove this, but if enough examples of the same ideas or ways of overcoming 
democratic values are shown then I can infer that learning does transpire. It is unlikely that 
there is any other explanation to describe such events. Dialogue is integral to how these 
regimes consolidate. A similar regime discourse would also illustrate that it is likely they 
learn from one another.  
I will ask a number of research questions. The main being ‘how do authoritarian 
regimes learn to consolidate and if so, do they learn from other examples in their region’? 
This will allow the study to track processes that authoritarian regimes employ to consolidate 
and whether learning techniques are due to diffusion or the linkage and leverage of other 
states. There is increasing literature on the topic, but it is currently fractured and limited in 
scope. I will provide a comprehensive analysis to increase understanding on this subject. 
                                                 
2
 As mentioned I wrote this paper before events in Ukraine. However, I still maintain Kiev will struggle to 
reform. Institutions and elites remain weak and existing institutions will shape the new regime. What will occur 
is a continuation of weak authoritarianism and Kiev maintaining equidistance between Moscow and Brussels.  
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Two sub-research questions provide further contribution to the study and the wider 
literature. The first is ‘why, when and to what extent do regimes learn from one another?’ 
This allows the study to analyse the processes of why regimes take ideas from others and 
when they do this and how far they take examples. The second asks ‘does the regional 
hegemon instigate learning techniques, or is the process multi-linear?’ This analyses 
whether it is the regional hegemon instigating learning techniques leading to learning, or 
whether the regional hegemon learns from others.  
PLAN OF THE THESIS  
In chapter two I will define the meaning of authoritarianism, before analysing 
authoritarian literature and the different typologies within it. This will allow the study to 
highlight that current literature is flawed by placing all authoritarian regimes into a single 
typology of their choice. I will also analyse the wider literature on authoritarianism looking 
at the institutions that exist in authoritarian regimes. I contend that whilst these regimes 
use institutions that appear to be representative and democratic they serve as a 
‘democratic’ facade and provide the regime with a vehicle to provide rents for supporters. I 
argue these institutions are used for this reason.  
Having in chapter two provided an analysis of authoritarianism and the derivatives of 
it, chapter three looks at the concept of authoritarian learning, diffusion, soft power and 
linkage and leverage. I argue that linkage and leverage best explains the concept of 
authoritarian learning. I also provide hypotheses to the longitudinal analysis and discourse 
analysis chapters.  
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Chapter four will analyse a longitudinal analysis of data from Freedom House. This 
will indicate that it is not just this study that argues that the FSU is becoming increasingly 
authoritarian. It is hoped the data will emphasise that existing authoritarian typologies can 
be used, but only to explain a few cases. The FSU states are too dissimilar to be lumped 
together under one typology.  
Chapter five is the core of the thesis and uses discourse analysis. As argued in the 
methodology section, I will use a critical discourse analysis of affiliated newspapers for the 
four cases. The papers being investigated (Sovetskaya Belorusia, Panorama, Vremiya, 
Rossiskaya Gazeta, Izvestiya and Uraydoviy Kurier) will allow the study to ascertain whether 
these regimes have a similar discourse. These newspapers print ministerial speeches and 
government documents so the newspapers echo the ‘voice’ of the regime. To corroborate 
this government websites (Kremlin.ru, president.gov.by, akorda.kz and president.gov.ua) 
will be used to emphasise the discourse of the cases and whether they have a similar 
language. If they use a comparable language then they follow the same precepts, use 
analogous tactics and engage in the same institution building. As this process cannot happen 
without dialogue and some form of learning, I can infer that learning occurs. 
Chapter six is the thesis’s conclusion. It allows the investigation to discuss 
implications of arguments made and indicates potential future studies and analysis. There 
remain gaps in the literature which require additional analysis. Chapter six will also provide 
a synopsis of why the concept of authoritarian learning is relevant and important for 
academic comprehension and why it needs further investigation.  
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CHAPTER TWO: UNDERSTANDING AUTHORITARIANISM AND ITS VARIANTS 
AUTHORITARIAN ADJECTIVES 
Throughout the analysis on authoritarianism I will show similarities and differences 
between the cases. Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan share many comparisons with one 
another but there are fundamental differences, particularly with Belarus. Thus, they cannot 
be considered under the same rubric. There have been various attempts to classify 
authoritarian regimes. Academic literature has debated what an authoritarian regime is and 
whether the authoritarian label can only be given to regimes that share similar 
characteristics. I agree with Svolik’s (2012: 16) conjecture that it is difficult to place all 
regimes under one rubric, which conceptually stretches authoritarianism. Hadenius and 
Teorell (2007: 147) have differentiated between monarchical, personalist and military 
regimes. Yet these categorisations do not adequately explain Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, or 
Ukraine. Other scholars use typologies, like competitive, electoral and hegemonic 
authoritarianism to try to explain authoritarian regimes, without relying (like Hadenius and 
Teorell) on the form of government in each regime. What exists, whilst not perfect 
(Bogaards, 2009: 400; Pleines, 2012: 126; Snyder, 2006: 220), is vague enough to 
accommodate many cases and sufficiently diverse to emphasise stringent differences 
between cases. Existing categorisations allow the study to show differences, aiding 
understanding of authoritarian learning and consolidation. Until new categories are created 
which better explain the pseudo-democratic characteristics of FSU states (Birch, 2011: 704; 
Reuter and Remington, 2009: 508; Gel’man, 2004: 1022), existing categories are applicable. 
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Competitive Authoritarianism 
Competitive authoritarianism analyses the competitiveness of elections. It 
investigates the growing number of regimes that acquiesce in democracy, but control the 
system to “ensure...political survival” (Howard and Roessler, 2006: 365). Elections are not 
truly democratic, but act as a regime façade to maintain power and for the regime to gain 
legitimacy (Easter, 2008: 210). The competitiveness of elections is the pertinent factor that 
distinguishes these regimes from other authoritarian regimes. Elections allow the possibility 
for change, as the regime is less certain of maintaining power as it has not entrenched itself 
(Way, 2004: 143). Whilst elections are held, the regime creates an “uneven playing field” 
allowing it to manipulate democratic principles to keep power and thus consolidate the 
regime (Levitsky and Way, 2012: 30). Such “uneven playing fields” exist in regimes 
transitioning from one-party rule to a new authoritarian form (such as, from the Soviet 
Union, to its successor states) (Levitsky and Way, 2012: 37). Competitive authoritarian 
regimes face the dichotomy of allowing opposition factions room to manoeuvre, whilst 
limiting them to create the stability needed for regime consolidation (Levitsky and Way, 
2005a: 26). I argue that competitive authoritarian regimes have weak political institutions. 
They are unable to control elections, which are competitive enough for the regime to 
plausibly lose control.  
What constitutes a competitive authoritarian regime? It is a government using 
competitive elections, but violating them and the state’s political institutions (Levitsky and 
Way, 2002: 52). The opposition operates and contests elections with the possibility of 
winning, but the regime skews the playing-field to its advantage (Levitsky and Way, 2010: 5). 
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As Levitsky and Way (2002: 53) contend, competitive authoritarian regimes “abuse state 
resources, deny...opposition media coverage, harass opposition...and manipulate...results. 
Journalists, opposition politicians may be spied on, threatened, harassed, or arrested”. The 
major difference between competitive and electoral authoritarian regimes is that 
governments in competitive authoritarian states do not engage in overt electoral fraud, but 
rather manipulate existing institutions (Levitsky and Way, 2002: 53).  
Competitive authoritarianism does not explain many FSU states. For instance, 
Kazakhstan has a more durable authoritarianism (Isaacs, 2010b: 1), making it distinctive 
from existing competitive authoritarian literature. Belarus and Azerbaijan, like Kazakhstan 
are consolidated authoritarian regimes, thus not fitting competitive authoritarian literature 
(Guliyev, 2005: 397). The past two Russian elections (parliamentary and presidential) have 
been marred by electoral fraud and manipulation (Adomanis, 2012), which again does not 
fit into the concept of competitive authoritarianism. Rather this study argues that 
competitive authoritarianism best explains the Georgian, Moldovan and Ukrainian regimes. 
These have elections that are competitive, but where state institutions remain weak enough 
for incumbents to lose power (Way, 2005: 192; Way, 2004: 143-144; Levitsky and Way, 
2005a: 30-31 Bunce and Wolchik, 2010: 44).  
Electoral Authoritarianism 
Electoral authoritarianism incorporates aspects of democracy with authoritarianism, 
contending that authoritarian regimes are not necessarily “less democratic than 
democracies, but plainly undemocratic” (Schedler, 2002: 37). The basis of electoral 
authoritarianism is that the regime holds regular elections, but “they violate the liberal-
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democratic principles of freedom and fairness...profoundly and systematically...to render 
elections instruments of authoritarian rule rather than “instruments of democracy” 
(Schedler, 2006: 3). Electoral authoritarian regimes claim to follow democratic world trends 
(McElhenny, 2004), but they “are minimally pluralist...minimally competitive...and minimally 
open” (Schedler, 2006: 3) and they engage in “manipulation so severe, widespread, and 
systematic that they do not qualify as democratic” (Schedler, 2006: 3). These regimes use 
manipulation, change electoral rules, exclude opposition, infringe rights, restrict media 
access, limit people’s right to vote and redistribute votes (Schedler, 2006: 3). This allows 
elites to maintain power and provide the facade of openness, whilst not allowing elections 
to be competitive. The regime creates institutions to protect incumbency, whilst 
maintaining a facade for “legitimating cover” decreasing “the high costs of repression and 
the grave risks of openness” (Case, 2009: 312).  
Rather than classifying regimes as democratic if they hold elections, it is better to 
monitor those elections, determine how they operate and from there decide whether they 
fit democratic criteria. This will determine whether the state is electorally authoritarian 
according to Morse (2012: 162). Electoral authoritarian regimes imitate democratic 
institutions (constitutions, constitutional courts, legislatures, judiciaries, an independent 
media and civil society) (Schedler, 2010: 70). Electoral authoritarianism not only stops the 
opposition from gaining power, but allows the executive to control the state (Golosov, 2011: 
623). One difficulty with electoral authoritarianism is that some academics include a wide 
range of states, where elections are so constrained they are non-competitive (Morse, 2012: 
165), leading to charges that electoral authoritarianism is a catch-all term. I wish to address 
this issue, by limiting the number of states that can be analysed under electoral 
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authoritarianism. Indeed, scholars of electoral authoritarianism have established 
distinctions between facade elections and elections that allow some competition (Morse, 
2012: 165). I view an electoral authoritarian regime as one with competitive but heavily 
manipulated elections. In the FSU, I argue that Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Russia are electoral 
authoritarian regimes. Elections are marginally competitive, but the regime uses 
manipulation to maintain power.  
Hegemonic Authoritarianism 
The basic understanding of a hegemonic authoritarian regime is that it is stable and 
there is little competition. Elections are a formality (Un, 2011: 546). The basis of what 
constitutes a democracy “have been severely curtailed while periodic elections have been 
maintained” (Un, 2011: 547). As hegemonic authoritarian regimes do not use elections for 
legitimacy, the state finds other ways for gaining legitimacy. The regime keeps civil society 
and NGOs weak, curbing possibilities for the populace to unite and protest against it (Sim, 
2006: 148, 150-151). Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have created parties of power that aid in 
the consolidation of a hegemonic authoritarian regime (Bader, 2011: 189). Nur Otan 
(Kazakhstan) with its coalition (the Civic Party and the Agrarian Party) holds 88% of the 98 
seats in parliament (Ziegler, 2010: 808). YAP dominates Azerbaijani politics (Reuter and 
Remington, 2009: 504). In contrast, the Kremlin party of power (United Russia) is not a 
hegemonic party. It does not unite competing elites and resolve conflicts (Robinson, 2012: 
306). Even though the Kremlin created a party to win elections (Roberts, 2012: 228) it was 
unable to dominate at the last parliamentary elections (2011) (March, 2012: 242). It is 
possible that United Russia could become a hegemonic party (Reuter, 2010: 293-294), but 
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with the possible rise of the All-Russia People’s Front, United Russia’s days may be 
numbered (Tsoi et al, 2013: 1). The All-Russia People’s Front is a Kremlin inspired proto-
political party attempting “to unite people across the ideological spectrum” (Nechepurenko, 
2013). As Putin stated "the People's Front is to give everyone a way to create...a great 
country, a great Russia...we are ready to work with everybody who shares our goals" 
(Nechepurenko, 2013). Howard and Roessler (2006: 368) argue that a hegemonic regime 
should receive over 70% of the vote in a presidential election.  By analysing electoral data 
from the last FSU presidential elections, I determine that Azerbaijan (Aliyev-88.8%), Belarus 
(Lukaschenka-80%), Kazakhstan (Nazarbayev-95.6%) and Turkmenistan 
(Berdymukhammedov-89.2%) all in a hegemonic authoritarian rubric (Azerbaijan Elections 
Website, 2008; State Electoral Commission of Belarus, 2010; Kazakhstan Election 
Commission Website, 2011; Turkmenistan Government Website, 2007). Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan have been placed in this category too; neither has had an election of any meaning 
(Carr, 2013a; 2013b).  
To provide clarity to the research question ‘how do authoritarian regimes learn to 
consolidate and if so, do they learn from other examples in their region’ and the sub-
research questions ‘why, when and to what extent do regimes learn from one another’ and 
‘does the regional hegemon instigate learning techniques, or is the process multi-linear’ I 
will use a literature review. Having assessed the derivatives of electoral, competitive and 
hegemonic authoritarianism I wish to provide a synopsis of wider authoritarian literature 
and institutions that exist in these regimes. This will allow the reader to comprehend 
differences among FSU authoritarian regimes.   
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AUTHORITARIANISM 
A literature review will provide a better comprehension of authoritarianism and how 
these regimes use democratic institutions to create democratic facades, which will aid in 
comprehension of how regimes consolidate and learn from other regimes. However, I argue 
that authoritarian regimes use these institutions, partially as a democratic facade but mostly 
to give supporters access to resources thus helping regime consolidation. Literature on 
authoritarianism has started to gain notoriety not only on the FSU, but also in other regions. 
Yet, it remains an understudied topic. Existing literature will provide understanding on 
authoritarianism, letting the study show how the four cases use their political systems and 
institutions to maintain power. To really provide a comprehensive analysis of how 
authoritarian regimes operate, I will analyse: political parties, elections, parliament, media, 
civil society, the economy, coercion and the personalisation of power. I feel these will 
provide a comprehensive analysis of authoritarianism. Understanding how authoritarian 
regimes operate and where the four cases fit inside the wider literature on authoritarianism 
is important. These sections will help form the basis for the variables used in the discourse 
analysis in chapter four.  
In defining authoritarianism, I use Linz’s (1964: 297) definition that authoritarian 
regimes “are...systems with limited...political pluralism...without intensive or extensive 
political mobilisation...and in which a leader exercises power within formally ill-defined 
limits but actually quite predictable ones”. This is in contrast to the definition provided by 
Svolik (2012: 16), that authoritarian regimes are not democracies. Svolik (2012: 16) argues 
that any regime is authoritarian if it ceases “to be a democracy the moment a few key 
31 
 
mechanisms - especially electoral rules and the respect of certain liberties – are 
circumvented, even non-violently”. This definition runs into three conceptual problems. 
Firstly, saying that authoritarian regimes are those that are undemocratic, pits states as 
diverse as North Korea and Moldova together under the same rubric. Secondly, saying what 
something is does not help conceptualise what it is not. Thirdly, as McFaul (2010: 4) 
contends, scholars are still unsure about what constitutes democracy. Using democracy, 
which is also hard to define as a classification of authoritarianism is not adequate. Linz 
(1964: 297) provides a sufficient understanding for authoritarianism. Authoritarian regimes 
are different to ideological totalitarian regimes like North Korea, China, Laos, Cuba and 
Vietnam (Dimitrov, 2013: 3). As remarked on in chapter one, I argue that totalitarian 
regimes espouse an ideology (Schedler, 2013: 48), whereas authoritarian regimes are not 
ideologically driven. 
 I am not concerned with grouping disparate authoritarian regimes together, to 
ascertain which type (monarchical, military, or personal) they fit within, or where 
authoritarian regimes spring from (Geddes, 1999a; 1999b; Hadenius and Teorell, 2007). 
Rather, I wish to ascertain institutions in authoritarian regimes to explain how the 
Belarusian, Kazakh, Russian and Ukrainian regimes manage to share tactics, learn from one 
another and in three cases (Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia) consolidate. I am interested in 
analysing the concept of authoritarian regime type and its different manifestations (as 
mentioned previously). 
 As all FSU regimes hold elections I will classify them like Hadenius and Teorell (2007: 
147) under the rubric of “electoral regimes”. Within this variable there is the classification of 
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“limited multiparty regimes”. I contend that this explains three cases, with the exception of 
Belarus (referred to later). This classification fits into the debate on typologies of 
authoritarianism. However, the literature contends that authoritarian “electoral regimes” 
are more susceptible to collapse. The institutions of parliament and elections can lead to 
democratisation so these authoritarian regimes are considered to be weak (Hadenius and 
Teorell, 2007: 150; Levitsky and Way, 2002: 59). I make the contention that; whilst 
authoritarian institutions appear democratic (to fit the democratic paradigm) the real use of 
these institutions (elections, political parties and legislatures) is for the regime to bestow 
patronage on regime supporters tying them to its success. Thus, the regime creates them 
for this purpose. In the FSU, the regimes copy (to an extent) Soviet institutions which 
claimed to be democratic, but rather consolidated authoritarianism and provided benefits 
for supporters (Gel’man, 2012: 298).  
If authoritarian regimes that use democratic institutions are weak then why have the 
FSU states not collapsed in over twenty years? Increasingly as Hadenius and Teorell (2007) 
note, more authoritarian regimes espouse democratic norms. Kratsev (2011: 10) rightly 
contends that, although authoritarian regimes use democratic language and institutions, 
they are not becoming weaker. The creation of a political party in an authoritarian regime 
bestows legitimacy on the regime from the publics perspective, tying elites to regime 
survival through patron-client ties (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007: 1283; Brownlee, 2007: 3). I 
have already referred to the concepts I will investigate to provide an intricate understanding 
of authoritarianism and comprehension on FSU authoritarianism.  
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Political Parties 
Authoritarian regimes when creating a political party, or multi-party system, allow 
the regime to provide supporters with access to resources and power, thus entrenching 
support. In authoritarian regimes political parties serve as vehicles of regime patronage, co-
opting other factions and curbing the possibility for other elites to usurp power (Bader, 
2009: 110). FSU political parties serve as voices for their leaders, in what Wilson and Birch 
(2008: 54) term “small-scale political vanity, fanaticism, and whimsy, which have generated 
a penumbra of tiny ‘divan’ or ‘taxi’ parties”. This is particularly prevalent in Kazakhstan 
where existing parties are centred on elites, rather than on ideology (Isaacs, 2008: 382). In 
Ukraine, political parties exist to promote oligarch interests. Deputies have little loyalty to 
their party. If parties do not provide them with power they abandon them for others that do 
offer benefits (Kuzio, 2012b: 433). The creation of political parties by authoritarian regimes 
bestows legitimacy on the incumbent and allows regimes to co-opt other political parties, 
offering them the choice of some benefits, or shutting them out of the system (Gandhi and 
Przeworski, 2007: 1283). It is a further way to rut the already uneven playing field. FSU 
regimes have created clone parties, copying symbols and policies of existing opposition 
parties (Wilson, 2002: 91-98; Birch, 2003: 526). This has been particularly so in Ukraine.  
Alternatively, regimes create parties to fill the ideological spectrum and to drain 
votes from existing parties. The Kremlin uses this method against the Communist and 
Yabloko parties (Torochesnikova, 2007). United Russia serves as a vast patronage system, 
providing clients with access to huge resources. As the Kremlin does not espouse an 
ideology, it uses United Russia to accommodate ideologically disparate factions (Way, 2010: 
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246-247). United Russia allows the Kremlin to control the federal (and regional) legislatures 
and has party branches throughout Russia, serving as the mechanism for ‘get out the vote’ 
campaigns (Gill, 2012: 461). Political parties exist to enable the regime to mobilise different 
areas of the electorate. By creating political parties to represent society, the regime can 
both control society and parliament (White and Kryshtanovskaya, 2011: 574). The creation 
of a multi-party political system is just one means that authoritarian regimes use to 
maintain power. The outlier is Belarus; Lukashenka does not have party affiliation or a party 
serving as a vehicle to get supporters into power (Pospieszna, 2014: 3-4). The authorities 
deregister or close down opposition parties on spurious charges, such as changing the law 
on party membership, allowing insufficient time to change to new legislation and then 
banning all parties who fail to adjust (Silitski, 2008). There are six pro-regime political 
parties, but these play a negligible role in the political system, unlike the systemic 
opposition in Russia (Pospieszna, 2014: 4).  
Elections 
To comprehend further aspects of the uneven playing field, I will analyse electoral 
systems in authoritarian regimes. Authoritarian regimes use elections to legitimate the 
regime among the populace. Elections also allow the opposition a vehicle for some 
competition, but within the regime’s control, rather than outside as a non-systemic 
opposition. Whilst, it gives the opposition a voice, the regime stops “short of rotating power 
or allowing fair elections that would risk their secure tenure in office” (Brownlee, 2007: 6).  
In the FSU, elections, like parliaments and political parties exist as Potemkin 
institutions (Fisun, 2012: 93). Silitski (2010a: 278) posits that FSU regimes have turned 
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elections into a “carnival” to make the process appealing for the public. Nazarbayev calls the 
ballot a “colour coded” electoral campaign. Elections are used by authoritarian regimes to 
gain legitimacy and co-opt other political parties (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007: 1283, 1291; 
Brownlee, 2007: 9). The Kremlin has created an electoral system, allowing the regime to 
maintain control through electoral fraud, stuffing ballot boxes, miscalculating votes and 
providing United Russia and Putin, (or Medvedev) near total media coverage (Krastev and 
Holmes, 2012: 34). Yet, the Kremlin allows some competition and indecision in the results to 
show that elections were, at least, nominally competitive (White, 2011b: 537). This is the 
case in Belarus. But, the Belarusian authorities often turn off communication access for the 
populace (Silitski, 2010a: 285). Elections help divide state resources among the regime’s 
supporters, keeping the regime competitive (Krastev and Holmes, 2012: 36).  
Elections are important ways to test new tactics to uneven the electoral playing field 
further. If regimes do not use elections to learn new tactics, then they may not be able to 
placate demonstrators in the future. Elections allow the regime to ascertain how effective 
regional elites are. If they cannot return victory for the ruling party then they are ineffectual 
and need replacing (Kratsev and Holmes, 2012: 36-38). Even in Ukraine, the 2006 and 2007 
elections under the ‘Orange coalition’ still returned many examples of electoral malpractice 
(Lukinova et al, 2011: 42). Different political factions compete for prominence across the 
FSU. During the Belarusian presidential election (2006), most opposition factions suffered 
the arrest of prominent leaders (Marples, 2006: 352). The Belarusian regime controls media 
access using it to get its message across and limiting opposition voices (Marples, 2006: 358; 
Forbrig et al, 2006: 11). It has made elections highly uncompetitive (Silitski, 2006b: 21). 
Manipulation means authoritarian regimes do not to need to worry about election night, as 
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elections are a foregone conclusion (Silitski, 2009a: 42). Electoral fraud and malpractice 
occur throughout the FSU, but have been perfected in Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus 
(Bader, 2013: 525). Regimes make sure that the uneven playing field is not just uneven, but 
as Krastev and Holmes (2012: 35) contend about the Kremlin, it has “gone further and 
cordoned off the stadium’s entrances and exits”.  
Parliaments 
As mentioned previously, most authoritarian regimes use democratic institutions to 
maintain the facade that their state is democratic, or transitioning to democracy (Wahman 
et al, 2013: 21; Kollner and Kailitz, 2013: 6). Authoritarian regimes manipulate the political 
and electoral systems to maintain regime pre-eminence through electoral fraud, creating 
political parties to counter opposition. The construction of these institutions allows the 
regime to distribute patronage to supporters. Parliament is another institution that has 
been usurped of its democratic meaning and exists in authoritarian regimes for supporters 
to voice some form of dissent. However, this is largely controlled by the regime through 
rents. As the example of Kazakhstan emphasises, parliament has become a rubber stamp 
institution (Starr, 2006: 6).  
As mentioned, authoritarian regimes manipulate elections so that the party of power 
consistently wins. Legislatures exist to pass required legislation, allowing regimes to co-opt 
opposition, bribing them with a modicum of power and access to resources. Legislatures 
allow the regime to dispense rents and promote supporters. Like elections and political 
parties, parliaments serve as another form of regime legitimation. Yet, the most important 
aspect of creating a parliament is the opportunity to distribute patronage (Blaydes, 2008). 
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Ukraine’s parliament, although not perfect, allows the opposition to debate and bring the 
government to account. This is the opposite of the Belarusian parliament, which has no 
leverage over Lukashenka (Astapenia, 2013; Rontoyanni and Korosteleva, 2005: 210). The 
creation of an upper house of presidential appointees significantly weakened the Belarusian 
legislature, but the reduction of the number of seats in the lower house and an opposition 
boycott made parliamentary deputies regime place-men, making it a rubber stamp 
institution (Rontoyanni and Korosteleva, 2005: 211; Silitski, 2010a: 282-283). In contrast 
after the Ukrainian parliamentary elections (2012), Party of Regions consistently faced 
opposition protests and was unable to pass legislation (Haran, 2013: 2).  
Compared with Ukraine’s (relatively) competitive legislature and its moribund 
equivalent in Belarus, the Russian State Duma appears similar to Ukraine, but in reality is 
closer to Belarus’s legislature. This is because at first glance the State Duma has four 
political parties. However, United Russia dominates the lower house and two of the three 
other parties (A Just Russia and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia) tend to vote with 
United Russia (Stoner-Weiss, 2010: 264), making Russia’s parliament effectively obsolete. 
United Russia has enough seats to pass legislation without needing to rely on other parties, 
but the regime controls United Russia to effectively reduce the State Duma to a rubber 
stamp institution (Roberts, 2012: 228). As United Russia is the dominant party in the State 
Duma it has control of most committees and leadership positions, allowing it to control the 
parliament and dispense patronage to supporters (Roberts, 2012: 229). As it dominates 
regional parliaments too United Russia allows the Kremlin to effectively control both the 
national parliament and its regional equivalents (Roberts, 2012: 231). A Just Russia and the 
Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia have a discourse of regime rhetoric failing to 
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counterbalance United Russia. Both act as a “quasi-opposition at best” (White, 2011: 658). 
As remarked on, the Russian and Ukrainian regimes have divided the opposition in various 
ways by creating clone parties in Ukraine and filling the ideological field leeching votes from 
non-systemic parties in Russia (Bader, 2009: 101). As advocated here, parliaments are not 
created to give legitimacy (although it helps). Rather, FSU parliaments bind elites through 
patron-client ties (Fisun, 2012: 92). Parliaments allow opposition to voice concerns in a 
carefully contrived environment. For these reasons Putin will maintain the State Duma, 
elections and a (relatively) free media (Gill, 2012: 467).   
Media 
With regards to the Belarusian regime, Minsk controls access to media, affecting 
how the opposition operates (Marples, 2006: 358; Forbrig et al, 2006: 11). However, it is not 
just an issue that affects the Belarusian regime. Authoritarian regimes routinely attempt to 
control the domestic media. Dissenting voices appearing in the public domain could erode 
the regime as the only source of information and affect its legitimacy (Stockman and 
Gallagher, 2011: 437). Authoritarian regimes control media outlets, either through the state, 
or through affiliates, directing information and preventing elite defection and alternative 
sources of information (Walker and Ortung, 2014: 71). Throughout the FSU, most editors 
and journalists are aware that if they write or speak out against the regime they will face 
sanctions. So they engage in self-censorship (Oates, 2007: 1286). By controlling the media, 
authoritarian regimes control the narrative and use media for regime promotion. This 
occurs predominately in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, but also in Ukraine (Walker and 
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Ortung, 2014: 71-72). Media control allows authoritarian regimes to promote their ideology 
and quashes alternative values before they become relevant (Walker and Ortung, 2014: 72).  
During the 2011-2012 protests, Russian media used three strategies to regulate 
alternative messages. Firstly, the media praised governors who arrested demonstrators. 
Secondly, opposition groups were portrayed as intent on destabilising the state and thirdly, 
the media aired entertainment shows (such as, Dom-2), reducing the likelihood of mass 
protests. The regime hoped people would rather watch television than protest (Walker and 
Ortung, 2014: 75). Russian media covers news about Putin, Medvedev and to a lesser extent 
United Russia (Stockman and Gallagher, 2011: 437-438). This is also the case in Kazakhstan, 
where the media lauds the achievements of Nazarbayev (Kenny and Gross, 2008: 518). The 
Kremlin, fearing the internet allows Russians to access uncontrolled information, has limited 
access to various alternative news websites (Gerber, 2013: 1-2). It prefers to air scripted 
shows, such as the Presidential phone-in, which does not allow for unscripted questions 
(Orttung and Walker, 2012). The Belarusian situation is similar. Most media is controlled by 
the state or regime associates and recent laws have further stifled the media. Publications 
with a distribution of over 300 copies need to register with the authorities and those with 
less must send five copies to the Ministry of Information for approval, before distribution 
(Aliaksandrau and Bastunets, 2014b). This is in contrast to Ukraine where media is split 
between state and privately owned groups. This means that disparate political factions get 
their voice heard (Ryabinska, 2011: 6). 
The Belarusian authorities have placed websites deemed by the regime to 
undermine the state on black lists. They force internet providers to have Belarusian domain 
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names. Internet providers must monitor what is viewed by each client and set-up systems 
for operative investigative actions (SORM). This data provides information on websites 
which can be viewed by the security services (Aliaksandrau and Bastunets, 2014b). Like the 
Kremlin, which controls most television media as most Russian’s get news from television 
(Gehlbach, 2010: 78), the Belarusian authorities do the same for the same reason. Minsk 
makes life difficult for independent newspaper media. By controlling printing access it keeps 
printing costs artificially high for these outlets (Aliaksandrau and Bastunets, 2014a). The 
Kremlin forced resignations of journalists at lenta.ru, after pressuring them for adverse 
reporting over the broadcasting of the Ukrainian protests. It constrained cable providers to 
terminate the airing of Dozhd (rain) TV (an opposition channel) (Krainova, 2014; Ryzhkov, 
2014). Russian state control of the media correlates with the regime’s attempts to control 
other sectors of society (Orttung and Walker, 2013: 2).  
Opposition 
Throughout this section, I have shown that authoritarian regimes are averse to losing 
power. So they create an uneven playing field when contesting elections, by using 
democratic institutions to limit opportunities for the opposition. Authoritarian regimes (as 
in the FSU) create systemic opposition parties to support the regime, acting as an 
opposition-lite. Regimes try to split the opposition. A united opposition makes it exceedingly 
difficult for a regime to maintain power, even through violence (Howard, 2006: 371). 
Authoritarian regimes harass opposition groups, abuse state resources, use the media for 
propagandistic purposes and engage in electoral fraud, to limit the functionality of the non-
systemic opposition. As Levitsky and Way (2002: 53) contest “members of the opposition 
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may be jailed, exiled, or—less frequently—even assaulted or murdered”. Authoritarian 
regimes expend great effort curbing the opposition’s ability to get its messages across 
(Geddes and Zaller, 1989: 344). In the FSU the media has become a mouthpiece for regimes. 
Political parties, parliaments and the media help regimes keep the systemic opposition in 
check. By using the media to emphasise that opposition does exist and denying media time 
to the non-systemic opposition, regimes can confuse the populace about alternatives (Lai 
and Slater, 2006: 115). If need be the regime can outlaw the opposition, claiming they want 
to overthrow the state. Consequently, the regime claims they exist to protect the populace 
(Geddes, 2006: 7). Authoritarian regimes often claim the opposition is a fifth column, or an 
‘other’ (Lai and Slater, 2006: 117). Another option is to ban political parties’ outright, 
stopping opposition from coalescing around common issues (Schedler, 2002: 43). To an 
extent this occurs in Belarus. The opposition have political parties, but elections are so 
contrived that members of the Belarusian parliament, (technically), are independents. Yet, 
most regimes co-opt opposition, dangling opportunities of resource access whilst 
demanding regime support (Svolik, 2009: 493; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007: 1280).  
In Kazakhstan there is the systemic, semi-systemic and non-systemic opposition. The 
Kazakh regime co-opts opposition activists by denying their political party access to the 
political field (through the high 7% parliamentary threshold), but allowing them access to 
resources for regime support (Bowyer, 2008: 14). The Russian State Duma also uses this high 
threshold to prohibit opposition parties from accessing resources (Stoner-Weiss, 2010: 265; 
White 2011: 673). The Russian Communist party is a semi-opposition trying to change 
Kremlin policy on certain issues, without opposing the system (March, 2002: 232-234). Yet, 
the Kremlin’s creation of parties (for instance, A Just Russia) to split the communist vote has 
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limited it to a lone voice surrounded by pro-Kremlin influences (Gel’man, 2005: 235). A Just 
Russia operates as another vehicle for the Kremlin to control parliament and help limit 
opposition voices, whilst serving as a state controlled opposition (White, 2011: 673). Unlike 
the Kazakh regime, the Kremlin does not (with the exception of splitting the communist 
vote) use political parties to dupe the electorate. Rather, Kremlin-created parties tend to 
channel opposition into controllable sources; serving as alternatives should United Russia 
fail as a political vehicle (March, 2009: 505, 513-515). Within the Russian State Duma the 
opposition represents different levels of closeness to the regime (Bacon, 2012: 106). Regime 
legislation has made it difficult for smaller parties to operate, thus stabilising the political 
system (White, 2012: 211). Like March (2012: 242), I argue that Russia has an ‘opposition’, 
rather than an opposition. Routinely the Belarusian and Russian authorities starve 
opposition parties of funds, making their ability to function difficult (Way, 2010: 237). The 
Belarusian authorities have limited “political space” pressurising the opposition and 
“discouraging citizen participation in...political life” leading to a weak opposition (Borowska, 
2013a). In contrast to Ukraine, Russia has become a non-democratic system, as party 
competition has declined (Gel’man, 2008: 914-915). However, the Ukrainian opposition 
suffers, like its Russian and Belarusian counterparts, from factionalism (Kedelia, 2012).  
Civil Society 
The analysis so far has inferred that the FSU regimes do not countenance loss of 
state control. Thus, they do not allow the operation of an independent civil society. I will 
now assess civil society in the FSU and how these regimes counter, or co-opt, these factions. 
Since the 1990s regimes have been adept at playing on people’s apathy. Lukashenka, for 
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instance, has been particularly skilful in this, claiming that the state should be the primary 
source for making people’s lives better (Howard, 2002: 164). This discourse plays on a larger 
fear among authoritarian regimes that should civil society be allowed to fully operate, it will 
become a strenuous independent voice (Howard, 2002: 165).  
Throughout the FSU, authoritarian regimes have tightened controls through 
legislation on the remit of NGOs. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia have drafted recently more 
prohibitive legislation (Maher, 2013). Since the ‘colour revolutions’, which the FSU regimes 
perceived as (partially) led by NGOs, they have restricted the remit of independent NGOs by 
limiting their functionality (Silitski, 2010c: 342). In Belarus, Lukashenka has set about 
eradicating the small civil society that existed prior to his taking power (Silitski, 2010a: 286; 
Marples, 2007: 65). Under Putin the regime has clamped down on civil society, equating 
these organisations with vehicles to precipitate demonstrations (Kramer and Shevtsova, 
2012). Putin has stated that NGOs should be involved in society but they should not be 
involved in politics. The regime determines what is political, limiting the remit of NGOs 
(Makarychev, 2008a: 63). Both Belarusian and Russian regimes use Government Organised 
Non-Governmental Organisations (GONGOs). These imitate civil society organisations but 
are regime controlled (Richter, 2013: 2; Marin, 2012: 20). Javeline and Lindemann-
Komarova (2008: 1-5) have argued that the Kremlin does provide support for NGOs and 
funds an array of organisations. Like Richter (2008: 4-5; 2013: 1-5) I contend that Putin has 
created NGOs for his own purposes. New legislation allows NGOs to be accused of treason 
for working with, or receiving funding from foreign states, or international organisations 
(Richter, 2013: 3).  
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The Economy 
I am less concerned about understanding how the economy operates in 
authoritarian regimes here, but rather whether it is controlled to the benefit of the regime. 
Way (2010: 230) argues that if a regime has well funded security forces, a hegemonic 
political party and control over its economy, its survival is practically assured. By controlling 
the economy and relying on state companies, authoritarian regimes can fire workers for 
infringements, such as, demonstrating against the regime (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009: 
412). By managing welfare access and the economy, authoritarian regimes extract rents 
distributing these to supporters. Liberalisation is not considered viable. It would mean the 
loss of regime control over the economy and welfare systems (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009: 
415). A large public sector enables the regime to dole out positions to supporters. This is the 
case with Belarus, where Lukashenka’s control of the economy provides him with legitimacy 
in the public’s view, allowing him to garner support by providing positions for supporters 
(Way, 2010: 249). If businesses wish to function in Belarus then the regime can claim rents 
from them to ensure survival (Greene, 2009: 813).  
Some authoritarian regimes (mostly hegemonic) are able to control the economy 
and survive most economic crises through providing supporters with rents. They will 
preserve the regime to maintain their control (Gandhi and Reuter, 2007: 8). The Belarusian 
regime has survived crises by selling state assets and forcing elites to stop rent seeking (for a 
time), to alleviate economic problems (Dudko, 2012; Tsikhanovich, 2012). Nazarbayev has 
devalued the Tenge (Kazakhstan’s currency) on occasions, but has remained popular 
(Boulegue, 2014; Isaacs, 2010a: 20). Wright (2008: 322) argues that authoritarian regimes 
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rely on the economy to shore up control. Yet, if the state controls the economy, then surely 
it has the resources to buy off supporters? The Belarusian and Russian regimes control their 
respectives economies and so do not rely on marginal supporters of the regime. Unlike 
Ukraine they have not suffered from competitive institutions (Way, 2010: 237). Lukashenka, 
claims that the Belarusian economy is a collective farm “Belarus is a small country and 
should be managed from a single centre like a good production collective” (Feduta, 2005: 
109). Through the creation of a presidential fund, Lukashenka has bought off opposition, 
giving resources to supporters (Way, 2010: 250). The regime has created a state-run 
economy and thus controls employee jobs. If employees of state-run enterprises are caught 
demonstrating they face unemployment, or in most cases demotion and wage freezes 
(Silitski, 2005b: 92; Frear, 2012: 23). As Gandhi and Przeworski (2006: 18) state, 
authoritarian regimes with large mineral deposits are less prone to compromise with other 
elites. The Kremlin’s support is largely homogenous. A relatively small cadre of elites have 
been able to monopolise the economy (Stoner-Weiss, 2010: 254).  
Coercion 
Academic literature mostly argues that authoritarian regimes rely on violent 
coercion (Nathan, 2003: 6). Leaders in authoritarian regimes are never certain that they are 
secure, thus they are forced “to continually prevent, detect, and contain threats to their 
hold on power” (Schedler, 2013: 21). To paraphrase Hobbes and as the ‘Arab Spring’ has 
represented, the life of a dictator is nasty, brutish and (often) short. 
  As I have shown here, authoritarian regimes have other means to maintain and 
consolidate power. Contrary to the view advocated by George (2005: 3), I do not assert that 
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coercion is anything the regime uses to maintain power. Of course changing the political 
system, parliament, the media, dominating civil society and opposition and controlling the 
economy are means of coercion, but I will only analyse violent coercion. Coercion is very 
much an important aspect of the apparatus of an authoritarian regime. As Way (2010: 230) 
claimed in the previous section, an integral aspect of an authoritarian regime’s chances of 
survival depends on a well equipped and funded security service. Nevertheless, coercion 
remains a very expensive means to keep the populace down. Authorities naturally prefer 
less costly means to keep the peace (Gobel, 2010: 177). I argue that authoritarian regimes 
do not like using coercion to remain in power. Vladislav Surkov (Kremlin aide) states that 
Russia is “shifting from coercion to persuasion, from repression to cooperation, and from 
hierarchies to horizontal links” and the regime will use “persuasion technologies” and 
refrain from coercion (Surkov, 2006a; 2006b; Oreshkin, 2012: 5).  
If an authoritarian regime does not have effective security services then it is open to 
potential protests (Bellin, 2004: 43). Authoritarian regimes need to have the perceived 
ability (by their populace) of having effective coercive capabilities (Bellin, 2004: 145). In 
Russia the regime has limited the ccurrence of protest rallies to occur and has used media to 
praise the regime, thus lowering the need for state coercion. People are too apathetic and 
risk averse for the regime to need significant coercive tools to deal with protest (Lyall, 2006: 
388). Violent coercion is used more by military or monarchical regimes, which are 
susceptible to viewing the world with a zero-sum remit and will more willlingly use violence 
to maintain power (Fjelde, 2010: 196; Lai and Slater, 2006: 118). Of course violent coercion 
is used across the FSU. However, excessive coercion leads to international consternation. 
Understandably authoritarian regimes are loath to use it (Lachapelle et al, 2012: 5).  
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Whilst FSU regimes are wary of using too much overt repression, if the regime feels 
threatened it will coerce opposition factions (Gel’man, 2013: 6). Having said this, the 
coercive apparatus that the Kremlin has at its disposal is limited. The Kremlin has found it 
difficult to maintain coercion throughout Russia. Security services are close to Moscow and 
St. Petersburg, as the regime feels these are the most likely cities for mass protest (Hanson, 
2007: 72). The Belarusian regime follows a similar line to the Kremlin that coercion would 
inflame an issue. Whilst the Belarusian regime makes life challenging for the opposition on 
occassion, it does not use overt coercion to maintain legitimacy (Korosteleva, 2012: 43, 47). 
This is largely true, but after 2010, it cracked down on opposition (White, 2011a: 800).3 
Although FSU regimes do not like to use overt repression they have done so previously. 
Violence like in Armenia, Uzbekistan and to a lesser extent Kazakhstan has occurred 
(Mkrtchyan, 2011; Levitsky and Way, 2010: 45; Aimbetova, 2012c).  
Leader Popularity 
The perceived legitimacy of a leader helps the public observe the regime as 
legitimate, than they are more willing to support it. An authoritarian leader can alternatively 
manipulate institutions (like the media) to portray a sense of legitimacy and support among 
the populace (Egorov and Sonin, 2012: 2). Yet, an incumbent’s loss of legitimacy does more 
damage to a regime than anything else (Brownlee, 2007: 48). So if regimes lose authority, 
consolidation becomes impossible. It is, therefore, important to preserve legitimacy.    
                                                 
3
 Events in Ukraine have shown that regimes willingly use coercion when faced with mass protest (Traynor and 
Walker, 2014), but this is outside this paper’s remit.  
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There is certainly some sense to this, but the leaders of FSU regimes appear to have 
a large legitimacy pool among their populaces. Lukashenka and Nazarbayev as ‘father’s’ of 
their nations need to have overwhelming support. Electoral fraud serves to inflate the 
conceived mirage of popularity (Egorov and Sonin, 2012: 2) even though Lukashenka is 
popular among Belarusians for stability and economic development (Liuhto et al, 2009: 65). 
The economic crisis has affected Lukashenka’s reputation, but Belarusians consider the 
opposition worse, so Lukashenka’s popularity is high (Frear, 2012: 23). Though Nazarbayev 
has been accused of corruption, stealing elections and human rights abuses, he remains 
popular with Kazakhs for improving their lives (Koch, 2013b: 27; Koch, 2013a: 112). The 
popularity of Putin is nearly as high as Lukashenka and Nazarbayev, bestowing legitimacy on 
the Kremlin (Treisman, 2008: 1). Like Lukashenka and Nazarbayev, Putin’s popularity is 
based on creating stability and wealth (Aron, 2007: 2). The economic upswing occuring in 
Putin’s first term is seen by Russians as Putin’s doing. This helps explain his continued 
popularity (White and McAllister, 2008: 622). Ukrainian governments have found it difficult 
to maintain legitimacy amongst disparate groups, limiting how the state functions. 
Ukrainian politicians tend to represent different groups and there has been no ‘father of the 
nation’ (with the possible exception of Kravchuk), so Ukrainian governments have lacked 
legitimacy across all sectors of society (Haran, 2010: 4).  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have attempted to explain the intricacies of authoritarianism, 
contending that there are three authoritarian adjectives: competitive, electoral and 
hegemonic. I then assessed in-depth the minutae of authoritarianism, using the examples of 
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the four case studies (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine), to emphasise how these fit 
into the literature on authoritarianism. I used certain variables: elections, political parties, 
the media, opposition, coercion, leadership capabilities, civil society, the executive and the 
legislature which I feel help explain authoritarianism. These also link with the variables that 
will be used with the discourse analysis in chapter five. Chapter two provided an 
understanding of authoritarianism helping offer the argument that the different FSU 
authoritarian regimes do not fit into one rubric, but rather each authoritarian adjective 
explains only a few cases. This is the basis of the argument that I make in chapter four on 
longitudinal analysis. On top of this it allows the reader to understand the basic 
underpinnings of authoritarian institutions and where the case studies fit in the wider 
literature. I was able to make the contention that authoritarian regimes use 
democraticesque institutions not so much to portray a facade of democracy, but to allow 
supporters access to rents thus preserving the legitimacy and support of the regime.  
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CHAPTER THREE: AUTHORITARIAN LEARNING  
This chapter provides additional analysis of authoritarian learning to further 
understanding on this key topic. I will assess literatures on diffusion, linkage and leverage 
and soft power. I advocate that linkage and leverage and soft power explain authoritarian 
learning. Diffusion has certain failings in adequately analysing authoritarian learning. Its 
main deficiency is its short-termism in comprehending events. I feel linkage and leverage is 
a more adequate theoretical concept for understanding authoritarian learning. Soft power 
also helps comprehension of authoritarian learning. If other states perceive that a state has 
a viable model they will likely copy legislation, ideas, tactics, concepts, values and 
institutions from it. If that state is authoritarian then through soft power it can ‘coerce’ 
others into adhering to an authoritarian model. I will provide the theoretical comprehension 
of what I consider authoritarian learning.  
This leads into the sub-research question ‘does the regional hegemon instigate 
learning techniques, or is the process multi-linear?’ To asess whether the regional hegemon 
instigates authoritarian learning and coerces other states to authoritarianism, I will assess 
Russia’s linkage and leverage and soft power with other FSU states. Russia as the successor 
state to the Soviet Union is commonly considered the regional hegemon. However, to 
understand the sub-research question ‘does the regional hegemon instigate learning 
techniques, or is the process multi-linear’ I will analyse the counter revolution that has been 
instigated across the FSU. This was prompted by FSU regimes against the ‘colour 
revolutions’ in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004) and against future ‘revolutions’ from 
occurring. The preventative counter revolution is important to understanding the intricacies 
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of the tactics, institutions and legislation that regimes share and for grasping the details of 
these regime’s learning processes. I will investigate the linkage and leverage Russia has with 
the other cases to analyse whether the regional hegemon instigates authoritarian learning 
and authoritarianism. At the end of the chapter I will provide hypotheses for chapters four 
and five which will further comprehend the study’s research questions.  
DIFFUSION 
There are two types of diffusion. Norm diffusion is a process by which values are 
conceptualised as important. These concepts percolate into individual states, or across 
regions (Hyde, 2011: 361). Political elites follow trends set internationally, copying these in 
the hope of being considered as aspiring to western values (Acharya, 2004: 269). Regimes 
espouse pseudo-democracy to placate and endear themselves to international 
organisations, eager that their authoritarian traits are over-looked (Hyde, 2011: 361). Policy 
diffusion allows different groups to learn from policies existing in domestic regions or 
abroad (Gilardi, 2010a). Using the example of America, Karch (2007: 30) found that popular 
policies came from the state-level, percolating to the federal-level after being implemented 
across many states. Once one state’s politicians had a debate and the media provoked 
further debate, other states would implement policies depending on the furore caused.  
Diffusion has become synonymous with democratic spread (Di Palma, 1990: 14). 
Academic literature in the 1990s argued that the ‘democratic third wave’, would spread 
democratic ideas across the globe (Kraxberger, 2007: 1055). It is important to understand 
how people learn, as it allows one to track the process of ideas throughout regions (Di 
Palma, 1990: 14). Scholars of democratisation contend that diffusion has transported 
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democratic ideas across borders, shaping values and tactics (Di Palma, 1990: 24). Since the 
success of democratic diffusion in the 1980s, Western states have analysed ways to diffuse 
democratic ideas to other regions (Kegley and Hermann, 2002: 15). Starr (1991: 356-357) 
contends that diffusion creates a domino effect. When democratic ideas cause a revolution 
in one authoritarian state, it leads to the collapse of other authoritarian regimes in the 
region. The literature on democratic diffusion expanded with the 1989 revolutions in Central 
and Eastern Europe (Kopstein and Reilly, 2000). However, its most recent apogee was during 
the late 1990s and early 2000s when revolutions occurred across Eastern Europe and the 
FSU, following ideas of democratic mobilisation from previous examples (Bunce and 
Wolchik, 2007: 96). These revolutions were the so-called ‘colour revolutions’ in Serbia, 
Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan (Beissinger, 2007: 259) and groups from previous 
‘revolutions’, dispensed ideas and tools to beat dictatorships (Colin, 2007: 68-69).  
It is argued that diffusion is limited to states in proximity to one another 
geographically (Schmitter, 2001: 38; Whitehead, 2001: 5). However, technological progress 
has allowed information to spread further, influencing states in disparate regions 
(Schmitter, 2001: 38). Diffusion allows a person to pinpoint the importance of an idea, 
showing how learning operates and the importance of mobilisation (Beissinger, 2009: 75). 
By grouping disparate states together, diffusion runs the risk of incorporating too many 
dissimilar cases. Kyrgyzstan is one such example (Bunce and Wolchik, 2009: 70). Diffusion 
scholars see Kyrgyzstan as different to other cases and acknowledge that mass protests and 
the model of other ‘colour revolutions’ were not prevalent. Ortmann (2008: 363) contends 
that Kyrgyzstan is too different to be placed in diffusion literature and should be viewed as 
an outlier, rather than part of the diffusion phenomenon. The Kyrgyz ‘revolution’ was 
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backed by the Kremlin, who claimed to be exporting ‘stable democracy’ and not a ‘colour 
revolution’ (Ortmann, 2008: 363-364). The ‘revolution’ did not produce democratic minded 
elites, but competing factions (Chadova-Devlen, 2011: 52). Even so diffusion scholars 
include it as a viable case. This is one of diffusion’s weaknesses, as diffusion scholars admit 
disparate and tenuous cases.  
I argue that diffusion has certain failings, the main being its short-term view of 
events. I agree with Way (2008a: 91) that linkage and leverage’s longer term inferences, 
resonate more than diffusion in explaining regime collapse as a wave like effect. This does 
not adequately explain why some regimes are impervious to it (Silitski, 2009b: 87). Politcal 
diffusion literature focuses almost exclusively on democratisation. But, there is nothing to 
say that authoritarian regimes do not learn. Like democratic protestors, authoritarian 
regimes have access to technology (Silitski, 2010a: 275). Regimes in Belarus, Kazakhstan and 
Russia had time to learn from the protests (Silitski, 2009b: 88). Diffusion charts interesting 
phenomenon, but does not explain the wider repercussions behind the phenomenon and 
societal issues. Diffusion cannot clarify how a process starts or ends. It is left to scholars to 
draw conclusions from circumstances. Better means, such as understanding the state are 
available, rather than explaining processes through diffusion (Whitehead, 2001: 6). 
Supporters of diffusion do not provide a comprehensible synopsis of authoritarian failure 
(Way, 2008b: 55) and are unable to adequately allow for negotiation and changes in the 
political arena, without providing adequate interpretation of negotiation and dialogue 
problems (Walsh-Russo, 2004). The FSU revolutions have more to do with weakening 
incumbent regimes than diffusion allows for (Way, 2008b: 57; Way, 2009: 90-91). Yet, the 
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reader must remember that policy and learning can diffuse and should be considered, even 
if the theory is unable to explain wider phenomenon. 
LINKAGE AND LEVERAGE  
A states interaction with the world explains how it operates in the international 
order and how other states react to it (Hurrell, 2001: 159). For instance,  the Greek Junta’s 
linkage with other governments allowed them to have leverage over Greece, making it 
easier for Greece to democratise (Tsingos, 2001: 346). As authoritarian regimes (to an 
extent) wish others to consider them as democratic, they hold elections, whilst ensuring 
maintenance of the regime (Levitsky and Way, 2006a: 206). The likelihood that an 
authoritarian state will hold regular elections depends on the linkage that that state has 
with democratic states and international organisations (Levitsky and Way, 2006a: 207-210; 
Levitsky and Way, 2005b: 520).  
Leverage is the influence that a state has over others. States that rely on 
international aid and Diaspora remittances are susceptible to leverage, allowing democratic 
states to compel change. Western leverage is effective on autocratic regimes reliant on 
western trade. If autocratic regimes do not follow Western norms and values, then the West 
can threaten “punitive action” (Levitsky and Way, 2010: 40-42). Yet, a state does not need 
leverage to democratise others. Linkage can scare authoritarian regimes into democratising, 
“linkage has raised the cost of autocratic abuses by increasing...external response” (Levitsky 
and Way, 2006b: 379). The extent of linkage leaves regions either with a few authoritarian 
regimes or a propensity of them (Levitsky and Way, 2005a: 23, 26). Linkage and leverage is 
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like conditionality, as democratic states engage in a cost-benefit analysis as to whether 
democracy promotion is cheaper than maintaining authoritarianism (Ambrosio, 2009: 13).  
Proponents of linkage and leverage recognise that democratic states may not exert 
pressure on authoritarian regimes if they do not have links with them (Levitsky and Way, 
2006a: 209-212). Regions where the West has few regional experts’ have maintained 
authoritarian regimes. The massacre in Andijan (Uzbekistan), did not receive Western 
condemnation for months, as Western governments were unsure what had occurred. Lack 
of western condemnation has allowed Lukashenka to ignore judicial censure on 16 
constitutional violations allowing him to consolidate the regime (Levitsky and Way, 2010: 
45, 79). In Central Asia the West’s ability to influence states is weak, so authoritarian 
regimes have consolidated. By seeing authoritarianism as entrenched, the West makes little 
attempt to encourage change (Way and Levitsky, 2007: 48). Due to a shared Soviet past, FSU 
states have linkage with each other and so together blunt “Western pressure” (Levitsky and 
Way, 2010: 50).  
Russia, as the regional hegemon, exerts influence on the other FSU states through a 
shared past and common culture (Cameron and Ornstein, 2012: 2). Russia influences “the 
forms of political authority and processes of political change in those states” (Cameron and 
Ornstein, 2012: 2). Scholars of democratic linkage and leverage have recognised that 
democratic regimes can change authoritarian regimes “through political, diplomatic, 
economic, moral, or cultural means” (Ambrosio, 2009: 13). Yet, Russia through cultural, 
economic and political leverage can shape institutions of other FSU states (Cameron and 
Ornstein, 2012: 5). Russia’s growing authoritarianism provides legitimacy for FSU regimes to 
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increase their authoritarianism (particularly, Belarus and Ukraine) (Cameron and Ornstein, 
2012: 24). This study contends that Russia exerts influence on other FSU states, to aid 
authoritarian consolidation in the region, whilst learning from others how to consolidate 
authoritarianism. I argue that linkage and leverage are pertinent in comprehending 
authoritarian learning. States that share a common culture, historical and economic traits 
are more likely to copy one anothers ideas (Vanderhill, 2013: 28-29; Bunce and Wolchik, 
2006: 297). If one state is economically dependent on another it is more susceptible to the 
wishes of that state (Vanderhill, 2013: 29). This has relevance in explaining Russia’s 
relationship with Belarus and Ukraine (and to a lesser extent Kazakhstan).  
SOFT POWER  
Soft power incorporates an array of concepts for a state to show its cultural values to 
the world. Unlike hard power, soft power does not rely on the use of military force to 
achieve its purposes (Nye, 2006: 26). Soft power is the ability to make someone do what is 
wanted without them realising they are doing it (Zahran and Ramos, 2010: 13; Lock, 2010: 
33). America for instance, uses culture for seduction purposes by endorsing the promotion 
of democracy, individual opportunities and human rights (Nye, 2006: 26). It assesses the 
culture of a state and how attractive it is to others. Others will view those values as 
beneficial and applicable to how they wish to live and thus view the state’s policies as 
inclusive “and legitimate” (Nye, 2010: 4). Soft power incorporates public diplomacy, 
broadcasting, exchange programmes, development assistance, disaster relief, the economy 
and military to military assistance (Nye, 2010: 7). It relies on civil society to promote values. 
Governments do not control transnational organisations, like, (using the example of 
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America), Hollywood, CNN or Harvard. Yet, these institutions promote cultural values that 
endorse American principles in the eyes of others (Nye, 2010: 7; Zahran and Ramos, 2010: 
13). However, the state is not a person, so how is it possible for a state to be influenced 
through soft power (Laybe, 2010: 53)? States may follow international doctrines to promote 
their own legitimacy, but does this constitute shared mutual values, or a need to appear to 
accept international norms (Laybe, 2010: 54)? Can Russia (for example), use soft power in 
the region? It has become important in Russian foreign policy. Increasingly, Russia tries to 
influence its neighbours through the promotion of cultural values (Tsygankov, 2006: 1079). 
Since Russia used hard power in the Russo-Georgia war (2008), the Kremlin noticed that its 
neighbours espoused a marked coolness towards it (Wieclawski, 2011: 12). Russia perceived 
that soft power with the promotion of cultural values was the best means to assert itself 
(Tsygankov, 2006: 1080).4 Many states contemplate the advancement of interests through 
soft power, such as China (Suzuki, 2010: 200).  
THE THEORY OF AUTHORITARIAN LEARNING 
If democratic ideas can spread and people can learn tactics to overcome 
authoritarian regimes, then why cannot authoritarian regimes reciprocate and learn how to 
overcome democratic protests? Diffusion allows authoritarian regimes to view what is 
occurring in other states, through policy ideas, the building of institutions for authoritarian 
consolidation and learning from demonstration effects. Correspondingly, authoritarian 
regimes are just as susceptible to learning and ideas as their democratic antagonists 
                                                 
4
 As referred to earlier this study was written before events in Ukraine occurred. However, I feel that the 
Kremlin still believes in the use of soft power and its value to the promotion of Russian cultural values.  
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(Vanderhill, 2013: 14-15; Ambrosio, 2010: 378). The linkage and leverage that authoritarian 
states have with one another is also significant in comprehending authoritarian learning. As 
I argued in chapter one, I believe that authoritarian learning is elite driven. It relies on 
dialogue between different elites in various authoritarian regimes. These elites talk about 
the best tactics and methods to overcome protest, opposition and alternative media 
through creating legislation, curbing independent sources of power and creating institutions 
to maintain power. Authoritarian learning is based on elite dialogue and taking examples 
from other states for use or re-shaping domestically.  
Learning is a challenging concept to measure. It is open to interpretation (Zito and 
Schout, 2009: 1104). At times it is difficult to differentiate between competition, imitation 
and coercion, which may seem to be learning (Shipan and Volden, 2008: 840). However, I 
contend that one can, through the study of linkage and leverage and analysis of state 
discourse, at least infer that learning exists. It is difficult to prove learning conclusively. But if 
states use similar institutions, comparable discourse and pass parallel legislation, it is 
unlikely this is done from the ether. One can then make strong deductions that learning 
occurs. There are different concepts in the learning literature. Policy transfer analyses how 
regimes transfer existing policy or institutions between them (Stone, 2001: 1; Stone, 2004: 
546, 548). Policy-makers are in constant dialogue, so it is understandable that groups share 
ideas and learning on policy implementation and applicable institutions (Dolowitz and 
Marsh, 2000: 6). Policy transfer explains external influences on domestic policies and 
institutions (James and Lodge, 2003: 182). Political learning is an important concept, 
allowing states to follow ideas, rather than copy or modify existing policy or legislation 
(Gilardi, 2010b: 651). By analysing relationships between states, one can understand the 
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importance of learning and account for why states share similar policies and institutions 
(Volden and Ting, 2006: 2). 
Authoritarian learning has become increasingly pertinent in the FSU since the ‘colour 
revolutions’. These events led to the collapse of regimes in Georgia and Ukraine, which 
directly affected how the FSU regimes dealt with protests and potential democratic 
encroachments in the region. As will be shown, Russia saw the ‘colour revolutions’ as a 
western inspired means to destabilise and end authoritarian regimes. The Kremlin learnt 
from the ‘colour revolutions’ that activists and ideas permeated states (Ambrosio, 2007: 
232-233). Other FSU regimes have been successful in stopping ‘colour revolutions’. 
Lukashenka overcame protests in 2006 and 2010 and has continued to manipulate 
elections. In Central Asia, only Kyrgyzstan became moderately democratic, although since 
the ‘Tulip revolution’ it has slid backwards, becoming increasingly authoritarian (Beissinger, 
2006). Authoritarian regimes are in dialogue on the best tactics to use to maintain power 
(Ambrosio, 2009: 3). These regimes saw the importance of civil society in the ‘colour 
revolutions’ and implemented “attacks on independent civil society and...opposition, limits 
on electoral competition” and made “efforts to...delegitimize colour revolution ideas...as 
subversive and alien” (Finkel and Brudny, 2012a: 2). Russia used ‘colour revolution’ tactics 
for authoritarian purposes, restricting civil society and the media, whilst changing electoral 
practices and limiting opportunities for independent election monitoring (Finkel and Brudny, 
2012b: 15-16). Russia provides regimes with “political, diplomatic and practical support” 
(Burnell, 2006). FSU regimes have learnt what Ambrosio terms (2010b: 137-138) 
“authoritarian resistance” to potential democratic encroachment.  
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AUTHORITARIAN LINKAGE AND LEVERAGE IN THE FSU  
To comprehend the main research question ‘how do authoritarian regimes learn to 
consolidate and if so, do they learn from other examples in their region’ and the two sub-
research questions ‘why, when and to what extent do regimes learn from one another?’ and 
‘does the regional hegemon instigate learning techniques, or is the process multi-linear?’ I 
will assess the importance of linkage and leverage in the FSU. The linkage and leverage that 
states have with one another helps explain associations, making learning likely to occur. I 
will investigate Russia’s linkage and leverage with other FSU states. This will emphasise 
regional authoritarian growth, its consolidation and the sharing of tactics. I contend as 
Vanderhil (2014: 6) does that China may have linkage and leverage with other states, but it’s 
not concerned with authoritarian promotion in the same way Russia is. The Russian example 
will show how authoritarian regimes learn from one another and will emphasise why, when 
and to what extent regimes learn from one another, whilst highlighting if regional 
hegemons impose techniques on others.  
RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY  
The ideology behind Russian Foreign Policy 
 Russia’s foreign policy promotes ideas of stability, protecting other states 
against Western ‘colonisers’ and creating a “‘democratic’ political order that” eliminates 
“independent opposition parties from competition for public office” (Horvarth, 2013: 6-
7). The Kremlin uses political technology to control elections and gives affiliated states 
access to political technologies and technologists. As Wilson (2005: 86) contends, “the 
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job of the technologist is one of direction, shaping and even creating governing parties 
and politicians, trying to do the same for the opposition, as well”. Political technology 
serves to counter instability. It is integral to Russia’s counter revolution programme 
(Horvarth, 2013: 87), which has been diffused to other FSU states. Sovereign democracy, 
whilst no longer existing as a concept underpins Russia’s foreign policy initiatives and 
has been followed in other FSU states. Belarus adheres solely to sovereign democratic 
values. Azerbaijan has adapted it to ‘responsible democracy’. Armenia has modelled its 
political system on the Putin-Medvedev tandem (Gvosdev, 2011) with Robert Kocharian 
passing the mantle to Serzh Sargsyan. Georgia and Ukraine developed tactics from 
Russia, curbing media freedoms, human rights whilst using administrative resources to 
close courts and build “artificial party projects” (Popescu and Wilson, 2009: 35-36). 
Russia’s values are used by other FSU states in their political systems to maintain power. 
This further highlights the trend towards authoritarianism in the FSU.  
Russian Foreign Policy in Understanding Authoritarian Learning 
Under Yeltsin, Russian foreign policy was divided between different elite factions 
who competed for prominence, but, with the emergence of a more solidified authoritarian 
regime, Russia’s foreign policy has consolidated (Dawisha, 2011: 331-332). The Russian 
regime promotes “a strong, unified, centralized, and respected Russian state as the best 
guarantor against disintegration and dismemberment” (Dawisha, 2011: 346). Putin, 
according to Piontkovsky (2009: 52-53) “has only distaste for Western-style democracy”. 
External threats to the regime need to be met “by all means”.  The regime promotes the 
West as a threat to legitimise itself. Although the ‘Primakov Doctrine’ originated in the 
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Yeltsin era, it has remained the guiding principle of Russian foreign policy. This dogma 
affirms Russian pre-eminence in the FSU, attesting that Russia will defend its interests there 
(Ambrosio, 2005: 4-5). Russia has fallen back on Czarist and Soviet rationales as a beacon to 
others (Ambrosio, 2005: 22-23). Although the growth of FSU authoritarianism is largely due 
to domestic factors, Russia’s authoritarian ‘model’ serves to consolidate and reinforce 
authoritarianism in other FSU states (Cameron and Ornstein, 2011b: 20). The linkage 
between Russia and other FSU states remains high. Twenty years after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, its history marks the region, Russian remains the regional language and the 
FSU economies remain inter-linked (Cameron and Ornstein, 2011b: 24-25). If Russia has an 
authoritarian model, linkage and leverage will be even closer.  
 Russia has tried to promote its role of serving as a ‘model’ for other states. 
With the weakening of America, other states are competing for prominence (Park, 
2012). Russia hopes its ‘model’ will be considered another option from integration with 
the West, or an alliance with China. It has “the clout...economic might and...centre of 
attraction for adjacent republics and quite a few other countries” (Nixey, 2012: 2). 
Liberal democracy remains the dominant world mantra, but with China’s rise, 
democracy is being reinterpreted (Park, 2012). Russia envisages a role for itself as a key 
player, with a model for other states. However, can Russia do this? Does it have the 
ability? Russia’s aptitude to serve as a model should be tested. To understand how 
Russia exerts influence in the FSU, it is important to comprehend its ideology and 
political model. The concept of sovereign democracy was devised by Vladislav Surkov. 
According to Hudson (2009: 193) it “outlines a mission to secure Russia’s 
sovereignty…the discourse takes a proactive tone…its logic rests upon a reaction to 
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perceived internal and external threats”. Whilst the term sovereign democracy is no 
longer advocated, the values behind it permeate Russian thinking in domestic and 
foreign policy circles (Hudson, 2009: 193). Promotion of former sovereign democractic 
ideas allows other authoritarian regimes to justify their political systems. Russia’s 
foreign policy under Medvedev became smarter, incorporating soft power (Mironov, 
2013). It is a concept that remains an aspect of Russian foreign policy under Putin and so 
needs to be investigated.  
RUSSIAN SOFT POWER IN THE FSU  
Soft power is the promotion of cultural values. As I am assessing authoritarian 
learning, it is pertinent to analyse soft power and how states promote authoritarianism. I do 
not include Chinese soft power or its linkage and leverage with other states here. I make the 
inference that China does not promote authoritarianism. Its soft power and linkage and 
leverage are benign. Whilst future studies will assess China’s authoritarian promotion and 
its influence on others, I feel it is more pertinent to investigate the Russian regimes 
promotion of authoritarianism. The Russian regime engages in authoritarian promotion, 
looking to bolster other authoritarian regimes, whilst subverting democratic norms 
(Vanderhill, 2014: 6). An analysis of Russia’s soft power and linkage and leverage will 
provide answers to the main research question ‘how do authoritarian regimes learn to 
consolidate and if so, do they learn from other examples in their region’ and the two sub-
research questions ‘why, when and to what extent do regimes learn from one another?’ and 
‘does the regional hegemon instigate learning techniques, or is the process multi-linear?’  
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 The Kremlin had ignored soft power, but now  urges “greater efforts by 
Russian media and business to consolidate and promulgate the country’s position in 
global affairs” (Monaghan, 2013: 6). The regime believes it has created a model 
promoting its cultural values and norms that other states will follow (Blank, 2012: 4; 
Makarychev, 2012). Its international English language news television channel (Russia 
Today) has become highly popular abroad (Kondrat’ev, 2013: 4). It has promoted new 
institutions and groupings, such as the BRICs and the Eurasian Union (EaU). The Kremlin 
wants to exert influence through culture, language, media, the economy and Diaspora’s, 
opening other states to its influence and protecting Russia from Western 
encroachments (Monaghan, 2013: 6). Since its mishandling of support for Yanukovych 
during the 2004 ‘Orange revolution’ in Ukraine, Moscow uses different tactics to 
maintain leverage in the FSU. It promotes civil society, culture, language, post-Soviet 
nostalgia and the Orthodox Church. A direct influence of the ‘Orange revolution’ has 
been promotion of “it’s” NGOs, using “it’s” web technologies, and exporting its own 
brand of political and economic influence” (Popescu and Wilson, 2009: 29). Putin 
classified the ‘Orange revolution’ as a dark period, warning that “if we embark on the 
path of permanent revolution…we will submerge the entire post-Soviet space in a series 
of endless conflicts, which will lead to...serious consequences” (Horvarth, 2013: 43).  
 Moscow offers an authoritarian political system as a model it hopes others will 
emulate (Rukavishnikov, 2010: 76-77). It has the financial resources and political 
acumen to branch out of the FSU into world politics promoting its model (Monaghan, 
2008: 726; 2013: 6; Makarychev, 2008b: 4). In recent years, it has chaired the following 
organisations: the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Organisation of the Black 
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Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC), Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) and the 
Barents Euro-Arctic Council. These coupled with the G8, G20 and its promotion of 
Kazakhstan to the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
chairmanship, have emphasised Russia’s increasing international role (Makarychev, 
2013: 1-3). Soft power is a foreign policy concept the Kremlin has adopted to improve its 
image abroad.  
RUSSIAN LINKAGE AND LEVERAGE IN THE FSU  
 In order to assess Russia’s linkage and leverage in the FSU and its promotion 
of authoritarianism and whether the regional hegemon instigates learning techniques, I 
will analyse a number of examples of potential authoritarian promotion in the region. I 
will investigate regional institutions arguing that these serve as potential vehicles for 
authoritarian promotion and for learning tactics, institution building and appropriate 
legislation for authoritarian consolidation. From this I will analyse the relationship 
between Russia and the other case studies (Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine) to assess 
whether it is Russia that instigates learning techniques or learns from others.  
FSU Regional Organisations: The Eurasian Union (EaU), the Eurasian Economic 
Community (EurAsEC) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
  I include these regional institutions because they allow FSU states to engage in 
dialogue and learning. There is a lack of literature on these institutions authoritarian 
tendencies, but I contend that they allow Russia to promote its model to other states 
and thus promote authoritarianism. An analysis of these institutions fits within the main 
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research question ‘how do authoritarian regimes learn to consolidate and if so, do they 
learn from other examples in their region’.  Understanding these institutions provides 
analysis of how FSU states deal with issues together. If the majority of FSU states have 
authoritarian tendencies this espousal of authoritarian discourse will influence other 
states in the region and promote authoritarianism. 
  The EaU is the most important institution because of its integration potential. 
It has latent possibilities to invigorate the FSU economies (Emerson, 2012: 2). Although 
its does not formally exist until 1st January 2015 its current members are Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Russia. Armenia has signed the ascension treaty and Kyrgyzstan is likely 
to join. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have requested observer status (Hoffman, 2012: 4). 
The discourse emphasises democracy, freedom and human rights. This attempts to 
make the EaU attractive to European focused states, like Ukraine and Georgia. 
Lukashenka and Nazarbayev have spoken of the need for economic integration, because 
the FSU states share a common heritage (Hoffmann, 2012: 2). The existing Common 
Economic Space (CES), which is the precursor to the EaU, includes Armenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Chufrin, 2012: 7). 
Moscow has linkage and leverage over the economies of the other FSU states. Even 
though the Soviet Union ended over twenty years ago, the FSU state’s economies are 
still centred towards Moscow and, (mostly), reliant on it for oil and gas (Laurelle and 
Peyrouse, 2012: 9-10).  
 Russia has developed the EurAsEc and the EaU to rival the EU in integrating 
FSU states, to provide a large market for Russian goods. Another creation, (the Eurasian 
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Development Bank), allows Russia to give friendly states loans (Aris, 2010: 3). The 
Kremlin hopes to bring other FSU states into its regional concept (Wisniewska et al, 
2010: 3). The establishment of EurAsEC means, according to Dragneva and Wolczuk 
(2012: 2) that the EU is no longer “the ‘only game in town’”. Moscow perceives EurAsEC 
“as a vehicle for reintegrating the FSU, including...countries that fall within the sphere of 
the EU’s eastern neighbourhood”. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
exists for FSU states to engage in areas like: “foreign policy, the creation of a ‘common 
economic space’, transport and communication systems, environmental protection, 
migration policy and the suppression of organised crime” (Sakwa and Weber, 2009: 
381). The CIS allows authoritarian states to fend off democratic protest and promote 
authoritarian principles (Kubicek, 2009: 240). Although I can only make suppositions 
here on the main research question ‘how do authoritarian regimes learn to consolidate 
and if so, do they learn from other examples in their region’ these institutions allow 
dialogue between regimes. It is plausible that they provide opportunities for learning.  
Russia and Kazakhstan 
 Russia has worked with these regimes to stop any possible ‘colour revolution’ 
from occurring in the region. As Russia’s relationship with Kazakhstan is the most 
prominent affiliation in Central Asia (Laruelle, 2009: 5) I will analyse this relationship. 
Being a case study it is important to analyse how Russia uses linkage and leverage with 
Kazakhstan. Russia uses the carrot more than the stick in its relationship with 
Kazakhstan. It fears Kazakhstan could find other allies, thus reducing Russia’s appeal. So 
the Kremlin has embarked on heavy promotion of its culture and model in Kazakhstan 
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(Brill Olcott, 2007: 14). Both states have similar economic and political views. On the one 
hand Putin’s concentration of power is viewed by Astana as something to emulate and 
protect the regime from ‘colour revolutions’. On the other Kazakhstan has provided the 
Kremlin with ways to ‘improve’ the Russian political system. Most notably the Kazakh 
party of power (Nur Otan) is a direct influence on United Russia (Brill Olcott, 2007: 16). 
From this, one can infer that both states learn and are testing grounds for the 
consolidation of authoritarianism.  
 The ‘colour revolutions’ affected Kazakhstan in many ways. The regime 
perceived economic modernisation and wealth creation as insufficient to maintain 
stability, support and legitimacy. In order to preserve power and remain united, Astana 
limited any opposition. Nazarbayev, like Putin, has created a ‘power vertical’ (Schatz and 
Maltseva, 2012: 49, 51-52). Opposition candidates have been co-opted into prominent, 
but “strategically unimportant positions” (Schatz and Maltseva, 2012: 57). 
Acknowledging that the ‘colour revolutions’ used youth groups extensively, the Kazakh 
regime has made entering university more accessible to young people and offered them 
free tuition making them beholden to the regime. If they protest the regime can 
withdraw funding (Ostrowski, 2009: 351, 355). The ‘colour revolutions’ unified the 
regime, making it difficult for opposition to operate effectively (Ostrowski, 2009: 362).  
  Astana sees threats in every eventuality and saw the Zhanozen (Western 
Kazakhstan) protests as dangerous. Striking oil workers were violently dispersed in 
events reminiscient of how the Uzbek regime dealt with demonstrators in Andijan. 
Kazakh police opened fire indiscriminately, killing sixteen and injuring sixty four. Many 
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striking workers were tortured and their lawyers arrested (Salmon, 2012: 73; Salmon, 
2011: 507; Shishkin, 2012: 9). The authorities used the crisis to emasculate civil society, 
by further controlling the media. This provided Astana with the opportunity to round-up 
opposition activists (Sindelar and Toiken, 2012: 2). The Zhanaozen riots were seen by 
Astana as the start of a revolution. Whilst, there is no direct connotation that 
Kazakhstan followed Russia’s counter revolution, there are certain similarities: arresting 
opposition activists, controlling media and claims of western influence for the 
demonstrators. As the authorities used violence in Zhanaozen there are correlations 
between this, the Andijan incident and the 2008 Armenian protests (Nurmakov, 2011).  
Russia and Ukraine5 
 The Kremlin views Ukraine as an integral part of its sphere of influence 
determined to keep it within its geopolitical sphere (Vanderhill, 2013: 56). Putin is 
alleged to have told President Bush that he did not consider Ukraine a state (Bohm, 
2013). Until 2011 Russia believed that Ukrainian membership of the EU was impossible. 
However, with the possible signing of an association agreement between Ukraine and 
the EU, Russia tried to draw Ukraine closer to it. The Kremlin offered Kiev better trade 
conditions should it join the CU, promising reductions in oil and gas costs. It also used 
the mantra that Ukraine would become a vassal of Brussels if it joined the EU 
(Kononczuk and Matuszak, 2011).  
                                                 
5
 As remarked on earlier, this thesis was written before the 2012 demonstrations precipitated the demise of 
the Yanukovych regime and led to the current impasse in south-eastern Ukraine. However, I would contend 
that in the short-term, if not the medium and long terms too, the new government of Petro Poroshenko will be 
in dialogue with Moscow. This could weaken Ukraine’s institutions and force a reversion to a weak 
authoritarian regime.  
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 The energy question underpins the relationship between Moscow and Kiev 
(Matuszak, 2010a: 1). Ukraine is reliant on Russian oil and gas and cannot afford to 
import oil and gas at market rates. Kiev negotiates from a position of weakness, allowing 
the Kremlin privileges, like the renewal of the Russian Black Sea fleet (Matuszak, 2010a: 
1-2). As the Ukrainian government has not reformed the economy, loans from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) have dried-up. Consequently Kiev has asked Moscow 
for help. The Ukrainian oil company Naftohaz solicited Gazprombank (a subsidiary of 
Gazprom) for a loan to pay Gazprom (Matuszak, 2012). Ukraine pays an inflated price 
($252 per 1,000 cubic metres compared to Belarus’s price of $194) (Matuszak, 2010a: 3-
4). Yanukovych has spoken about Ukraine joining the CES, if and when Russia joins the 
WTO. With Russia’s ascension to the WTO, Yanukovych’s bluff has been called. Russia is 
the main destination for the majority of Ukrainian trade, so it is a matter of time before 
Ukraine joins the CES. The Russian and Ukrainian economic relationship is large, 
although Ukraine is fearful of too much Russian reliance (Matuszak, 2010b: 7). 
 During the ‘Orange’ coalition, Russia portrayed Ukraine as unstable. The 
Kremlin contrasted this to its political system of stability and predictability (Kramer, 
2010: 2). Yanukovych with his electoral victory in 2010 began capturing the state, 
treating “electoral victory as a licence to appropriate and distribute state assets for the 
private benefit of its leadership and supporters”. In prolonging the Black Sea fleet’s 
tenure in Crimea, Yanukovych got concessions for allies (Emerson, 2010: 1-2). Party of 
Regions and United Russia have collaborated since 2005 (Hartel, 2010: 3). Kiev has 
limited independent media by not renewing media licenses if newspapers and television 
channels do not portray the government in a positive light (Iwanski, 2012: 1; Haran, 
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2010: 3). The National Commission for Freedom of Speech, Media Development, the 
National Commission for Strengthening Democracy and the Rule of Law, and the 
Department of Human Rights have all been dissolved (Haran, 2010: 3). Intimidation of 
opposition politicians and media has indicated that Ukraine’s political system has not 
overcome the mantra of “managed democracy” (Moshes, 2010: 3). The 2012 Ukrainian 
parliamentary elections saw changes to the electoral code. Legislation introduced a 
mixed member electoral system (similar to Russia), banning political blocs and raising 
the electoral threshold from 3% to 5%. All this is similar to what exists in Russia. Kiev 
also uses facade parties to fragment opposition votes (similar again to Russia). 
Yanukovych often circumvents parliament, passing laws by presidential fiat. In 2013 at 
an EU-Ukraine summit, the EU set out conditions for Ukraine to meet, such as “judicial 
reform and resolution…of political prisoners; reform of the electoral system…real 
implementation of reforms…for approximating EU rules”. However, Yanukovych has 
ignored these appraisals (Haran, 2013: 1, 4). Russia waits with the CU, should Kiev break 
with the EU (Kudelia, 2013: 1). In 2013 Ukraine signed a memorandum with the Eurasian 
economic commission, perceived by some as a step to membership (Haran, 2013: 3). 
Yanukovych’s government often passes legislation “behind closed doors and without 
discussion” and lacking a quorum (Haran, 2013: 5).  
 As Yanukovych holds a majority in parliament it is plausible he will create, like 
Putin, a power vertical and construct a hegemonic party using Party of Regions as a base 
to control parliament, whilst buttressing his rule with administrative-bureaucratic 
resources (Fisun, 2010: 4-5).  With the CU exhibiting “impressive growth” this may be 
the only valid alternative for Ukraine (Moshes, 2013: 3). Yanukovych’s growing 
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authoritarianism and negation of liberal reforms needed for the EU, makes it unlikely 
Ukraine will join the EU soon (Moshes, 2013: 5). Kremlin political aide, Sergei Glazyev, 
contends that if Ukraine joins the EaU, it would have lower gas prices, no export duties 
and the elimination of other trade barriers. This will save Ukraine about $11 billion, 
whereas the EU will bring only cost (Visloguzov, 2013: 2).  
Russia and Belarus 
 There are many aspects to Russia’s relationship with Belarus. The Kremlin 
hopes that states with EU pretensions (Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) will see the 
benefits of integration with Russia, rather than cling to their EU dream. It uses its 
relationship with Belarus and regional organisations, like the EaU, as an alternative to 
the EU. Moscow promotes the Belarusian economy making its regional integration plans 
attractive for other states (Wierzbowska-Miaga, 2013: 5). Belarus is strategically 
important to Russia, as it is close to Kaliningrad and allows Russian forces to dominate 
the Baltic States and Eastern Europe if necessary (Rinna, 2013).  
 Both regimes are allied politically, economically and militarily. Russia has an 
interest in maintaining Belarusian economic stability. Belarus is a ‘pipeline’ for Russian 
oil and gas, accounting for 25% of all Russian gas exports and 21% of Russian oil exports 
in 2012. 2.8 billion kilowatt/hours of Russian electricity passed through Belarus in 2012. 
30% of Russia’s trade goes through Belarus (Wierzbowska-Miaga, 2013: 10-12). Russian 
companies have exclusive rights “for the supply of natural gas to Belarus”. They 
dominate “the transit and distribution of gas” (Wierzbowska-Miaga, 2013: 16). Russia 
accounts for 35% of all Belarusian exports. It keeps Belarusian enterprises operational, 
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providing them with favourable trading terms. If Minsk were to frustrate the Kremlin, 
Moscow could raise oil and gas prices forcing policy change in Minsk (Wierzbowska-
Miaga, 2013: 22-23). Russian companies’ control 25% of Belarus’s banking sector. It is 
the main provider of foreign currency loans for Belarusian companies. Lukashenka has 
spoken of integrating the Belarusian economy further with Russia, allegedly benefiting 
Belarusian society (Ambrosio, 2006).  
 Politically Minsk and Moscow have joint interests, most notably the Russian-
Belarusian Union State. If the Union State is successful it may lead to further integration 
with other FSU states (Wierzbowska-Miaga, 2013: 10). The Kremlin uses political 
lobbyists to promote Russian companies and investment. It has created pro-Russian 
political parties and opposition candidates, allowing it to exert pressure on Lukashenka, 
whilst ensuring Russia’s interests should Lukashenka unexpectedly lose power 
(Wierzbowska-Miaga, 2013: 26-27). Moscow has also placed pro-Russian forces in the 
presidential administration, military and security services (Bugajski, 2004: 102) and has 
protected Minsk from external pressures to democratise. The Belarusian regime, having 
overcome democratic protests in 2006 and 2010  emphasises for the Kremlin that the  
‘colour revolutions’ are over (Ambrosio, 2006; Tarkowski et al, 2011: 7; Padhol and 
Marples, 2011: 3). After the 2010 demonstrations Minsk restricted internet access and 
blogging websites, searching independent media outlets and suppressing the Union of 
Poles, seeing it as a Polish ‘fifth column’ (Gaidelyte, 2010: 73). The Russian-Belarusian 
Union State insulates Minsk “from...democratic trends in Europe”. The Union State 
“allows the Belarusian regime to resist specific pressures from the West by supporting 
regime survival (conditionality); and provides it with an alternative to EU membership 
74 
 
(integration)” (Ambrosio, 2006). Moscow views Belarus, along with Ukraine, as a 
historical part of old Russia (Ambrosio, 2006). It protects “Belarusian authoritarianism”, 
through trade, military security and cultural identity (Ambrosio, 2006). Regular meetings 
between leaders confer recognition on Minsk. The Kremlin organises election 
monitoring for Belarusian elections, halting Western claims that Belarusian elections are 
undemocratic. Moscow defends Minsk from Western sanctions (Moshes, 2011: 3) and 
fears that if Lukashenka fell Belarus would become pro-European, distancing itself from 
Moscow (Ambrosio, 2009: 114). The failure of the ‘colour revolution’ inspired ‘Denim 
revolution’ in Belarus, allowed Minsk to learn and teach Russia ways to overcome a 
‘colour revolution’ (Wilson, 2011: 211).  
 Culturally, Russia exerts huge influence. 90% of Belarusians use Russian as 
their first language. Since 1995, Russian has been a co-official language with Belarusian 
(Ambrosio, 2006). Most Belarusians identify “with the Russian cultural area”.  Russian 
media dominates Belarus as Channel One, Rossiya and NTV, are the three most popular 
channels, shaping Belarusian’s world view, towards the Kremlin (Wierzbowska-Miaga, 
2013: 28). Minsk believes that with Russia it “belongs to a separate civilisation that is 
Slavic and Orthodox. Eastern values...are fundamentally different than...the West” 
(Ambosio, 2006). Western concepts of democracy and human rights are alien to Belarus. 
Lukashenka speaks of the immorality of Western culture and himself as a preserver of a 
Slavic-Eastern heritage. The former Orthodox Patriarch (Aleksii the Second) “honoured 
Lukashenka with the first ever “Christian Orthodox Unity” award” (Ambrosio, 2006). The 
Russian Orthodox Church promotes Russia’s foreign policy. The current Patriarch (Kirill) 
has stated that “faith, morality, sacred places, and homeland” are as important as 
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human rights (Satter, 2012). Kirill argues that Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians hold 
spiritual unity, with affinity to ‘holy-Rus' (Cwiek-Karpowicz, 2010: 336-337). Kirill views 
himself as Patriarch not only of Russia, but also of Ukraine and Belarus. He is the “good 
shepherd” integrating the Russkiy Mir (Russian world) (Curanovic, 2012: 21-22). Moscow 
has leverage over Belarus economically and strategically. Politically it supports the 
regime, even learning from it to build authoritarianism.  
MINSK’S PREVENTATIVE COUNTER REVOLUTION. TEACHING MOSCOW?  
 To answer the sub-research question ‘does the regional hegemon instigate 
learning techniques, or is the process multi-linear’ I will assess how Minsk reacted to 
possible ‘colour revolutions’. How it dealt with protests and whether tactics, legislation 
and institutions used have given impetus for the Kremlin to copy techniques. From this I 
can infer both that learning occurs and that it is not the regional hegemon that diffuses 
authoritarian learning techniques to others. Russia also learns from others. During the 
2006 ‘Denim revolution’ Belarusian students created a youth organisation Zubr. Taking 
ideas from previous ‘colour revolutions’, they proclaimed the ‘Denim revolution’ in line 
with the other ‘colour revolutions’ (‘Bulldozer’, ‘Orange’, ‘Rose’ and ‘Tulip’). Belarusians 
took to the streets in an “extraordinary mobilisation” (Ambrosio, 2009: 21). But, 
opposition parties were disunited and poorly coordinated. In contrast, the pro-
government organisation Belaya Rus was united. Competing opposition groups 
espoused different ideologies, emphasising division, lack of leadership and basic 
organisational skills (Korosteleva, 2009: 328). The pro-regime Belarusian Republican 
Youth Union (BRYU) exerted pressure on the opposition mobilising “school-leavers and 
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university students using...mechanisms of sticks and carrots” (Korosteleva, 2009: 329). 
Although the Belarusian opposition was divided, for a short period it seemed a ‘colour 
revolution’ could topple the regime (Korosteleva, 2009: 329).  
 The ‘Denim revolution’ scared and fascinated the Kremlin. Once assured that 
the Belarusian regime would survive Russian authorities learned how Minsk overcame 
the protests (Ambrosio, 2009: 68). The demonstrations failure highlighted that youth 
organisations have large porous memberships, allowing for state infiltration. The 
Belarusian effectively rendered many regional Zubr branches “ineffective” (Wilson, 
2011: 221).  After 2006, Lukashenka set-up NGOs “the facade of a genuine indigenous 
civil society, but one that...provided further evidence of a managed pluralism in Belarus” 
(Frear, 2011: 183). The Belarusian Republican Youth Union (BRYU) performed tasks 
similar to its Russian equivalent (Nashi) (Astapenia, 2012). The media issued regime 
propaganda, portraying it in a positive light, whilst using kompromat (compromising 
material) against the opposition (Frear, 2011: 187). The Belarusian regime uses (like 
Russia), fake candidates to disperse and confuse opposition voters (Wilson, 2011: 211-
212). In the aftermath of the attempted Belarusian ‘colour revolution’, Russian 
authorities found five areas they could use to overturn possible future ‘revolutions’: 
political repression, obstruction of independent media, weakening of the opposition, 
limiting opposition publications and maintaining regime support (Markus, 2010: 118).  
The Belarusian regime, like the Kremlin learnt from the ‘Orange revolution’. It used 
the security services to forcibly end demonstrations. Minsk limited the chances for NGOs to 
register, restricted the ability for international NGOs to operate and closed independent 
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polling organisations (Silitski, 2010a: 289-290). Lukashenka has routinely changed the 
constitution and political system to maintain power. If opposition leaders become too 
significant they are jailed or exiled (Silitski, 2005a). Although the notion of pre-empting 
democratic infringements started in Russia it was developed and honed by Minsk. 
Lukashenka refined manipulation and repression to an art form (Silitski, 2010b: 2). He 
curbed internet and media access, whilst strengthening his position. It is true that the 
Kremlin acts as a “black knight” providing Minsk with economic resources, but Minsk 
provides Moscow with examples of authoritarian consolidation (Potocki, 2011: 51-53).  
Minsk has tried continually to bring the media under control. After a 1996 
referendum Lukashenka gained powers to control the judiciary and legislature, whilst 
making presidential decrees law. This has centred all political institutions on the presidency. 
Lukashenka saw the defeat of Milosevic (in Serbia) as a lesson that elections should not be 
competitive. The regime should get the electoral result out quickly to neuter opposition 
mobilisation. The ‘Orange revolution’ was seen as threatening and security forces were 
trained to “resist the export of democracy” (Silitski, 2006a). During the ‘Orange revolution’ 
KGB operatives were in Kiev taking notes on stopping a ‘revolution’ and gathering 
information on potential democracy exporters. The KGB devised new tactics to stop 
demonstrations. The media “shared countless reports, documentaries, propaganda 
broadcasts, and newspaper articles” explaining to the populace the official discourse on the 
revolutions (Silitski, 2006a). Belarus and Russia have created an “authoritarian 
international” to pre-empt democracy by reinforcing authoritarianism. Putin has taken ideas 
and concepts from Belarus to consolidate authoritarianism in Russia (Silitski, 2006a). The 
failed Belarusian ‘colour revolution’ gave Russia ideas to overturn democratic movements.  
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 The inability of the opposition to challenge Lukashenka has led to regime 
consolidation. All deputies to the Belarusian parliament are “elected through first past 
the post, single mandate constituencies, loyally supporting the Belarusian authorities”. A 
liberal party is allowed “to provide the semblance of competition”. Often ‘opposition’ 
candidates are withdrawn at the last moment, allowing regime candidates to contest 
unopposed, which confuses voters. The Belarusian parliament is a rubber-stamp 
institution “which almost never initiates...legislation” (Tucker and Frear, 2012). As 
Tucker and Frear (2012) claim “elections provide a veneer of electoral legitimacy…and 
demonstrate that the opposition has been comprehensively beaten. Electing deputies to 
represent the collective will of voters is not a priority”.  
RUSSIA’S PREVENTATIVE COUNTER REVOLUTION 
 Whilst the Kremlin only began substantial counter measures to curb 
democratic infringements in the FSU after the collapse of the Kuchma regime in the 
‘Orange revolution’ there were precursors towards preventative counter revolution 
before winter 2004. For example after the Serbian ‘Bulldozer revolution’, the Belarusian 
regime had started to analyse events that caused the Milosevic regime’s collapse 
(Silitski, 2005a; 2006a). The ‘Rose revolution’ which precipitated Shevernadze’s downfall 
in Georgia precipitated other FSU regimes ascertaining how to overcome potential 
‘revolutions’. These tactics reached their apogee in Russia. The Kremlin set aside 
resources to undermine protests, the opposition, the independent media and civil 
society to curb possibile ‘colour revolutions’ occurring in Russia.  
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 The Kremlin set about creating policies to reduce potential opposition and 
demoralised it through propaganda. It views democratic regimes in the FSU as 
detrimental to its interests and willingly undermines them (Vanderhill, 2013: 4). The 
regime creates an uneven playing field by removing opposition “physically from the 
scene” through “jail, exile, or even murder” (Silitski, 2009a: 42-46). Russian media does 
not mention electoral fraud and follows regime discourse (as will be seen) that elections 
are free and fair (Wilson, 2010: 147-148). The Kremlin controls the “commanding 
heights” of the media industry, knowing that most Russians get news from television, so 
making it easier for the regime to control news (Gehlbach, 2010: 78). Moscow nominally 
follows the constitution, but in practice undermines its tenants, creating democratic 
institutions on paper, but creating opposing structures “that transcend the rules and 
constraints of the constitutional state” (Sakwa, 2014: 62). This aids regime 
consolidation, allowing it to deal with opposition protests without adhering to 
constitutional niceties (Bacon, 2012: 106; Shevtsova, 2009: 62).  
 Whilst the Kremlin (and Minsk) instigated a preventative counter revolution 
before the ‘Orange revolution’ its intricacies and development reached a pinnacle at this 
event. In the winter of 2004-2005, Yanukovych was defeated in the Ukrainian 
presidential election after outgoing President Leonid Kuchma tried to manipulate the 
vote in favour of Yanukovych. However, dissatisfaction at voter manipulation led to 
mass protests resulting in the ‘Orange revolution’ (Wilson, 2005: 1-6). Yanukovych’s 
defeat caused embarrassment for the Kremlin, which had backed him. The Kremlin  
believed that a ‘colour revolution’ could occur in Moscow. The ‘Orange revolution’ 
directly influenced Kremlin policy to counteract instability (Petrov, 2010: 1-2). Moscow’s 
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rationale for counter revolution against the “Orange plague”, started with the argument 
that there is “a revolutionary situation in Russia, not a political, but a social revolution 
(Maksimov et al, 2005). The Kremlin saw that NGOs played a prominent role in coalition 
building and organising opposition factions and youth groups. It had to counteract them. 
Some NGOs were likened to “communists, American agents and nationalists” and Al-
Qaeda (Horvarth, 2013: 123). Protagonists of counter revolution argued that the Kremlin 
should “create their own NGO network and provide them with ideological, personnel, 
financial, and...political technological support” (Petrov, 2010: 2). The failure of ‘colour 
revolutions’ in Belarus, Azerbaijan and Armenia accentuated ways demonstrators could 
be beaten. The instability from the ‘Tulip’ and ‘Orange revolutions’ in Kyrgyzstan and 
Ukraine (respectively) were widely publicised in the Russian media (Juraev, 2010: 2).  
 The Kremlin saw that it was important to limit how NGOs operated in Russia, 
fearing they could organise a ‘colour revolution’. Since 2006, NGO laws have been 
restrictive. Russian NGOs must register as a ‘foreign agent’ if they receive funding from 
abroad. NGOs must submit annual financial expenditure reports, disclose sources of 
funding and issue reports on personnel activities. Between 2006 and 2007, 2,900 NGOs 
were disbanded lacking funds, or were closed by authorities (Petrov, 2010: 2). This 
neutralised most civil society organisations. The regime has created GONGOs like the 
‘Institute for democracy and cooperation’, “to monitor democratic freedoms in the US 
and Western Europe” (Horvarth, 2013: 124). It has created a systemic opposition to 
support the regime, but act in opposition to one another, thus curbing effective  
opposition (Bashlykova, 2013: 1). This is another tactic of the counter revolution. 
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 After the Beslan school massacre, Putin created a public chamber “billed as an 
arena for dialogue and...scrutiny of state decisions and legislation” (Horvarth, 2013: 
124). It allows the Kremlin to build its own “loyal civil society”, whilst monitoring 
potential adversaries. The public chamber consists of “pawns of the Kremlin” and 
“leading security officials” (Horvarth, 2013: 124). It is an institution constructed 
vertically from the president downwards. Although the public chamber was meant to 
represent NGOs to promote favorable legislation, it has “devoted little attention to 
legislation”. Putin has urged it to stop operating with NGOs as their “recommendations 
have been taken into account…now it is essential that the implantation of the law is 
monitored by the public”. It serves “as a buffer between civil society and state 
authorities”. The public chamber sets the tone and agenda of state-civilian dialogue 
pushing aside those deemed “inconvenient” (Petrov, 2010: 3; Richter, 2009: 40, 41).  
  Another aspect of the ‘colour revolutions’ was that the various 
‘democratic movements’ created youth organisations, suh as in Serbia (Otpor), in 
Georgia (Kmara), in Ukraine (Pora) and the failed Belarusian ‘colour-revolution’ (2006) 
(Zubr) (Horvath, 2013: 4, 14, 28). The Russian authorities watched these youth 
organisations spawn and diffuse ideas (Horvarth, 2013: 14). The creation of a Russian 
version of Pora by democratic activists (Nash Vybor-Our Choice), highlighted to the 
Kremlin that a ‘revolution’ could occur in Russia (Horvarth, 2013: 37, 65). The regime 
realised that legislation restricting NGOs, creating spoiler parties and “loyal opposition” 
was not enough. Nor, could Moscow rely just on the coercion of the security services to 
maintain control. The Kremlin created a youth organisation mirroring youth groups in 
the ‘colour revolutions’, but this youth group was created to eradicate alternative youth 
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group, helping limit possible future protests (Horvarth, 2013: 7). The regime considered 
them to be shock troops, or a “Putinjegund” (Petrov, 2010: 3).  The youth organisation 
Nashi (ours) existed “to overwhelm...adversaries by mass mobilisation of the popular 
will”.  It could organise pro-regime demonstrations and rountinely get young people 
onto Moscow’s streets to counter possible opposition protests. Its anti-fascist ideology 
portrayed all anti-regime groups as fascists (Petrov, 2010: 3). This mantra of preventing 
a revolution became pertinent to Russia’s influence in the FSU.  
HYPOTHESES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH IN THE PROCEEDING CHAPTERS  
The analysis of linkage and leverage emphasised the second sub-research question 
‘does the regional hegemon instigate learning techniques, or is the process multi-linear?’ I 
contended that the regional hegemon (Russia) did in fact learn authoritarian tactics to 
overcome demonstrators from other states (particularly Belarus). However, by providing 
models, regional hegemons create representations that other states can copy. To an extent 
the other research questions have also been assessed. The main research question ‘how do 
authoritarian regimes learn to consolidate and if so, do they learn from other examples in 
their region’ was partially shown. Russia has created regional institutions and a foreign 
policy that affects regional learning. This is seen in the tactics, legislation and institutions 
adopted to overcome demonstrations, after the ‘colour revolutions’. Yet, the first part of 
the main research question ‘how do authoritarian regimes learn to consolidate’ still requires 
clarity. The other sub-research question ‘why, when and to what extent do regimes learn 
from one another’ was also partially analysed, emphasising that after the ‘colour 
revolutions’ Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia learnt counter revolutionary techniques against 
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democratic ideas. However, Ukraine remains different. The regime has not consolidated 
against democracy. To understand why, further analysis will be made. 
Having assessed various important literatures in comprehending authoritarian 
learning and consolidation I will provide possible hypotheses for the proceeding chapters on 
longitudinal and discourse analysis. I believe the longitudinal analysis will show that FSU 
regimes are increasingly authoritarian. I will emphasise that existing typologies should not 
be used as universal rubrics for all authoritarian regimes, but to explain only a few cases. 
Longitudinal analysis will clearly emphasise that there are different authoritarian 
categorisations between FSU states. The hypotheses in the longitudinal analysis section are 
‘authoritarianism is increasing in the FSU’ and ‘there are differences in authoritarian levels 
between the FSU regimes’. These will explain the ‘why’ and ‘when’ aspects of the sub-
research question ‘why, when and to what extent do regimes learn from one another’. If all 
the regimes are becoming authoritarian it will point to why it is occurring as regimes copy 
one another and the ‘when’ question will track movement over time showing that FSU 
regimes are becoming more authoritarian. The longitudinal analysis will point to the 
inference of different authoritarian levels in the FSU.   
The discourse analysis chapter will provide analysis of the first section of the main 
research question ‘how do authoritarian regimes learn to consolidate’ and the second part 
of the sub-research question ‘why, when and to what extent do regimes learn from one 
another’. By analysing the language of the case studies through regime affiliated 
newspapers, government speeches and laws, I will show a similar discourse. Therefore, the 
first hypothesis is, ‘the case studies speak a similar language’. This leads to the second 
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hypothesis ‘there is a learning process’. As Ukraine is less authoritarian than the others, it 
fits the ‘to what extent’ of the sub-research question ‘why, when and to what extent do 
regimes learn from one another?’ Therefore, the third hypothesis is, ‘there is a difference in 
language and tactics used by the Ukrainian regime’. These are the hypotheses I will use in 
the next two chapters to answer the research questions.  
CONCLUSION  
Through analysing the theoretical literature on diffusion and linkage and leverage I 
argued that diffusion is not a viable concept to explain authoritarian learning. It is too 
focused on the short-term and cannot provide adequate explanations for why an event 
occurred. It is why I prefer linkage and leverage. Whilst, I do not deny that learning can 
diffuse across borders and people learn from events, I feel that linkage and leverage states 
have with one another is more conducive to learning. 
Through extensive analysis of soft power, linkage and leverage and the Russian 
relationship with both, I started to answer parts of the research questions. First, I provided a 
comprehensive answer to the sub-research question ‘does the regional hegemon instigate 
learning techniques, or is the process multi-linear?’ I have shown that Russia, as the FSU’s 
regional hegemon, does not impose authoritarianism on others. Rather it has learnt from 
others (for example, the failed 2006 ‘Denim revolution’). Whilst, it provides a model for 
other states and promotes its culture, it does not impose learning techniques, but learns 
tactics and ways to consolidate from other regimes. I showed with regards to the main 
research question ‘how do authoritarian regimes learn to consolidate and if so, do they 
learn from other examples in their region’ that the cases do learn from other regional 
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examples. However, further analysis in the following chapters needs to assess the first part 
of the question ‘how do authoritarian regimes learn to consolidate’. In regards to the 
research question ‘why, when and to what extent do regimes learn from one another’, I 
showed that the ‘why’ was due to the ‘colour revolutions’. Regimes began concerted efforts 
to overcome democratic openings in the region after this event. Yet, I have only partially 
analysed two of three research questions. So the hypotheses investigated in the subsequent 
two chapters will provide answers to these research questions.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: AUTHORITARIAN LEARNING IN THE FSU  
 Chapter two provided an investigation of existing literature on different typologies 
of authoritarian regimes. I state that existing authoritarian rubrics are satisfactory, but these 
typologies place all authoritarian regimes under a chosen formula making them unwieldy. 
One purpose of this chapter is to show that the FSU regimes are not equally authoritarian 
and consequently should not be put in a single rubric. Another purpose here is to emphasise 
that the FSU has become increasingly authoritarian over time. Statistical data will emphasise 
this. This investigation is not alone in arguing that the FSU is becoming more authoritarian. 
Freedom House (and other comparative democratic bodies) show the same contention. 
Data from Freedom House will not show that learning occurs, but does emphasise a trend of 
increasing authoritarianism. I argue that what is pioneering is the use of models to explain 
only a few cases, rather than using one typology (for instance, competitive authoritarianism) 
to explain all authoritarian cases. The data will show that all FSU states are progressing 
towards hegemonic authoritarianism. This became particularly pertinent after 2004, with 
events in Ukraine. FSU authoritarian regimes, fearing domestic ‘colour revolutions’, began 
consolidation to counter this threat. The subsequent graphs will show, however that there 
are differences among FSU regimes in their authoritarian levels. 
To aid the argument that models should be used to describe only a few cases, I 
offered hypotheses for this chapter (in chapter three), which elucidate the ‘why’ and ‘when’ 
of the sub-research question ‘why, when and to what extent do regimes learn from one 
another?’ The two hypotheses are: ‘authoritarianism is increasing in the FSU’ and ‘there are 
differences in authoritarian levels between the FSU regimes’. Both hypotheses help explain 
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differences in FSU authoritarian levels. I analysed in chapter two different authoritarian 
categorisations: competitive, electoral and hegemonic authoritarianism. Whilst, I agree that 
these classifications are hazy, they allow researchers to classify regimes simply if used 
correctly. Without these classifications one is left as Gilbert and Mohseni (2011: 271) 
advocate, with having to create new means to classify authoritarian regime types. Creating 
new rubrics for regimes that do not fit existing typologies does not provide more clarity and 
often blurs lines further (Bogaards, 2009: 400). I argue that competitive, electoral and 
hegemonic authoritarianism are diverse enough to highlight the various FSU authoritarian 
regimes, helping comprehend the differences between these regimes.  
DATA ANALYSIS: AN AUTHORITARIAN TREND?  
I agree with the argument made by Bunce and Wolchik (2010a: 44-45) and Ambrosio 
(2009: 13) that learning cannot be adequately measured quantitatively. If the data 
accentuates authoritarian evolution over time, then conclusions can be drawn that these 
regimes are becoming authoritarian. It will point to the notion that learning occurs, infering 
that regimes copy institutions, tactics and maintain dialogue with one another, leading the 
study to argue that learning occurs.  
In chapter one’s methodology section, I discussed the issue of using Freedom House 
data. Firstly, there is the matter of arbitrability. There is little explanation for why Freedom 
House groups different states together and what their overall chosen typologies mean. It 
does not treat states as independent entities, but groups them homogenously together 
under undefined arbitrary criteria (Giannone, 2010: 69). Secondly, scholars contend that 
Freedom House has neo-liberal values, so it ranks states according to free market principles, 
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democracy and closeness (in foreign policy) to America (Bollen, 1993: 1212, 1215; Bollen 
and Paxton, 2000: 59; Mainwaring et al, 2000: 19). But, according to Gastil (1990: 26) 
criticism of Freedom House data on ideological grounds is based on “opinions...rather than 
detailed examination of survey ratings”. A third issue is that Freedom House often changes 
variables, which affects data gathering and results. As the data operates over a time period, 
changes in collating statistics are not accounted for. Previous data collection is not changed 
to accommodate a variables evolution (Munck, 2001: 10; Munck and Verkuilen, 2002: 16). 
Scholars should be aware of this. I will take this issue into account.  
Despite all the issues with using Freedom House data there are significant benefits to 
utilising this data when looking at typologies and analysing levels of authoritarianism. The 
same problems concerning Freedom House data occur for all other democracy monitoring 
organisations and each organisation’s scores are not dissimilar (Pemstein et al, 2010: 7, 12). 
Freedom House provides comprehensive analysis of democracy measurement (Giannone, 
2010: 69). Bowman et al (2008: 943) found that even though variables changed there was 
little variation adversely affecting data collection and analysis. Whilst not ideal, Freedom 
House provides viable information for measuring democracy and charting trends. The claim 
of ideological taint does have some tenancy, but is at best ambiguous. For instance, the 
graphs will show from 2010 to 2012 that the Ukrainian regime got progressively more 
authoritarian. This could be due to Yanukovych’s closer alliance with Moscow (Wilson, 
2010), resulting in a higher score for Kiev, which the reader should consider as a possible 
ideological stance. Yet, it is not only Freedom House that claims that the Yanukovych regime 
has become more authoritarian since coming to power (Haran, 2013). The study will take a 
mildly critical view of Freedom House data.  
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By using information from Freedom of the Press (FotP), Freedom in the World (FitW) 
and Nations in Transit (NiT) between 1994 and 2012, I will ascertain that FSU states are 
becoming more authoritarian. This study provides nine graphs analysing each Freedom 
House criteria, to establish whether an FSU authoritarian trend is apparent. Before 1993, 
there was the possibility the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) could become 
more than a loose regional conglomeration (Sakwa and Webber, 1999: 379-381). So the 
study uses data from 1994 because it is the first year FSU states were truly independent.  
90 
 
Graph One: Freedom of the Press in the FSU states from 1994-2012 
 
Source: Freedom House.
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Graph Two: Freedom in the World 1999-2013 
 
Source: Freedom House. 
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Graph Three: Nations in Transit: Democracy Scores of FSU states from 2003-2012 
 
Source: Freedom House. 
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Graph Four: Nations in Transit: Electoral Process Scores of FSU states from 2003-2012 
 
Source: Freedom House. 
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Graph Five: Nations in Transit: Civil Society Scores of FSU states from 2003-2012 
 
Source: Freedom House. 
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Graph Six: Nations in Transit: Independent Media Scores of FSU states from 2003-2012 
 
Source: Freedom House. 
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Graph Seven: Nations in Transit: Judicial Independence Scores of FSU states from 2003-2012 
 
Source: Freedom House.  
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Graph Eight: Nations in Transit: Corruption Scores of FSU states from 2003-2012 
 
Source: Freedom House. 
98 
 
Graph Nine: Nations in Transit: Governance Scores of the FSU states from 2003-2012 
 
Source: Freedom House
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Freedom of the Press (FotP) 
The FotP data will show how FSU states have usurped media freedom, instigating state 
control of media. The methodology, gives each state a score from zero to a hundred. Zero 
denotes total press freedom and a hundred denotes total state media control (Freedom 
House, 2012a). Each state is categorised under labels ‘Free’, ‘Partly Free’ and ‘Not Free’, 
with 0-30 denoting ‘Free’, 31-60 marked ‘Partly Free’ and 61+ ‘Not Free’ (Freedom House, 
2012a). The criteria are reliant on survey data and a coding system from zero to six. There 
are three categories that are amalgamated to give each state a score, these are: ‘Legal 
Environment’, ‘Political Environment’ and ‘Economic Environment’ (Freedom House, 2012a). 
One must take into account that ‘Free’, ‘Partly Free’ and ‘Not Free’ are arbitrary categories. 
It is difficult to statistically show these variables. They do not help explain individual states. 
For instance, data from the new 2013 report (Freedom House, 2013a) emphasises a 
continual issue. There is no explanation as to why Ukraine has a ‘Partly free’ media with 60, 
but Armenia’s media is ‘Not free’ with 61. Whilst, data provides good representation of 
declining FSU media freedom, the reader must remember that rankings are subjective. Is 
Armenia’s media any less free than Ukraine’s? I use data provided by Freedom House 
because it is comprehensive. I have not tried to produce a variable for ‘Free’, ‘Partly Free’ 
and ‘Not Free’, due to difficulties in turning qualitative data into feasible quantitative 
variables. The reader must be aware that Freedom House’s data is skewed, grouping states 
together, rather than differentiating between cases.  
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Graph One: FotP in FSU states 1994-2012 
The graph highlights that press freedom is worsening across the FSU, Belarus, for 
instance, is wedded in the high scores. Russia has risen to the same level as Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. After 2004 Ukraine’s press freedom was considered relatively 
open, but has weakened since 2010. This could be due to the change from the pro-western 
‘Orange coalition’, to Yanukovych’s pro-Russian stance (Kuzio, 2012a). One should consider 
this. However, graph one highlight’s that Armenia and Kyrgyzstan’s scores fell. Both 
governments are close to Moscow (Hartley and Walker, 2013; Minasyants, 2014). There may 
be ideological issues with data, but if so it would be more pronounced. This graph show’s 
that Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are all close. Interestingly, Russia started below Ukraine 
(1994), but has since risen to join Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. Belarus with 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan is at the top, although Belarus started at a lower level. This 
point’s to my contention that there are differences in classifying FSU regimes. Graph one 
shows that different states are grouped together, indicating similarities between them. 
Placing Kyrgystan and Armenia jointly in one authoritarian typology makes little sense as 
they share few characteristics in regime composition. This graph emphasises the contention 
of chapter two that we cannot classify all authoritarian regimes under one rubric, but should 
group like states together.  
Freedom in the World (FitW) 
The FitW is scored from 1-7 (Freedom House, 2013b). The FitW survey is split into 
two categories ‘political liberties’ and ‘civil liberties’ (Freedom House, 2013b). In ‘political 
liberties’ there are ten questions, with scores assigned to each state (Freedom House, 
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2013b). The ‘civil liberties’ category has fifteen questions (Freedom House, 2013b). The 
ratings 1-7 denote the typologies of ‘Free’, ‘Partly Free’ and ‘Not Free’. States with a score 
of 1.0-2.5 are deemed ‘Free’, 3-5 denotes ‘Partly Free’ and 5.5-7 are ‘Not Free’ (Freedom 
House, 2013b). In the Freedom House (2014) report, the published data claims Ukraine’s 
trend has gone towards authoritarianism, scoring 3.5. However, as graph two will 
emphasise, the trend has stayed identical since 2012. This perhaps points to a perceived 
ideological bias.  
Graph Two: FitW 1999-2013 
The analysis is unable to include scores for 2000, due to missing data. The graph 
shows that only Kazakhstan had significantly different scores between 1999 and 2000, with 
a considerable downward spike. I feel apart from Kazakhstan there were no noteworthy 
changes. Belarus rose to Turkmenistan’s level, this rise was rapid from 1999-2003. Between 
1999 and 2005 Russia rose to join Azerbaijan and Tajikistan. Kazakhstan started at the same 
level as Kyrgyzstan, before dropping to Moldova’s level and then rising to join Azerbaijan 
and Russia. Ukraine started below Georgia, but was erratic and between 2006 and 2010 
Ukraine was the most ‘open’ FSU state, but has since receded. The FiTW data follows the 
FotP data, showing that the FSU is becoming authoritarian. Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine 
are close together. Kazakhstan and Russia are more authoritarian. Russia is just below the 
more authoritarian group of Belarus, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Graph two emphasises 
(like graph one) that all the FSU regimes cannot be placed in one homogenous category. 
However, some states share similarities with one another (Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) 
and so can be placed in a common typology. 
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Nations in Transit (NiT) 
There were issues with assessing the NiT’s methodology. Freedom House included a 
‘democracy score’, but, changed this variable in 2004 (Freedom House, 2012b). Before 2004, 
the democracy score was a calculation of two scores (democratisation and rule of law). 
These were calculated by the averages of all variables, adding them together and dividing by 
two (Freedom House, 2012b). Since 2004, the democracy score has been determined by 
adding all variables and dividing the total by the number of categories (Freedom House, 
2012b). This affects the scores to an extent. However, I feel that the democracy score is 
viable as it explains “conditions of democratic institutions” (Freedom House, 2012b). Since 
2005, new categorisations included ‘Local Democratic Governance’. In keeping with 
continuity, I excluded it as the FSU states are highly centralised.  
The NiT methodology relies on specialists rating each state on a 1-7 scale, (Freedom 
House, 2012b). The six categories are: ‘National Democratic Governance’, ‘Electoral 
Process’, Civil Society’, ‘Independent Media’, ‘Judicial Framework and Independence’ and 
‘Corruption’ (Freedom House, 2012b). Each variable uses questions helping researchers, 
give comprehensive scores (Freedom House, 2012b). The ‘National Democratic Governance’ 
variable analyses the “democratic character, stability, independence, effectiveness and 
accountability” of a state (Freedom House, 2012b). ‘Electoral Process’ analyses elections, 
electoral processes, a political system’s development and how the electorate participates in 
voting. ‘Civil Society’ analyses NGO growth, their financial sustainability and the legislation 
allowing them to operate (Freedom House, 2012b). The variable ‘Independent Media’ 
assesses press freedom, viability of a private press and internet access (Freedom House, 
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2012b). The category ‘Judicial Framework and Independence’ emphasises judicial reform, 
judicial independence, treatment of prisoners and “compliance with judicial decisions” 
(Freedom House, 2012b). The last variable ‘Corruption’ investigates anti-corruption 
initiatives, public perceptions and legislation (Freedom House 2012b). Ranking issues do 
occur in the dataset, however, NiT data and methodology provides a broad comprehensive 
analysis (Habdank-Kolaczkowska, 2013: 23).   
Graph Three: NiT, FSU Democracy Scores (2003-2012) 
Graph three shows that FSU democracy scores have (except Kyrgyzstan, Moldova 
and Georgia) become more authoritarian. Belarus started below Turkmenistan before rising 
in 2010. Kazakhstan started below Belarus. Before 2006 its score rose, but between 2006 
and 2009 it levelled out. Since 2009 it rose to reach Belarus. Russia started at the same level 
as Armenia (2003), but has since risen to draw level as Tajikistan. Ukraine’s score is rising. 
Graph three emphasises that democracy scores are becoming similar. Nine out of twelve 
states have high trends and are becoming more authoritarian. What is worrying is that 
Russia’s score rose exponentially. This could predispose other FSU states to 
authoritarianism. Russia is the regional hegemon (Merkel, 2010: 21). Although the majority 
of regimes are close to one another (with the possible exception of Armenia) again Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine are grouped together away from others. This further corroborates the 
contention that different classifications are needed, rather than one universal one.  
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Graph Four: NiT, FSU Electoral Process Scores (2003-2012) 
Belarus rose to the same level as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, but  has 
fluctuated often. Kazakhstan’s score was stable before rising in 2008, to below Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Russia by 2012 was at the same level as Kazakhstan. 
Again the three lowest states are Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Only Ukraine shifted 
between 2007 and 2008, before rising again. In graph four Moldova and Ukraine are closely 
aligned again, with Georgia as an outlier between them and the other FSU states. Armenia 
and Kyrgystan, like Moldova and Ukraine are on their own, although Kyrgystan’s electoral 
process is improving. Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan show that their electoral process is more authoritarian. This points to the 
argument that a reduced number of states can only be included in each categorisation.  
Graph Five: NiT, FSU Civil Society Scores (2003-2012) 
Belarus became more authoritarian between 2003 and 2006. The regime limited civil 
society group’s ability to function. Kazakhstan’s score rose with a slight decrease from 2007-
2008. Similarly, Russia’s score rose, but since 2010 its score has decreased. Ukraine’s score 
rose in 2004, before  falling in 2006. Since then its score has levelled out. As shown only one 
state (Russia) has dropped. But, it still remains relatively high. Graph five shows Armenia 
joining Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine with an improving civil society. Kyrgyzstan and Russia 
are more authoritarian. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan cluster together. Belarus has 
improved its civil society score. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are at the top. The graph 
points to something slightly different. Those states that remain consistently authoritarian 
and remain at the top of other graphs are spread out in graph five. Yet, there are similarities 
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between states. Kyrgystan and Russia are close together as are Armenia, Georgia, Moldova 
and Ukraine near one another. A universal category like electoral authoritarianism could not 
explain all these states. It should be used to describe a few similar cases.  
Graph Six: NiT, FSU Independent Media Scores (2003-2012) 
According to graph six (independent media scores), Belarus started at the same level 
as Uzbekistan and has remained constant except for one dip in 2010. Russia’s trend was 
upwards from 2007. Kazakhstan by 2006 was at the same level as Belarus, except for a slight 
decrease in 2009. Ukraine emphasises drastic changes. Georgia and Ukraine remain close 
with a more independent media than other FSU states. Moldova is an outlier. The other FSU 
states are close together within two distinctive factions on independent media scores. 
Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan are in one group with a marginally freer media 
than Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. This again points to 
treating states with similar scores in one category rather than one homogenous typology.  
Graph Seven: NiT, FSU Judicial Independence Scores (2003-2012) 
Graph seven emphasises variance among FSU states. Belarus remained relatively 
constant. Kazakhstan was mostly consistent too. Russia’s score increased. In 2005 it levelled 
out, before rising again in 2008 and then somewhat precipitously until 2011, before 
decreasing in 2012. Like graph six Ukraine has the most dramatic score. In 2005 Ukraine was 
relatively low, but by 2012 it had risen dramatically. Georgia and Moldova are close. 
Armenia is an outlier. Ukraine with regards to judicial independence is close to Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. Belarus, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have 
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the least independent judiciary. This further substantiates the contention that regimes with 
similar characteristics should be placed in one typology, rather than in wider 
categorisations.  
Graph Eight: NiT, FSU Corruption Scores (2003-2012) 
Kazakhstan has been consistent remaining close to the authoritarian end of the 
spectrum pointing to a high level of regime corruption. Belarus’s corruption level rose to the 
same level as Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Russia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Armenia started in 
the same place in 2003, but since then there is variance. Russia has consistently risen. 
Ukraine remained the same until 2012, when it rose. This graph shows corruption is 
prevalent. Armenia and Georgia are outliers, although Armenia is closer to other FSU states. 
Graph eight, like graph five, does not necessarily corroborate the argument for using 
different typologies. The majority of FSU states are close to one another.  
Graph Nine: NiT, FSU Governance Scores (2003-2012) 
By 2006 Belarus reached the same level as Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Yet, in 
2008 its score fell below the other two. Kazakhstan started in the same position as 
Uzbekistan, but increased gradually. It has since levelled out. Russia had an upward trend 
throughout the period. Ukraine fluctuated between 2003 and 2006, before climbing. 
Governance scores remain high (meaning a lack of democratic governance and thus 
increased authoritarianism), but Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have better scores 
than other states. This again points to putting similar states in one rubric rather than placing 
all states in a single typology.  
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS  
This chapter set out a number of hypotheses that I attempted to answer. The two 
hypotheses were: ‘authoritarianism is increasing in the FSU’ and ‘there are differences 
between the FSU regimes in their authoritarian levels’. These hypotheses helped explain the 
‘why’ and ‘when’ of the sub-research question ‘why, when and to what extent do regimes 
learn from one another?’ Taking the first hypothesis the graphs clearly show increasing 
authoritarianism. All the FSU states are in the authoritarian spectrum. The graphs 
emphasise that these regimes are progressing to hegemonic authoritarianism. However, 
there are different levels of authoritarianism, which are clearly illustrated in the graphs.  
The graphs emphasise that from 2003, authoritarianism increased. Hegemonic 
regimes mostly stabilised. Using evidence from chapter three on preventative counter 
revolution, I infer that this is a significant reason for the increase of FSU authoritarianism. 
Regimes fearing possible ‘colour revolutions’ became more authoritarian or maintained a 
high level of control. There has been a rapid authoritarian trend since 2004. It is slightly 
different for Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. These regimes espouse European values, but 
domestic institutions remain weak. Thus, these three states have become more 
authoritarian over time. The data suggests that after 2004 many FSU regimes started 
authoritarian consolidation. This answers (to an extent) the ‘why’ and ‘when’ of ‘why, when 
and to what extent do regimes learn from one another?’ It answers ‘to what extent’ too, as 
there are clear delineations between authoritarian regimes pointing to different 
authoritarian levels. Although statistics cannot offer qualitative explanation to why, they 
point to an explanation for ‘to what extent’. This will be examined more in chapter five.  
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I wanted to investigate whether existing typologies used currently to explain all 
authoritarian regimes, could be used to describe only a few cases with shared similarities. 
The graphs show differences in each regimes authoritarian nature. Generally Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine can be categorised together as many graphs show similar scores for 
them. This is also true of Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. Russia is an outlier. In a few graphs Russia 
is close to Armenia and Kyrgyzstan (civil society); whilst in others it is much higher 
(governance). I contend that Russia is starting to leave Armenia and Kyrgyzstan and join 
other states like Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. This is worrying as Russia’s political trend affects 
the FSU as a whole (Merkel, 2010: 21). Although I contend that Russia is not as authoritarian 
as the hegemonic authoritarian regimes it is progressing to this categorisation. 
The graphs emphasise the problem with existing typologies and lack of individuality. 
When it comes to categorising regimes I have to engage in somewhat arbitrary placements. 
Existing typologies are unwieldy. However, I feel that when used with only a few cases they 
become better as classifications. There are issues with categorisations. But I feel I have 
shown significant differences in regime type. Existing categorisations can explain a few 
cases. I wanted to show that the FSU regimes cannot all be classified as, say electoral 
authoritarian. There are nuances between them, meaning only a few can be placed in each 
category. I argue that hegemonic authoritarian regimes are those where the incumbent 
receives over 70% of the vote. Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan fall into this category. As the graphs show this is largely correct, although 
Kazakhstan is somewhat of an outlier. Electoral authoritarian regimes hold elections, but 
there is very little competition in them. This would account for Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and 
Russia. The graphs show this to be true. But, Russia is (to an extent) an outlier, moving 
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closer to hegemonic authoritarianism. Whilst it is leaving the electoral authoritarian rubric, 
it has not become hegemonic authoritarian. Clearly Russia is not as authoritarian as 
Uzbekistan so it should not be excluded as electoral authoritarian here. The last 
authoritarian typology is competitive authoritarianism. In these regimes elections are 
competitive enough for the regime to plausibly lose control. I contend these are the 
weakest, most ‘liberal’ authoritarian regimes. As the graphs highlight Georgia, Moldova and 
Ukraine fit this rubric, although Ukraine is breaking away. Whilst, the typologies are not 
perfect and at times arbitrary, there are clear differences between FSU regimes. 
Classification of fewer regimes is a viable option for future studies. 
Chapter four provided a longitudinal analysis of FSU authoritarianism between 1994 
and 2012. Using Freedom House data I tracked authoritarian growth and different regional 
authoritarian levels. The study accounted for existing methodological issues with Freedom 
House data though I argue that the data provides an excellent longitudinal analysis. After all 
it is not just Freedom House that claims these states are authoritarian. The graphs aided the 
study in analysing two hypotheses, the first ‘authoritarianism is increasing in the FSU’ was 
shown to be the case, particularly after 2003 when regimes worked to overcome possible 
‘colour revolutions’. This corroborated evidence in chapters two and three for the sub-
research question of ‘why, when and to what extent do regimes learn from one another’ 
providing answers to ‘why’ and ‘when’. The second hypothesis ‘there are differences 
between the FSU regimes in their authoritarian levels’ analysed different FSU regimes 
attempting innovatively to categorise them. The graphs showed that FSU regimes have 
different authoritarian levels and so should be treated as such.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE LANGUAGE OF AUTHORITRIANISM 
As mentioned in chapter three, I set out several hypotheses for chapter five. These 
will aid understanding to the main research question’s first section ‘how do authoritarian 
regimes learn to consolidate’ and the second part of the first sub-research question ‘to what 
extent do regimes learn from one another’. This will further emphasise why I am using 
discourse analysis and corroborate chapter three and four’s argument that there are 
different types of FSU authoritarian regimes. The hypotheses are: ‘the case studies have a 
similar discourse to one another’, ‘there is a learning process’ and ‘there are differences in 
language and tactics used by the Ukrainian regime’. Ukraine is a competitive authoritarian 
regime, so it is less authoritarian than the other cases. It would be interesting to ascertain 
the extent of the Ukrainian regimes discourse compared to the others. These hypotheses 
will provide greater comprehension of the discourse of the four case studies. I will offer 
further analysis of discourse analysis methodology, before providing a rationale for its use 
and why the chosen variables were selected.  
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY  
In chapter one, I provided a brief comprehension of discourse analysis to understand 
the social context of a society and how it operates, allowing the researcher to make 
inferences (Schiffrin, 2001: 56; de Melo Resende, 2012: 3). Discourse analysis is the base for 
a comparative approach to comprehend different societies (Philips and Hardy, 2002: 3). 
Taking a comparative approach discourse analysis allows an issue to be interpretated and 
draws potential parallels between cases (Brinton, 2001: 139). Discourse analysis provides 
comprehension of how institutions operate and their affect on how a society functions. 
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Institutions are created by people, thus their language provides the researcher with clear 
comprehension of the analysed society being analysed (Heller, 2001: 254; Linde, 2001: 518). 
Nearly all discourse is elite driven. Elite use of discourse and relevant institutions, (the 
media and schools) shape how society thinks and thus makes sure that ‘chosen’ ideas are 
followed (Van Dijk, 2001: 355-356). I stated in chapter one that I would take a critical 
discourse analysis approach. This allows comprehension of processes elites use to shape 
society through disseminating ‘chosen’ ideas (Van Dijk, 2001: 356). Politicians are adept at 
using language to reinterpret an event in their favour (Orwell, 1969: 225), so critical 
discourse analysis allows researchers to take analytical approaches to studying discourse 
and reinterpreti the meaning (Van Dijk, 2001: 356; 1996: 84; Wilson, 2001: 400). It allows 
researchers to use ‘framing’ devices to produce analytical variables that offer an overall 
synopsis of an issue (Myhill, 2001: 162; Gumperz, 2001: 217).  To expain why I am use 
discourse analysis and to justify the variables I need to rationalise it as a research method.  
JUSTIFICATION OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS  
As mentioned, discourse analysis serves as a viable research method for 
comprehending institutions, how they affect society whilst being shaped to the elites 
chosen ends. If the cases have comparable discourse, talking about similar tactics and 
means of consolidation, as well as referring to examples and incidences from other cases, or 
previous events, one can determine that learning occurs. An analysis of language will bring 
this to the fore, allowing the study to categorically state that learning occurs. It would 
provide answers to parts of the research questions under investigation here: ‘how do 
authoritarian regimes learn to consolidate’ and ‘to what extent do regimes learn from one 
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another’ and further corroborate differences between FSU regimes in their level of 
authoritarianism. If the cases have comparable discourse, they will use similar tactics to 
maintain authoritarian stability. This would point to learning. The cases will not have taken 
ideas out of the blue. Discourse analysis will make greater inferences than the graphs in 
chapter three and help fuel the contention that learning occurs. Newspapers from the four 
case studies will be assessed to discern government discourse. I will use Sovetskaya 
Belorusia from Belarus, Panorama and Vremiya from Kazakhstan, Rossiskaya Gazeta and 
Izvestiya from Russia and Uraydoviy Kurier from Ukraine. These newspapers are close to the 
respective governments and will further understanding of authoritarian learning. These 
newspapers will use similar language to their respective regimes. 
JUSTIFICATION OF VARIABLES  
2010 was chosen as the start year. This is when all four of the present regime leaders 
came to power6. The study could have started in 1991, 1994 or 2000 when the other 
presidents gained power, but Yankovych only assumed power in 2010, so this year was the 
most pertinent to commence a discourse analysis. Whilst, Putin was not (constitutionally at 
least) president between 2008 and 2012, many contend that the Russian prime minister was 
the main authority in the Medvedev interregnum (Barry, 2011). To justify the variables used 
for authoritarian learning I employed a “framing device” (Gumperz, 2001: 217). In chapter 
two I analysed authoritarianism through various categories. These form the basis of the 
variables here. I chose eight variables: democracy, electoral system, civil society, opposition, 
                                                 
6
 As mentioned previously, this study was written before Yanukovych fled and Ukraine began its months of 
protest and (possible partition) before a new regime was elected (under Petro Porshenko).  
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non-governmental organisations (NGOs), media, parliament and corruption. These fit 
existing literature. The variables follow work by Linz and Stepan (1996: 7-11) on the five 
arenas of democracy. Four of the five arenas are parralleled in variables here. These are: 
political society, civil society, rule of law and effective bureaucracy. Civil society refers to 
“self-organising groups, movements, and individuals...autonomous from the state”. It 
includes “social movements”, “civil associations” and citizens willing to demonstrate (Linz 
and Stepan, 1996: 7-8). Political society refers to people being able to contest elections. The 
third variable is rule of law and the fourth guarantees rights and freedoms (Linz and Stepan, 
1996: 10-11).  
Presidents as a variable have not been included as everything in the four case studies 
emanates from the president (Khazanov, 2011: 20). Often the incumbent has been in the 
elite since the Soviet Union’s collapse (Schmitter, 2010: 20). Nazarabayev was republican 
head of Kazakhstan during the Soviet Union. Lukashenka gained power soon after and Putin 
was anointed by Yeltsin. FSU presidents were, or became, the primary institution deciding 
policies (Blondel, 2012: 8). If a ‘president’ variable were included, it would not elevate the 
analysis. The other variables analysed allow the four presidents to express their views and 
for the reader to adequately comprehend the regimes (and by extension the president’s) 
discourse. Nor would a presidential variable aid analyse of authoritarianism, as these 
regimes are highly president-centric I use presidential speeches on variables that fit the five 
arenas of democracy. A presidential variable would analyse a range of irrelevant subjects.  
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DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE FOUR CASES  
Democracy 
Belarus 
The Belarusian regime has a different discourse to that espoused by the Russian and 
Kazakh regimes. The Russian and Kazakh regimes talk of being democratic, but the 
Belarusian regime does not. Minsk’s discourse is that the political system is not democratic. 
Lukashenka claims that Belarusians have had “so much so-called democracy that it has 
made Belarusians nauseated”. He drew the conclusion that Belarus had “over-
democratised” providing too many freedoms, resulting in the Minsk terrorist attacks (11th 
April, 2011) (Lukashenka, 2011b). During his 2005 National Assembly address, Lukashenka 
stated that the ‘colour revolutions’ were open banditary under the guise of democracy. 
Belarusians are (according to Lukashenka) “too intelligent to follow these “charlatans”. 
Western money, according to Minsk, cannot destabilise the regime. The security services 
know how the money is being brought to Belarus and are tracking the perpetrators (the 
American embassy). The regime will stop this imposition of so-called ‘democracy’ 
(Lukashenka, 2005). Minsk has a different conceptualisation of democracy from other states 
and international organisations. For Lukashenka, the western democratic concept is 
“bourgeois”. As western states have a different conceptualisation of democracy their 
criticism is unjustified. For instance, Belarus has many referendums (Lyul’ko, 2012). 
Lukashenka takes a similar line to Russia, that stability is mandatory. The current path 
should be maintained (Lukashenka, 2012a). According to Lukashenka, Belarus has the 
resources to build its own democratic political system, but the regime must be intolerant of 
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anarchy (Lukashenka, 2011b). He argues that the system modernises the state. It is a 
conservative system, with modernisation maintaining a Soviet style system, which benefits 
the Belarusian people (Shimov, 2012). Liliya Yermoshina (head of the central electoral 
commission) states that the political system is a “primary democracy”. Society is based on 
democratic lines (Romanova, 2012). Lukashenka has built a well managed society with 
people living in prosperity. People do not require democracy when they have wealth and 
peace. This is the official line. Russia has learnt from this model (Rostikov, 2010: 3). For 
Lukashenka (2005), only Belarusians can force the regime to concede power, but they 
support “the course of the county”.   
Kazakhstan 
Presidential adviser, Ermukhamet Ertysbaev, stipulates that Kazakhstan is 
democratic because it is written in the constitution. The kremlin has a similar discourse to 
this. Like in Kazakhstan, the Russian constitution says Russia is a democracy, so according to 
official regime discourse Russia is a democracy. In Kazakhstan the people elect 
representatives, except for governors and senators (Ghani, 2012). Nazarbayev speaks like 
Lukashenka and Putin, contending that stability is mandatory before reforms can occur, 
"stability and national security - these are the key terms" (Kononenko, 2013b). Stability 
permeates the Kazakh regime’s discourse. Nazarbayev stated that nothing occurs unless the 
state remains stable (Kononenko, 2013). The battle against lawlessness, voiced by 
Lukashenka, is part of Nazarbayev’s articulation too. Nazarbayev reiterated the need to 
maintain evolutionary change when faced with potential revolution (Nazarbayev, 2012a). He 
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argues that Kazakhstan is moving to democracy, “we believe that democracy and 
freedom...is the ultimate goal for us, not the beginning” (Sevost’yanova, 2013c). 
Russia 
The regime uses extensive administrative resources to control elections to ensure its 
representatives maintain power (Tret’iakov, 2010: 6). Kremlin political technologists, by-
pass courts and organise mass demonstrations, with supporters being bussed in from 
outside Moscow. The regime coerces students and state workers to demonstrate and vote 
for the regime, or face losing university places, funding and jobs (Pavlikova, 2013: 6). The 
same tactic is used in Belarus and Kazakhstan. Democracy is the mantra used by each 
regime to mean unity, stability and regime preservation. The official line is similar to the 
Kazakh regimes. The Russian regime argues that as the constitution speaks of democracy 
and the rule of law and democratic institutions, Russia is a democracy (Petrov, 2012: 3). 
Dmitry Medvedev states that democracy is less stable than other forms of government. Only 
regime controlled institutions bring stability (Kuz’min, 2010: 2). A strong state can protect 
people from threats. This is the Kremlin’s message. It is similar discourse to the Belarusian, 
Kazakh and even Ukrainian regimes that a strong state is paramount. The discourse of 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia is centred on the notion that their political systems are 
different. Sergei Lavrov (Russian foreign minister) contends that “every state has its own 
civilisation...to choose their own path to establish their own institutions based on their 
civilisation, without other states or institutions telling them what to do” (Shkel’, 2012: 2). 
Vladislav Surkov (presidential aide) states, no country has ever truly been democratic. It is 
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up to Russia to forge its own path in achieving its own democracy (Chesnakov, 2012: 3). This 
is the official line and is similar to language in Belarus and Kazakhstan. 
The wealthier a society, the likelier it will be democratic. Lipset’s modernisation 
theory emphasises that economic development drives democratisation. States use market 
freedoms to develop democracy, not corral it (Lipset, 1959: 49-50). Przeworski et al (1996: 
41) argue that when people attain an average wage of $6,000 per annum, the state 
becomes stable and democratic. It is important to construct institutions to maintain 
democracy (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). As Kuvshinova (2011: 7) states, modernisation 
cannot create democracy alone. Yet, the Russian regime argues that modernisation will 
democratise the state, but until this occurs the state should maintain control of society and 
the political system (Medvedev, 2010: 11). This is the official regime line. Medvedev states 
he wants modernisation to consolidate democracy. Rapid modernisation will be unstable, 
which the regime considers bad. Consequently, it appears from the discourse that the 
regime is in a catch-22 situation (Sadchikov, 2010: 2). It cannot modernise for fear of 
instability, but without modernising it cannot become democratic. The Kremlin’s type of 
‘democracy’ is based on stability, which in turn preserves the regime. Russia will not follow 
other states and have a system where political parties change power. A political system that 
has opposition and where that opposition can win limits state power and increases elite 
disunity. Russia according to Putin will not follow this process. For Putin, Russia has not had 
a stable transition for over a century with the Bolsheviks coming to power in a revolution, 
the civil war and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the anarchy of the 1990s. It is up to 
the regime to bring gradual modernisation with democratisation (Tverdov and Samarina 
2013: 1). Russia due to the Medvedev and Putin presidencies has two synopses of 
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democracy. Medvedev advocates that Russia is beginning a democratic transition 
(Medvedev, 2010: 11). Putin, like Lukashenka and Nazarbayev, contends that Russia is 
already democratic (Petrov, 2012b: 3). This created confusion, disappointing those who felt 
Medvedev was liberal (Litvinovich, 2011). With Putin as president the mantra that Russia is a 
democracy will become prominent again.  
Ukraine 
Ukraine’s official discourse is European orientated. Yanukovych states Ukraine is a 
European civilisation doing everything for EU integration. Political reforms are taken from 
European examples (Nagrebets’ka, 2011b). Yet, for all its talk of Europe, the regime 
mentions stability constantly. It has created a constituent assembly to draft a new 
constitution, with no opposition input (Nagrebets’ka, 2011c). Belarus, Russia and Ukraine all 
equate bureaucratic growth with a lack of democratisation. Kiev will work towards 
democratisation by tackling bureaucracy (Tugluk, 2011). In contrast Russia and Belarus will 
overcome bureaucracy before democratising (Pilgin, 2010; Lukashenka, 2013a). But, 
according to Linz and Stepan (1996: 11) democracy needs effective bureaucracy. Only Kiev 
(Newsroom, 2013b) allows western representatives and international organisations, like the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), to monitor elections 
(Alexanderov, 2012b; Sevost’yanova, 2012). Kiev wants to be a democratic society, 
according to official discourse (Yanukovych, 2013). The discourse from Belarus, Kazakhstan 
and Russia is that their systems are different and will evolve slowly to counter instability. 
Kiev is concerned about stability, but will work towards democracy, as democracy is the best 
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political system to overcome instability. This is the adverse contention to the discourses 
occurring in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia.  
Summary 
In the ‘democracy’ variable stability is a recurring theme throughout all four cases 
and three competing discourses. Belarus stands alone in claiming that it is not a democracy, 
but that the regime should maintain power for the populace’s benefit. Eventually, so the 
discourse goes, Belarus will become a democracy but for now the regime knows best and 
maintaining stability is paramount. By contrast, the Kazakh and Russian regimes share a 
discourse that they are already democratic. Like the Belarusian regime, both refuse to 
countenance outside help and advice for democratisation, seeing (particularly for the 
Kremlin) their own individual path to democratisation. It is interesting to note that the 
Kremlin has learnt from Minsk about creating wealth and stability among the populace 
which alleviates calls for democratisation. The Ukrainian regime shares the mantra about 
stability with the other three cases, but is, according to the discourse, determined to 
become democratic. Unlike the other three cases the Ukrainian regime is willing to learn 
from examples of democracy assistance. The ‘democracy’ variable has returned similarities 
and differences in the four cases discourse, further highlighting differences in regime type.  
Parliament 
Belarus 
Parliament is considered by the regime to maintain the stability of the political 
system. Lukashenka contends it is the institution for “serious political reform” (Orgish, 
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2012a). He argues that “parliament plays a vital role in strengthening the state” bringing 
society together, rather than have opposition on the street (Lukashenka, 2012). Liliya 
Yermoshina mentioned the difficulty of finding interesting candidates for parliament 
“naturally we are worried that there is not enough competition for parliamentary seats”. 
She states that many candidates apply, but few are chosen due to inadequate 
documentation and understanding of Belarusian (Romanova, 2012). According to official 
discourse the government has liberalised the parliamentary candidate registration process 
leading “to a quantitative increase in candidates, but, unfortunately, this affects the quality 
of all...who participate in the elections” (Romanova, 2012). The opposition should not use 
“destructive measures” to counter state stability. Belarus’s parliament does not have 
political parties. It has created a parliament that supports the regime, candidates are chosen 
for political loyalty (Alexandrov, 2012b). The same is true in Kazakhstan, where Nur Otan 
dominates parliament. Russia’s State Duma consists of United Russia and the systemic and 
semi-systemic opposition. These parliaments help maintain stability, by not allowing other 
factions a voice. The Belarusian parliament is a regime mouthpiece, without the regime 
having to confront different views. This is very different to western notions of parliament.  
Kazakhstan 
Parliament will be stronger and more effective, once the regime has moulded it 
(Kuz’min, 2011, p. 2). This is similar discourse to the Belarusian regime, Lukashenka (2011a) 
states that it is important to strengthen parliament and shape it to the regimes wishes. Igor 
Rogov, Chairman of the constitutional council contends that parliamentary legislation makes 
Kazakhstan stronger (Konenko, 2013a). Parliament prevents government from wilfully 
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changing the state’s Basic Law (Konenko, 2013a). Division could lead to instability, so the 
regime limits opposition to maintain stability (Interfax-Kazakstan and KazTag, 2011). 
Razymov (2011) speaking about the Majilas (lower house) underlines that it is split into “two 
poles...that of Nur Otan...with its coalition satellites and the democratic opposition, the 
National Social Democratic party “Azat”, the communist party and the “Alga” party”. There 
are 107 deputies in the Majilas, 98 are members of Nur Otan (Interfax-Kazakhstan and 
KazTag, 2011). Kazakhstan’s parliament, like Belarus’s consists of regime supporters.  
Russia 
As shown in the authoritarian literature on parliaments, the Russian parliament is 
dominated by one party (Unted Russia) which is similar to Belarus and Kazakhstan. 
Journalists view the State Duma as tamed, beholden to the government (Sokolov, 2013). 
The State Duma passes legislation regardless of whether it violates the constitution 
(Mishina, 2013). The regime has created a systemic opposition to control parliament more 
effectively. The second party (A Just Russia) sees itself in opposition to United Russia, but 
not the regime (Podesenov, 2013b: 3). The creation of the All-Russia People’s Front could 
bring together all systemic opposition in the State Duma, allowing the public to identify the 
regime with stability (Tsoi, 2011: 2). The regime hopes the Popular Front and United Russia 
will act in opposition to one another, but support the Kremlin (Tsoi, 2011: 2). However, this 
will make parliament obsolete (Rubin and Tropkina, 2012: 1). The authorities want to divide 
the State Duma between both parties, excluding the opposition (Novikova, 2011: 3). As 
Naryshkin (2012: 3) contends, Russian parliamentarians should be united, adhering to 
regime policies. This discourse is similar to Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine in terms of 
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parliamentary unity. United Russia controls parliament, but the Kremlin wants further 
control and so has created a loyal opposition.  
Ukraine 
Yanukovych speaks of parliament needing to listen to all political voices, regardless 
of affiliation (Newsroom, 2012). Working with the opposition is difficult as Yanukovych 
claims a small cadre of them are against the state, “it’s not opposition to the government. 
It’s actually opposition to the people” (Newsroom, 2012b). The opposition are viewed as 
uncooperative. Yanukovych speaks of “compromise” yet it is only the regimes view that is 
on the table and the opposition must accept it (Gorchinskaya, 2012). Ukrainian political 
parties are weak. Deputies are often bought, creating a disunited opposition. This is the 
start of the authoritarian path and it has already been taken by the other cases. In Ukraine 
parliament is not controlled by the government, but the opposition are bought off. The 
Ukrainian parliament is reminiscent of the Russian State Duma during Putin’s first 
presidency (Motyl, 2012c). The Ukrainian prime minister, Mykola Azarov stated that no 
politician should confront the government. Parliament, according to official discourse, is 
representative, working towards European integration. But, the reality is that opposition is 
usurped (Protsishin, 2013a). This is the first step towards higher authoritarianism and is a 
trend Putin followed upon taking power in 2000. 
Summary 
The discourse on parliaments shows certain trends amongst the four cases studies, 
though Ukraine’s discourse is less pronounced than the others. Belarus’s, Kazakhstan’s and 
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Russia’s parliaments operate under regime control and are thus corralled institutions 
passing legislation and creating a democratic facade. For these three states, parliament is a 
way for the regime to maintain stability and keep itself in power. It is enlightening how the 
Kazakh regime speaks of parliament as an institution that will become effective once the 
regime has constructed it. These parliaments do not bring the regimes to account, as 
existing democracy literature contends. In Ukraine stability is viewed by the regime as 
paramount, but it has not been able to corral parliament as in Belarus, Kazakhstan and 
Russia. Rather it relies on coercion and bribery. This is a characteristic of the State Duma 
under Yeltsin and in the early years of Putin’s regime. All four regime’s discourse on 
parliamentary opposition is negative with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia creating 
institutions without alternative opposition to the regime. In Ukraine the regime argues that 
the opposition should follow its wishes. The discourse is largely similar, but there are 
significant differences in regime type among the cases.  
Electoral System  
Belarus 
Belarus holds elections in the middle of winter (like Russia) to stop potential protests 
(Rostikov, 2010: 3). The Belarusian regime believes it less likely that people will willingly 
protest in sub-zero temperatures. Correspondingly the regime thinks that the opposition 
will be unable to maintain protests (Shraibman, 2013). The same argument is made by the 
Kremlin to putting elections in winter (Kofman, 2011). The official discourse of the 
Belarusian regime is that elections do not have much purpose, “elections are divisive...it 
always leads to a vociferous minority and elections do not bring absolute satisfaction, it is 
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not up to elections to reconcile society” (Elfimov, 2012). It is up to the elite “to identify 
the...prevailing mood of society”. The president and central electoral commission choose 
“who…to represent” (Elfimov, 2012). According to Lukashenka (2012), Belarus has 
developed elections befitting its constitutional framework, ensuring a “transparent...open 
environment for elections”. Lukashenka (2010a) argues elections are democratic because 
the “balance of power, percentages of the vote, have always responded to our alignment of 
democratic forces”. In 1996 there was a referendum to approve the current constitution 
and, according to Lukashenka, the referendum’s passing emphasised public support for the 
regime, which no longer needs to be tested (Kryatov, 2012c). Like Medvedev in Russia, 
(Volodin, 2010: 4), Lukashenka believes that Belarusian democracy is different to western 
standards because it represents people (Kryatov, 2012b). Yet, the Belarusian discourse is 
different to that of Russia’s. The Russian regime views elections as the people’s will, 
whereas Belarus does not. 
The Belarusian central electoral commission has a similar discourse to its Russian 
counterpart. Both are geared to regime consolidation. Six representatives are chosen by the 
president and six are selected by the Council of the Republic. The head of the central 
electoral commission is hand-picked by the president (Law of the Republic of Belarus, 2010). 
According to official discourse, the regime changes laws allowing the easier registration of 
candidates (Alexanderov, 2012a). Voters can vote provided they show valid identification 
(Belta, 2012b). They can access booths and they can vote “against all”. The system is 
majoritarian, allowing elections to be won if 50% of each constituency’s electorate vote. Yet, 
this rosy picture of an independent central electoral commission and electoral system is 
tainted by other parts of the discourse. Yermoshina states “we wanted to democratise, but 
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it turned out that democracy complicates the life of the central electoral commission” (Press 
Service of the President of the Republic of Belarus, 2011). Lukashenka announced the 
electoral code would be changed. This has not happened (Shraibman, 2013). According to 
official discourse Belarus, like Russia, has difficulty with new candidates unable to follow 
procedure, thus leading the authorities to reject their candidature (Andreychenko, 2011).  
Both Belarus and Russia claim that there is no use of administrative resources at 
elections. Igor Slesarenko (member of the Belarusian central electoral commission) 
contends that in Belarus there are no black-PR technologies. According to official discourse 
the ballot paper is legible, allowing Belarusians to make educated choices during elections 
(BelTa, 2010b). Lukashenka upholds that the government listens to international observers 
when implementing electoral legislation, but that change will be gradual (Kryatov, 2013). 
Belarus, according to official discourse, engages with OSCE recommendations making 
reforms to electoral legislation by funding political party’s campaign materials. Lukashenka 
in the official discourse states that the opposition did not take this opportunity. This is 
detrimental to the public as they only learn about candidates on Election Day. Official 
discourse argues that Lukashenka is transferring funds to the central electoral commission 
to publish documents informing the public of all political factions (Kryatov, 2013). The 
regime through legislation does not allow any candidate to demand an election boycott. 
This was the opposition’s main tactic. Candidates must have private funds rather than rely 
on the state, affecting how the opposition operates. Election funding is heavily monitored. 
Consequently, few people will donate to the opposition for fear of reprisals (Shraibman, 
2013). Yermoshina argues “let them establish their own funding; they will not do it, but it is 
for the sake of democracy...we will implement OSCE recommendations in part” (my italics). 
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The regime portrays itself as concerned with  democracy. In reality this is a facade 
(Shraibman, 2013). The regime claims that Belarusians know Lukashenka provides wealth, 
employment, prosperity and stability, so it is not surprising that 79.65% voted for him in the 
2010 presidential election. The 20.35% who did not emphasises that Belarus is a plural 
society according to the official discourse. Another aspect of Belarus’s electoral system is 
that Lukashenka has ended term limits allowing him to run for as long as his health holds 
(Buhovets, 2011). 
Kazakhstan 
Nazarbayev asserts that the government and Nur Otan should control the electoral 
process (Ivanov, 2011). This fits, like the discourse in Belarus and Russia, succinctly into 
Schedler’s (2009b: 264) “menu of manipulation”, where the regime “may choose a number 
of tactics to…carve the democratic heart out of electoral contests”. This discourse highlights 
the authoritarian nature of these regimes. Although elections are held, there is little 
competition (Schedler, 2009: 268). Kazakhstan, like Belarus has a language law. The central 
electoral commission chooses candidates through thorough examination (Atasova, 2011). In 
the last presidential election (2012) it barred eleven of twenty-two candidates for lack of 
Kazakh language skills (Sevost’yanova, 2013a). Existing legislation allows the central 
electoral commission to dither on registering political parties (Sevost’yanova, 2011b). Most 
regional electoral commissions are headed by, or composed of, members of Nur Otan 
(Sevost’yanova, 2011b). Electoral legislation allows the security service to disperse 
demonstrations. The authorities believe laws on demonstrations and political activity fit 
international covenants on human rights (Sevost’yanova, 2011b). Moscow and Minsk deal 
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with the opposition akin to the Kazakh regime. The central electoral commissions in 
Kazakhstan and Belarus know that the public want the incumbent, so they create electoral 
legislation for this. The Kazakh parliament has ended presidential term limits because it is 
‘known’ to be popular (Sevost’yanova, 2011a).  
Russia 
Following the announcement of his presidential return, Putin stated that the ensuing 
protests were democratic provided they remained legal. Putin is proud that society votes 
“objectively” (Putin, 2012a: 1). Society should be free to vote, but not vote for those who 
use “hypnosis” (Putin, 2011: 2). Elections restore the sovereignty of the people, creating a 
genuine source of democracy (Putin, 2012a: 1). They maintain the legitimacy of the regime 
and help provide wealth, accountability and a better life, whilst the system remains stable 
and democratic (Putin, 2012a: 1; Volodin, 2010: 4). The central electoral commission head 
Vladimir Churov argues that registering parties makes Russia a multi-party democracy 
(Mironov, 2012: 3). All of the above is official discourse. But the central electoral 
commission discounts party registration documents “claiming documents as forgeries” 
(Shkel’, 2009). It controls election funding for all parties. Vladimir Churov sees the 
opposition as “losers”. His remit is to maintain the current political system (Novikov, 2012).  
The regime’s discourse is about maintaining stability, whilst implementing gradual 
reform to the electoral system. State Duma deputy, Vladimir Pilgin, has stated that, “the 
state should not lose control. The state will reform slowly...set standards for the future” 
(Shkel’, 2010: 13). This is the official discourse. Polls by the Levada Centre show that the 
public thinks the authorities use the electoral system to repress opposition (Goble, 2013). 
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The Kremlin has developed a system of limited and controlled pluralism, providing voters 
with a choice, but only to Kremlin approved parties (Golosov, 2013). Sergei Naryshkin states 
that the electoral system will change over the next five years, but the regime will control the 
process (Interfax, 2013a). Proposed changes (2012) will return the electoral system to a 
mixed system, allowing independents to stand. These candidates will be unable to survive 
on meagre budgets provided by the electoral commission, forcing them to affiliate to a 
party. As United Russia has the most resources, it stands to make the most gains in 
controlling independents (Winning, 2013). United Russia does not even speak to voters, or 
provide a party manifesto. It exists for the regime to remain in power (Travin, 2013). This is 
similar to the role played by Nur Otan in Kazakhstan.  
Ukraine 
Kazakhstan, Belarus and Russia claim their political systems are democratic and 
different. But, according to official regime discourse, Ukraine has been praised for its 
elections (Vlasenko, 2012). Yanukovych contends that elections “are held in compliance 
with all democratic procedures” (Matsegora, 2012a). This is different to the Russian 
regime’s discourse, as Vladimir Churov contends the OSCE’s analysis of the Russian 
presidential election was “politically motivated” (Petrov, 2012a: 2). Ukraine allows 
international observers to monitor elections. This official discourse is accurate Ukrainian 
authorities used OSCE recommendations from 2010, in the 2012 elections (Turner, 2012b). 
Elections may be clean, but the government pays off independents and smaller parties to 
gain a majority (Motyl, 2012b).  
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In the 2012 parliamentary elections there were a significant number of invalid 
ballots. Consequently, the law was changed and the election rerun in five constituencies 
(Nagrebts’ka, 2012b; 2012a). Furthermore, the central electoral commission embarked on a 
‘crusade’ against bribery. Those caught were imprisoned (Central Electoral Commission, 
2012). This is the official discourse. Yanukovych has changed electoral legislation, allowing 
elections to be run on mixed electoral lines. Half of all deputies will be voted in by 
majoritarian vote, thus making it easier for the regime to coerce deputies to change 
affiliation and join the Party of Regions (Faryna, 2012). Ukraine is changing its electoral law 
and looking to Russia for implementation strategies. Furthermore, Yanukovych in 2012 
imposed his supporter on the Ukrainian central electoral commission (Tuchynska, 2013). 
This is similar to what has occurred in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, where central 
electoral commissioners ensure that the regime wins. The discourse in Belarus, Kazakhstan 
and Russia is that the central electoral commission is a regime institution. They exist to 
make sure that elections go the regime’s way. Ukraine espouses an official discourse of 
Europe, but the regime’s actions are inclined towards closer integration with the other three 
cases.  
Summary 
The discourse on elections returns some interesting results. In Belarus, elections are 
not considered overly important. The regime argues that elections create instability, so it 
should choose electoral candidates to be confirmed by the electorate. Although the Kazakh 
and Russian regimes state that elections are important, their individual discourse argues 
that elections have little impact other than confirming regime candiates. The Kremlin is 
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vocal on the importance of elections, but this is lessened by its discourse about the central 
electoral commission. It works to preserve the regime and counter possible opposition. The 
Belarusian, Kazakh and Russian regimes dislike other states and organisations (like the 
OSCE) offering advice to improve elections. Belarus makes limited changes only to 
consolidate the regime. Astana and Moscow reject out of hand any recommendations, 
claiming their political systems are different. Ukraine’s discourse is different. Officially the 
regime listens to outside recommendations, but in reality Yanukovych has copied Russian 
electoral laws and its political system to consolidate power. By putting a placeman in the 
central electoral commission it remains to be seen if this institution becomes subservient as 
have its equivalent institutions in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. Although less 
authoritarian in its discourse than the other cases, in reality Kiev is becoming more 
authoritarian taking ideas from the other cases.  
Civil Society 
Belarus 
The regime has made it easier to form civil society organisations. Consequently, it 
has increased the number by 245%, according to a member of the Ministry of Justice (Elena 
Kirchenko) (Rud, 2010). For Lukashenka civil society should follow “traditional values”, 
where organisations discuss matters in a civilised way, whilst adhering to the law 
(Ponomarev and Kirilenko, 2013). Belarus’s civil society should support the state, operating 
where the state cannot (Kirilenko, 2012). This is a similar discourse to the Russian regime. 
Lukashenka (2010b) claims that the state can fulfil most duties, leaving little leeway for civil 
society. In the official discourse Belarusian civil society will be different. It will not damage 
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peace and stability (Lukashenka, 2010c). Civil society will help build democracy, but it should 
“comply with applicable laws and not allow…their organisations to play political games that 
instigate individuals calling on election-day for illegal actions” (Ministry of Justice of the 
Republic of Belarus, 2010).  
Kazakhstan 
The activities of civil society organisations have declined in Kazakhstan. This is good 
according to Serik Seiduanov (Deputy Mayor of Almaty), because it means people are less 
political (Burdin, 2012), which is the official line. The state has pushed civil society to the 
margins (Kozachko, 2012). Nazarbayev advocated that the government would build and 
fund civil society (Nazarbayev, 2012b). This is similar discourse to the Belarusian, Russian 
and Ukrainian regimes. A significant part of civil society building is the creating of youth 
parliaments, allowing people to take an interest in politics under regime auspices 
(Sevost’yanova, 2011c). Before Kazakhstan builds civil society it must have a strong 
economy. The regime should limit reliance on government support (Razymov, 2012a). The 
discourse is similar on civil society. All cases advocate that civil society should be state 
created as this will lead to democracy. In Kazakhstan and Belarus, the regimes view civil 
society as marginal believing that the state can perform all roles of civil society. Kazakhstan, 
Belarus and Russia have created a state funded civil society.  
Russia 
According to official discourse civil society needs to be created. Once constructed it 
should follow government requirements (Novikov, 2011: 2). The public needs to know more 
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about civil society, so the government will provide finance for public television,  to promote 
civil society’s work (Maksimov, 2012: 9). Civil society organisations keep the public away 
from politics (Maksimov, 2012: 9). With increasing internet usage, civil society keeps people 
informed about government policy (Chesnakov, 2013: 3). It is important the Kremlin builds 
civil society, as it gives the regime more legitimacy (Markelov, 2011: 5; Putin, 2012b: 1). This 
is official regime discourse. People feel disenfranchised so civil organisations gives them 
opportuntites to discuss pertinent issues. Yet, people should also remember that the regime 
brought stability and wealth. Thus, they should not cause instability and undermine the 
state. According to Putin it is parliamentary deputies who will build civil society (Beluza et al, 
2011: 1). A regime created public chamber was introduced after the Beslan disaster, to 
enable civil society organisations to work together. Yet, the authorities rejected tabled 
amendments, “leaving the would-be watchdog practically toothless” (Abdullaev, 2005: 1). 
The president appoints 42 members they choose another 42 members from NGOs. The 84 
members choose another 42 members from regional NGOs. This leads to regime control of 
the public chamber (Abdullaev, 2005: 1). According to Oleg Shein (opposition activist), “this 
is not a public but a presidential chamber…it will be used as a cloak...it can be claimed that 
this or that bill was discussed with society” (Abdullaev, 2005: 1). The Federal Security 
Bureau (FSB) monitors the public chamber and members, emphasising that it is mere 
window-dressing (Bratersky, 2012b: 3).  
Ukraine 
Yanukovych argues that the government should build a civil society to advance 
democratisation (Newsroom, 2013c). He has initiated a Coordinating Council for Civil Society 
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Development, which will publish annual plans on constructing civil society (Litkevich, 2012). 
It is similar to the Russian public chamber.  Yanukovych argues that civil society aids 
modernisation,  promoting methods of “transparency and accountability” (Yanukovych, 
2013). This remains official discourse. The Ukrainian government is building its own civil 
society groups whilst marginalising others (Higgins, 2012). The Ukrainian parliament passed 
a law “On the Promotion of Civil Society Development in Ukraine”, but according to Marina 
Staviinchuk (Head of the Main Department of the Ukrainian Presidential Administration), it 
failed to define civil society. If, as the government advocates, they want a stronger state, 
then they need a robust civil society. Yet, this would curb regime power, so civil society 
remains weak (Matsegora, 2012b).  
Summary 
All four cases have a discourse on the importance of civil society for democratisation. 
Yet, even in official discourse each regime wants to control civil society. The Ukrainian 
regime may in its discourse, mention European integration but it has copied the Russian 
public chamber, promoting a civil society that the regime can control. In reality it shares 
similarities with other states discourse, of building a regime controlled civil society.  
NGOs 
Belarus 
 NGOs must adhere to the constitution. The state can intervene if the attorney-
general believes it necessary. The Ministry of Justice controls all NGO financing (Law of 
the Republic of Belarus, 2011a). NGOs, according to former-Foreign Minister Sergei 
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Martynov, will work in sectors deemed applicable by the state (BelTa, 2009a). The 
regime has funded NGOs in other states. As Olga Stuzhinskaya (director of the Office for 
a Democratic Belarus) (BelTa, 2009b) challenges, they provide training courses and 
workshops to promote NGO competence in Europe. This is similar to the Kremlin 
controlled NGO (the Institute for Democracy and Cooperation), which assesses 
American and European democracies reporting on how to improve their political 
systems. The official discourse is that it is now easier to register a new NGO. Silitski 
(2010: 4) agrees, but only if the NGO is regime affiliated. Belarusian NGO law is 
convoluted with complicated “barriers to entry...from high minimum membership 
requirements to long decision-making processes...even the successful passing... does 
not guarantee...registration” (Firsava, 2013).  Unregistered NGOs are quickly closed. 
New laws make receiving money from or having assets abroad (Wydarzenia, 2011) 
illegal. Non-approved public events are dispersed (Vialichka, 2012: 2). NGO registration 
is similar to Russian legislation, although Belarus’s system is not as stringent as Russia’s.  
Kazakhstan 
 No NGO can receive foreign funding (Akhmatova, 2012a). This would allow 
foreign interests to have ascendancy in the state (Dzhalilova, 2013a). This is official 
discourse. Kazakhstan’s largest democracy NGO closed after the government withdrew 
funding (Jalilov, 2013). The regime has not defined what an NGO is, so it is difficult for 
organisations to operate (Aimbetova, 2012b). Aimbetova (2012b) argues that it is the 
state and not NGOs that work effectively in a healthy society. NGOs are opaque, 
whereas state institutions are accountable. This is official discourse. The government 
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allows NGOs to spend 30% of their budget, but it fines them if they exceed that limit. 
NGO’s must provide annual tax reports to get an operation certificate (Aimbetova, 
2012b). The mantra remains that a strong state works effectively by itself. The 
government passed new legislation reducing NGO funding, but it also wants to build a 
strong state to help society (Pavlovskaya, 2013). This highlights the stability notion, 
which is a recurring mantra in the discourse.  
Russia 
 NGOs must register according to the Ministry of Justice of the Russian 
Federation providing details of their organisation. In the documentation they must 
identify their purpose, location, area of expertise “and number of foreign staff”. The 
Ministry often changes the tax code forcing NGOs to change accountancy practices and 
it uses unscheduled checks to monitor NGOs (Ministry of Justice of the Russian 
Federation, 2012a: 10). Article 37 provides an exhaustive list of stipulations for 
registering and closing NGOs. Another law centres on administrative issues and 
monitoring (Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, 2012b: 24). Article 6 sets out 
guidelines for financial document monitoring and the regulations for NGO compliance.  
 On 11th February 2013, the State Duma passed a law forcing foreign funded 
NGOs to register as ‘foreign agents’. According to Chapter 24, Article 1, any organisation 
using data from NGOs deemed ‘foreign agents’ must indicate the source, or it too will be 
classified as a ‘foreign agent’. ‘Foreign agent’ NGOs will face checks and unscheduled 
inspections. NGOs not registered as ‘foreign agents’ will face suspension (Ministry of 
Justice of the Russian Federation, 2013). According to Putin, the Kremlin will set-up an 
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organisation to monitor human rights groups regardless of whether they receive foreign 
funding or not (Interfax, 2013c). The ‘Orange revolution’ created ‘Orange paranoia’ in 
the Kremlin, making NGO persecution extensive. Since 2001 the regime has curbed NGO 
independence (Dzhibladze, 2013). Yury Chaika (Russian Prosecutor General) contends 
that NGOs regardless of being ‘foreign agents’ or not should face stiffer regulation. Their 
independence leads to instability (Arutunyan, 2013). At a meeting with security 
personnel, Putin argued that NGOs should be carefully monitored, so they do not 
engage in “destructive purposes” (Putin, 2014). 
 Russia’s human rights ombudsman does not differentiate between political 
and social NGOs, so all NGOs must register (Interfax, 2013f). The Russian Justice 
Minister, Alexander Konovalov, considers that it is impossible to force NGOs to register 
as there is no legal requirement for them to do so (Interfax, 2013e). The ‘foreign agents’ 
law is not restrictive enough only disenfranchising NGOs opposed to the regime 
(Interfax, 2013b). This is official discourse. Konovalov contends that Russia needs 
tougher NGO laws. A new Bill “broadens the...grounds for such inspections...In our 
opinion, the number of grounds can certainly be expanded” (Interfax, 2013d). The 
official line is that NGO laws in other states are as restricted.  NGO legislation will not 
change, as it could lead to instability (Gorbachev and Samarin, 2013: 3; Bocharova and 
Biryukova, 2013: 2).  
Ukraine 
 Ukraine originally had an NGO law based on Soviet law. Since a ruling by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in 2013, the government recognised the law as 
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“grossly violating…associations, establishing discriminatory procedures for such 
associations” (Nagrebetska, 2013). The new law based on European recommendations 
makes it easier to register an NGO. The Ministry of Justice no longer monitors NGOs. 
This, according to Marina Staviinchuk, will increase the number of NGOs and help build 
civil society (Nagrebetska, 2013). According to official discourse, the new NGO law will 
further democracy, allowing the government to pass legislation for a democratic 
political system. Now there is no government interference in how NGOs operate and 
what role they play in society (Newsroom, 2013d). This is the official discourse. The 
government is, however, limiting foreign funding to NGOs, like in the other cases. If 
foreign funding is denied, NGOs are reliant on state funding and likely to become 
subservient to the regime (Lutsevych, 2013: 5). Kiev’s discourse, however, is closer to 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. 
Summary 
 All four cases have a discourse where NGOs help build democracy and civil 
society. Ukraine’s discourse is different to that of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. The 
latter three have curbed NGO abilities to operate, limited funding and forced reliance on 
the state. The Belarusian and Russian regimes have created official NGOs which are used 
to build a controlled civil society. Although the Ukrainian regime’s discourse is different, 
in reality it has infringed on the ability of NGOs to operate. This is seen in the regime 
limiting NGO access to foreign funding, thus forcing NGOs to rely on the state.  
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Opposition 
Belarus 
According to changes in the 1994 ‘Law on Political Parties’ (Law of the Republic of 
Belarus, 2011b) a political party must have a thousand members spread across most regions 
with head offices in Minsk. The Ministry of Justice can refuse registration if documentation 
is deemed inadequate. Political parties cannot be funded externally. Minsk views opposition 
as “ineffective”. The regime should protect people from opposition ideas in case they 
permeate society (Orgish, 2012b). The opposition should support the government. 
Lukashenka has said he will build an opposition to operate in the regime’s interest, 
preserving the political system (Orgish, 2010). The regime wants a systemic opposition 
similar to Russia. A Just Russia and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia serve as regime-
sanctioned alternatives to United Russia, without reducing regime control and Minsk wants 
to emulate this (Orgish, 2012b). However, the party that was created (Belarusian Social 
Democratic Party-Hramada) did not gain public support (Orgish, 2012b). If the opposition 
wishes to be relevant, they should integrate into the political system, as now they are 
“bandits” and a “fifth column” (Lukashenka, 2011a). This is official discourse. The regime 
uses violence, sudden arrests, beatings and unexplained disappearances against opposition 
groups, whilst claiming to maintain stability. Russian security forces also use these tactics 
(Arutunyan, 2006: 1).  
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Kazakhstan 
Kazakhstan, like Russia, has a systemic opposition. This supports the government by 
acting as a conduit for disaffected groups from the regime. Nur Otan, the dominant party, 
splits both the systemic and non-systemic opposition (Jalilov, 2011). Parts of the opposition 
engage in dialogue, supporting the regime and hoping they can instigate reforms (Razymov, 
2012). After the Zhanaozen protests, the government cracked down on opposition leaders. 
When the opposition notifies the authorities of a demonstration, the protest location will be 
used on the day for pro-government rallies (Aimbetova, 2012c). This is similar in Russia. In 
all cases the regimes contend that it is difficult to talk with the opposition. Yet, each regime 
will not consider dialogue with the opposition, unless on their terms. The Ukrainian regime 
speaks of co-operation, providing the opposition agrees to its terms. The opposition in 
Belarus is referred to as a “fifth column” by Lukashenka. Russia and Kazakhstan fear 
instability, creating a systemic opposition to incorporate society around the regime.  
Russia 
The Russian regime discourse promotes the idea that the opposition are western 
controlled and determined to overturn the regime. Georgian Deputy, Givi Targamadze, has 
been accused of organising and training opposition (Kozlova, 2012: 2). This fear of 
opposition has led to the arrests of Sergei Udaltsov and Leonid Razvozzhaeyv on charges of 
starting a revolution and the publication of documents on a potential ‘colour revolutions’ by 
gay rights activists (Kozlova, 2012: 2; Podosenov, 2013). The government has spoken about 
using party blocs in the political system (Sybbotina and Sivkova, 2013). It is considering 
making the All-Russia People’s Front a bloc partner with United Russia to dominate 
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parliament (Bashlikova, 2013). However, Alexei Mukhin (Centre for Political Information) 
asserts that liberalisation would create smaller parties, making political blocs harder to 
form, thus splintering opposition. He believes the regime will use blocs to create opposition 
ruptures (Mazaeva, 2012: 3). For Yershov et al (2011: 3) the opposition are only interested 
in violence. The regime has to maintain stability. This is official discourse. Putin contends 
that any opposition party is unfit to govern. It is important the regime keeps power, but it 
should admit mistakes and learn from the dissatisfaction against United Russian in the 2011 
parliamentary elections (Putin, 2011). As United Russia still dominates elections it proves 
that society wants the regime. Demonstrations that occurred after parliamentary and 
presidential elections in 2011 and 2012 were not in support of the opposition, but 
disappointment at regime excess (Putin, 2011). To maintain stability the authorities should 
disenfranchise the opposition (Grachlev, 2013: 3). This is official discourse. Since the 
‘Orange revolution’, the regime has not permitted large demonstrations in Moscow 
(Bratersky, 2011: 1). The police and OMON have a zero-tolerance policy towards protests, 
therefore, forcing opposition to demonstrate without authorisation (Seliger, 2008: 3). The 
Kremlin hacks social media networks, (like Twitter, V-Kontakte, Skype and Facebook) to 
monitor opposition. During opposition elections to the coordination council hacking was 
used hacking to disrupt the vote (Kravtsova, 2012a: 1). The opposition are seen as foreign 
stooges bent on destabilising Russia (Bratersky, 2012a: 1). This is similar rhetoric to the 
Belarusian and Kazakh regimes.  
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Ukraine 
Prime Minister Azarov has stated, that the government is prepared to work with 
opposition, “our government is essentially set for constructive cooperation with 
the...opposition...After all, where there is no teamwork, there is no result” (Medyhntsya, 
2013b). He states that Ukraine does not need “contenders for power”, but rather unity. 
Currently, part of the opposition wants to destabilise the state with “lies, demagoguery and 
populism” (Medyhntsya, 2013a). Yanukovych states that he will work with the opposition 
“wherever there is a desire to cooperate” providing that the government and opposition 
“maintain stability in the future” (Newsroom, 2013a; Newsroom, 2012a). This is official 
discourse. Parliament passed legislation making it illegal for state employees and students 
to attend protests. This is similar to Minsk (Protsishin, 2013b). A new law allows security 
forces to disperse unapproved protests. Demonstration leaders must provide exact numbers 
of participants (Skyba, 2013). This law is similar to ones in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. It 
is impossible to know in advance the number of protestors making dispersal certain.  
Summary 
Again Kiev’s discourse has both different and similar components to the other cases. 
This irreconcilable contrast is evident in the Ukrainian discourse where the regime works 
with the opposition. The regime is open to dialogue with the opposition, but, it will maintain 
stability and the opposition should cooperate. This is similar discourse to the other three 
cases where stability and unity are sacrosanct. The Ukrainian regime follows a discourse 
comparable to the Belarusian, Kazakh and Russian regimes arguing that opposition is intent 
on regime destabilisation. This is seen with Lukashenka’s continual rhetoric of the “fifth 
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column”. The Kazakh and Russian regimes have created systemic oppositions to curb 
alternative opposition. The systemic opposition permits these regimes to claim that 
opposition exists, whilst allowing each regime to coax disaffected voters and control the 
political process. The Belarusian regime uses coercion to a greater extent, but all four cases 
have a discourse summarised as the opposition should work within regime’s perimeters.  
Corruption 
Belarus 
 Lukashenka argues that corruption needs to be brought under control but law 
enforcement does not do enough. Corruption is less in Belarus than elsewhere (Press 
Service of the President of the Republic of Belarus, 2013c). Lukashenka promises the 
fight against corruption will continue. Any state-worker accused of corruption will be 
fired (Press Service of the President of the Republic of Belarus, 2013b). Lukashenka 
elucidates corruption only occurs in capitalist economies with privatised industries. So, 
Belarus’s economy will remain in state hands. However, he agrees that corruption 
occurs less in democratic political systems. So Belarus’s political system will be 
reformed, but evolve slowly (BelTa, 2010a). This is  official discourse. Minsk is dealing 
with corruption, viewing it as “the main threat to the state”. The media often claim that 
corruption is low and worse in other states like Poland and Lithuania (Borowska, 2013b). 
The Russian regime also claims that corruption is worse in other states (particularly the 
Baltic States) (Grigas, 2012: 2). Corruption cases are used selectively to eliminate rivals. 
By FSU standards corruption is low (BelTa, 2013b), but “the authorities do not respect 
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the rule of law, courts are not independent and underpaid officials will...supplement 
their salaries with bribes” (Borowska, 2012). 
Kazakhstan 
 Corruption is a permanent problem in Kazakhstan with Nazarbayev 
complaining that ministries never adhere to budgets. Omarkhan Oxikbayev, (Majilas 
Deputy), exposed ministries for siphoning budget money (Basarova, 2012b). However, 
this is partly because the law is unclear as to allowances for public procurement 
(Sevost’yanova, 2013b). Nazarbayev acknowledges that if Kazakhstan is to become a 
consolidated democracy, it needs to tackle corruption (Aimbetova, 2011). He spoke of 
the need to “learn from other countries” (my italics) on corruption (Nazarbayev, 2012b). 
All four cases view corruption as a significant concern in cementing democracy. As will 
be shown (with the partial exception of Ukraine), the discourse of the four cases is that 
the regimes will tackle corruption before beginning a democratic transition.  
Russia 
 The Kremlin’s discourse is that the regime is fighting corruption. The State 
Duma has created a commission to monitor wealth, incomes and properties of Duma 
Deputies and their families (Shadina, 2012: 4). However, Kulikov (2010: 1) argues the 
fight against corruption cannot be sustained, as the Ministry of Justice’s independent 
monitors are not providing the necessary information on corruption. Pavlikova (2013: 6) 
contends that corruption is pervasive. To register and stand for election, a candidate 
must pay the regional electoral commission. Vladislav Surkov (Beluza, 2011: 2) states 
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that corruption is universal in society. No legislation will stop it. All that can be done is to 
set an example (Rogozin, 2011: 4). The state shows society how to be corrupt. It has 
been part of centuries of state building, constraining “a free economy, a vibrant civil 
society and a transparent state”. The regime has ratified anti-corruption legislation, but 
has failed to follow it. Whilst, this will not end corruption, it would help (Deliagin, 2011: 
6). The regime uses convoluted language for corruption, making it difficult for it to be 
accused, but easier for it to accuse and charge others (Zlotin, 2012: 9).  
Ukraine 
 The Ukrainian regime tackles corruption by using European examples. It joined 
the Partnership for Open Government in 2011, which makes public administration 
transparent, provide access to government resources, create anti-corruption legislation, 
provide quality administrative services and build e-government and e-democracy 
(Newsroom, 2013e). The Ukrainian government knows corruption affects people’s 
perceptions of democracy. It has implemented three laws which stop state interference 
in people’s lives. Yanukovych said the best way to tackle corruption and build a 
democratic system is to create trust in government, coordinate between institutions, 
improve the investment environment and observe human rights and the rule of law 
(Zhuravs’ky, 2011). As the government has a database of corrupt civil-servants, they 
cannot find a public sector job again (Bodnya, 2013). Yanukovych contends that 
corruption is rampant regionally, affecting the government’s ability to build democracy 
(Koval, 2013). Yanukovych admits it will be a long fight (Matsegora, 2011). Ukraine has 
left tackling corruption to NGOs. This is official discourse. Local government and central 
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government ministries have curbed the remit of NGOs (Khmara, 2013) affecting anti-
corruption measures. Whilst Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia wish to solve corruption 
alone, Ukraine seeks help from Europe.  
Summary 
 The corruption variable provides competing discourses amongst the four 
cases. The Belarusian regime like its Russian and Kazakh counterparts claims that 
corruption is prevalent, but uses rhetoric that it is no worse than other places, so it does 
not need to tackle it. At the same time Minsk is reluctant to give up control of the 
economy (which is largely state controlled) nor make radical reforms to the political 
system. The Kazakh regime claims it will tackle corruption as it is an effective barrier to 
consolidating democracy. This is a similar discourse to the Ukrainian regime. Kiev argues 
that to become democratic, corruption must firstly be tackled. This is in contrast to 
Moscow which refuses to acknowledge the prevalence of corruption, claiming it is a part 
of Russian life so cannot be tackled. The Belarusian, Russian and Ukrainian regimes often 
use selective corruption charges to oust rivals and limit effective opposition. The 
discourse of the Belarusian, Kazakh and Russian regimes is that they can tackle 
corruption alone. This is different to the Ukrainian discourse where Kiev will use EU help 
on confronting corruption.  
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Media 
Belarus 
 If a foreign media company wants to operate in Belarus, they have to provide 
the personal information of all Belarusian employees (Law of the Republic of Belarus, 
2008). Media must disseminate correct information and publish state material. 
Television and radio programmes are cut to allow for government statements if and 
when necessary (Law of the Republic of Belarus, 2008). Oleg Proleskovsky (Minister of 
Information) states “the impact of...media is enormous”, but the media should maintain 
stability and preserve cultural identity (Bibikov, 2013). Lukashenka (2013b) contends 
that he wants a privatised media in the future, but currently the media is weak and 
relies on state funding. There are 1,071 privately owned newspapers, but it is weak and 
relies on state funding. The state controls 175 of 225 electronic media sources, but only 
two out of nine television channels. This is official discourse. All media has to follow 
state ideology and rely on funding. This contravenes the law ‘On Mass Media’. Media 
should not be state controlled, nor should the state have a monopoly. Lukashenka does 
not need to appear on television, as channels show his speeches. Consequently, he is 
continually in people’s minds (Arutunyan, 2006: 1). The government controls printing 
and distribution, affecting how the opposition disseminates information (Arutunyan, 
2006: 3). This is similar to Kazakhstan. A new law in Belarus on the installation of 
television antennae requires that people have planning permission first, in order to be 
able to erect them. Existing antenna need a permit (Law of the Republic of Belarus, 
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2013). The process is time-consuming, thus limiting people’s access to satellite television 
and foreign media. Again this is similar to Kazakhstan. 
 Media is changing. Sergei Nesterovich (Deputy Minister of Information) argues 
that the internet is replacing ‘old’ media. It is a “unique platform to exchange ideas” 
(Korbut, 2012). According to official discourse, the internet allows paedophiles, 
“depraved literature”, the entertainment and retail industries to divert people’s 
interests (Parton, 2013). A new specialised unit (Operational and Analytical Centre - 
OAC) monitors the internet to protect citizens. Social media and networking sites are 
tracked (Parton, 2013). All companies must store citizens’ data on website hits and give 
access to the authorities (BelTa, 2010). This is official discourse. Protection is important. 
Hackers target and attack government websites (Kozlovich, 2013). According to official 
discourse the OAC monitors the internet, using collected information to build civil 
society (BelTa, 2013a). The OAC has created a Belarusian version of the internet 
(‘ByNet’), like Kazakhstan’s ‘KazNet’ and Russia’s ‘RuNet’. This according to official 
discourse protects Belarusians from dangerous material, whilst preventing them 
accessing other parts of the web (Pasiyak, 2012). BelaPan monitors the internet, 
allowing it to observe, follow and terminate internet services (BelaPan, 2010). This is 
official discourse, to protect people and end “anarchy” (Bortnik, 2010). The reality is 
somewhat different. BelaPan “works to find ways to control the internet” (Andreev, 
2013). The OAC and BelaPan control all Belarusian websites. If a person views ‘illegal’ 
material, the OAC terminates their internet access (Bortnik, 2010). Opposition websites 
are often blocked. The OAC has the technology to listen to Skype conversations. Whilst, 
security services cannot monitor everyone “they are certainly not constrained by 
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Belarusian laws or human rights concerns” (Kryvoi, 2012). The authorities block 
vkontakte and Facebook (social media sites) before and after protests. Fake websites 
are set-up to confuse opposition groups. These take the computer information of those 
that visit the website to secure KGB servers. New technology enables the authorities to 
find bloggers (Kryvoi, 2011). The authorities, fearful of an ‘Orange revolution’ and 
viewing the internet as a vehicle to promote demonstrations, have many ways to 
monitor it (Charnysh, 2011). These technologies are also used in other FSU states 
(Kryvoi, 2012).  
Kazakhstan 
 According to official discourse Kazakhstan has a free media. Sections are 
owned by private enterprises (Akhmatova, 2012b). It is important that freedom of 
speech is defined by the regime, as media articles could create instability (Basarova, 
2012a). Like Belarus, Kazakhstan’s media must devote space to government 
announcements. Radio and television must stop broadcasting, if the government makes 
emergency statements (Interfax-Kazakhstan, 2012). This is official discourse. Most 
media is government funded so they practice self-censorship. Journalists can face 
defamation charges further contributing to self-censorship (Dzhailova, 2013b). The 
government has increased control of broadcast and internet media by buying private 
media (Kenji, 2012). The law ‘On National Security’ allows the regime to close media 
companies on charges of extremism, without defining what extremism is (Dzhalilova, 
2013b). Another law ‘On Personal Data’, stipulates that all persons mentioned in an 
article must have their individual details included (Dzhalilova, 2013). Consequently, 
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journalists no longer use sources. Journalists face penalties for mentioning politicians in 
an unflattering light (Dzhalilova, 2010a). ArRukhKhak (a pollster), found that 52% of 
newspaper articles and 29% of television broadcasts in 2010 were dedicated to Nur 
Otan (Drozdov, 2011). The regime has made digital television mandatory. It controls 
broadcasting codes, so can control what people watch. Foreign media must register 
before they can broadcast (Jalilov, 2010b).  
 Nazarbayev views the internet as detrimental to humanity’s interests “instead 
of spreading knowledge” it promotes lies, hatred and vice (Nazarbayev, 2012a). 
Kazakhstan, like Belarus and Russia has its own section of the internet ‘KazNet’, which 
“will fight illegal content viruses, online fraud and zombie networks…combat 
pornography, terrorist and extremist views” (Jalilov, 2010c). The Majilas has passed 
legislation limiting ‘destructive’ websites; though the Ministry of Justice has not defined 
what “a destructive website” is (Jalilov, 2010a). ‘KazNet’ allows the regime to put 
newspapers online, allows ease of access according to official discourse and limiting the 
need to view foreign news websites (Dzhalilova, 2010). For Shaternikova (2012), the 
government’s interest in the internet has been beneficial, as it allows dialogue between 
public and regime, promoting e-democracy and e-society. This is official discourse.  
Russia 
 Russia’s media laws allow organisations to register new newspapers and other 
media if they disclose information and personal details of participants (Prokof’ev and 
Fomchenkov, 2011: 12). This is similar to Belarus and Kazakhstan. The extremism law 
stifles media, as Roskomnadzor (Federal Agency for Supervision of Communications, 
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Information Technology and Mass Media) censors articles. If an article is rejected it is 
pulled, hence leading to self-censorship. This has been used against liberal outlets 
(Lyalyakina, 2013). Russian media relies on state funding, thus curbing innovation. 
Official discourse is that although media is state-controlled it does not detract from 
Russia’s democracy. The media keeps citizens informed (Shadrina, 2010: 6). If media 
were privately funded, it would serve private interests and not the state’s which creates 
instability (Grigor’ev, 2010: 6). Public television must provide news and build civil society 
without allowing politics into debates (Maksimov, 2012: 9). Moscow’s official discourse 
is similar to Minsk and Astana’s. The regime claims media is free, but self-censorship 
exists (Arutunyan, 2009: 65-66). Official discourse contends that free speech is good, but 
it does not make the media free. The media would become dependent on private 
interests (Arutunyan, 2009: 77). Thus, the authorities keep “overall control of the sphere 
and clamp down on...news outlets” whilst using “techniques to maintain a...grip on the 
media, detaining...critics, closing down media outlets and blogs, and bringing libel or 
defamation suits against journalists” (Moscow Times, 2012a: 3). Newspapers have been 
targeted by government raids. The authorities have brought the last independent 
vestiges under control (Bratersky, 2010: 3). This is similar to Belarus and Kazakhstan. 
 Blogging makes the government look weak, as it allows “faceless” criticism 
(Novoselova and Iakovleva, 2010: 12). Ministers have been instructed not to blog. It can 
lead to misunderstandings and scandals as the diatribe against Moskovsky Komsomolets 
(a newspaper) by Andrey Isayev illustrated (Kozlov, 2013: 2). The Kremlin copies Chinese 
internet law. This allows authorities to block websites without explaining why (Revich, 
2013: 6). The police browse social media for inappropriate content. Accused websites 
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have 24 hours to remove data, or face closure. Like Belarus and Kazakhstan, the Kremlin 
wants to control the internet as it realises that Russians can access other uncontrolled 
media. This is official discourse. Blogging and social media have been affected. The 
regime uses anti-piracy and anti-extremism laws to bring bloggers to trial (Eremenko, 
2013). It has closed websites for ‘extremist’ material, forcing opposition sites to get 
domains abroad. However, the Kremlin claims that the extremism law is overzealously 
interpretated by regions. Yet, it is unlikely that the city authorities of Komsomolsk-on-
Amur (for example) tried to ban YouTube without Kremlin support and knowledge 
(Krainova, 2011: 3).  
Ukraine 
 The official discourse in Kiev is that the media can educate Ukrainian citizens 
to think and raise issues. Yet, the media is too weak for this (Korkiv, 2012). According to 
Viktor Pshonka (Prosecutor General), the state will do all it can to protect journalists and 
their property (Bittner, 2011). In reality, Ukraine’s media has become less free and Kiev 
has not made promised reforms (Vlachenko, 2011). There are 2,266 media companies. 
700 are owned by the government and more are subsidised. To promote free speech, 
Kiev needs to end subsidies. Until media is privatised it will have to accept criticism 
(Ylovits’ka et al, 2013). The government needs to end leases on property leading to 
another form of censorship. Media companies face eviction if they criticise the 
government (Ylovits’ka et al, 2013). The government has instigated laws allowing 
“media access to information from the government...not deemed a security issue”. As 
Andrei Shevchenko (Chairman of the Freedom of Expression and Information 
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Committee) (Nagrebets’ka, 2011a) argues “our people need to know...all information of 
government”, but he also admits that not all information will be available to the public 
“we are not talking about draft decisions, and…approved documents. There are 
statutory exceptions…secret information. But open to all is information on expenditure”. 
All other documents can be deemed draft decisions. The government buys newspapers, 
if it is unable to buy the newspaper the papers owners are taken to court for tax fraud 
(Motyl, 2012a). The regime uses ties with media to induce self-censorship (Turner, 
2012a). All four cases follow a similar pattern having a difficulty with freedom of speech.  
 The concept of online government occurs in official discourse. The 
government recognises that people should have access to information and it needs an 
online presence. The regime believes that there are issues with providing public 
information and improving citizen awareness, whilst not undermining stability (Sosnin, 
2013). The state must juggle e-governance and protect citizens from the internet’s 
darker side. The government’s focus on internet protection provides “protection 
from...aggressive "entrepreneurs" (Sosnin, 2013). Whilst, the internet has benefits 
(curbing state bureaucracy), it allows anonymity which is dangerous (Sosnin, 2013). The 
government uses similar tactics to Russia and Belarus to block websites (Turner, 2012a). 
All four cases emphasise the internet’s downside. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia have 
built individual internet areas to control what people see. Ukraine is following this trend.  
Summary 
 The discourse on media provides a clear analysis of authoritarianism in the 
four cases. Throughout, there are continual references to maintaining stability. This is 
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particularly so regarding the internet. The four regimes view the internet as a hazard. 
Astana, Minsk and Moscow have set up national parts of the internet, making it difficult 
to gain access to foreign websites. The Ukrainian regime uses Russian and Belarusian 
tactics to block websites and compile data on users. More traditional media 
(newspapers, radio and television) have become state controlled, or owned by 
organisations close to the state. Media reliance on state funding allows all four regimes 
to impose media censorship. Control of printing presses and leasing of office space 
expands censorships remit. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia have limited foreign funding 
of media outlets. The poorly worded extremism laws in Kazakhstan and Russia limits 
media independence further. Whereas Belarus and Kazakhstan’s discourse is that 
eventually the media will be free (without setting a time for it), for the Russian regime 
the media is already free and censorship is beneficial. The Ukrainian regime is copying 
the other three (especially Belarus and Russia) in formulating media controls. All four 
cases advocate that media should help preserve regime stability.  
Conclusion 
 I do not contend that discourse analysis will show that authoritarian learning 
occurs. It is something that cannot be definitely emphasised, but only hinted at. 
However, tactics cannot occur from nothing. It is unlikely that four cases simultaneously 
use comparable gambits when speaking about their political systems. Statistical data 
corroborates that the FSU states are authoritarian. Discourse analysis goes further 
showing that three of the cases use very similar language, even sharing tactics. This can 
be seen in the similarities between Russia and Kazakhstan’s extremism law. Other 
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examples include how the Belarusian, Russian and Ukrainian regimes use poorly worded 
corruption legislation to oust opponents. All four states view the opposition as a cause 
of instability. The Ukrainian regime  in its official discourse is moving towards Europe, 
but in reality is also taking ideas from the other cases. For example, Kiev has started to 
impose new legislation limiting NGO access to foreign funding. Whilst, it is not possible 
to emphasise that learning is definite, it is difficult to believe that four regimes with 
close affinity to one another, would not engage in learning and dialogue with each 
other. Future investigations would expose further nuances. I assessed eight variables to 
determine authoritarian learning. By using variables fitting succinctly in the democracy 
literature I emphasised how authoritarian the cases are. I maintain the belief that there 
are different types of authoritarian regime in the FSU.  
 Whilst, conducting discourse analysis I teased out similarities on the cases 
discourse. Throughout, the issues of stability and unity were contrasted with civil 
liberties. Stability in the discourse was paramount. The state must remain strong and 
vigilant to deal with instability. Yet, it is the regime that interprets stability, viewing 
potential challenges as dangerous. Throughout the four case’s discourse, the state 
protects citizens from threats to maintain stability. It is the regime that determines what 
a threat is. Democracy is the chosen word of all four cases, to mean stability and regime 
preservation. For all four cases stability and state control are important.  
 The Belarusian model of stability and well-managed society is one that Russia 
recognises and takes ideas from. The stability mantra is one that permeates the 
discourse of both regimes. The Kremlin (as was seen in chapter three) took ideas from 
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the Belarusian regime in stopping ‘colour revolutions’. Lukashenka had by 1998 
eradicated all viable opposition and continually purges any that appear. I argue that the 
Kremlin used Minsk’s example in dealing with the opposition. Whilst it is not possible to 
prove learning succinctly, it can be inferred that it is the most likely contention for 
explaining how regimes operate in similar ways. Similar ideas permeate the Kazakh 
regime’s discourse. All three states use similar rubrics to discuss their political systems, 
claiming they are democratic, but different to the West. Parliament is a variable all four 
have similarities on, although Ukraine less so. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia have 
modelled parliament to serve the regime. Kazakhstan and Russia have created facade 
democracies. Both use political parties acting in opposition to one another, but, 
supportive of the regime. Belarus has tried to create a systemic opposition, like 
Kazakhstan and Russia, but has found other ways to exclude the opposition. The 
Belarusian parliament consists of regime supporters with no party affiliation. The regime 
views political parties as causing instability. Russia and Kazakhstan use pseudo-parties to 
fragment opposition and co-opt marginally independent parties as ‘opposition’. Ukraine 
has not gone as far, but the regime isolates the opposition. The central electoral 
commission in three cases serves to maintain a democratic facade, whilst allowing 
regime control of the electoral process. Although the Ukrainian regime’s language is 
different the fact the head of the central electoral commission is an ally of Yanukovych 
does not bode well for its independence.  
 Belarus and Russia hold elections in the depths of winter to stop potential 
protests. This was the regimes attempt to deal with a possible domestic ‘colour 
revolution’. By holding elections during the coldest month of the year (mid December to 
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mid January) the Belarusian and Russian regimes believe that protestors, even if willing 
to demonstrate, will be unwilling to maintain demonstrations over a long period. That 
both regimes took this aspect from the ‘colour revolutions’ and used it does not prove 
learning, but it does significantly infer that learning and dialogue occur. Belarus’s 
electoral system and central election commission, like Kazakhstan’s, makes elections a 
side-show. Ukraine’s new electoral system has made it easier for Party of Regions to 
coerce deputies from smaller parties. Nur Otan, Party of Regions and United Russia use 
administrative resources to co-opt opposition deputies. All four cases have discourse on 
building a state controlled civil society. Russia and Ukraine have created chosen civil 
society groups. Yet, all four cases perceive civil society as a threat.  
 Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia do not tolerate opposition other than their 
created systemic opposition. All four regimes monitor internet websites. Whilst, the 
opposition are able to use the internet (and do), regular blocking and limiting of 
websites makes the opposition’s ability to operate and get views across largely 
ineffective. Each has created draconian protest laws with the Ukrainian regime following 
the example of the other three. Again Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia have limited NGO 
operations, creating laws circumscribing their remit and access to funding. The 
Ukrainian regime has not passed similar legislation, but has limited NGO access to 
foreign funding and as NGOs rely on state funding, this will make them reliant on the 
government. Corruption discourse varies across the four cases. Belarus and Russia claim 
corruption is lower than the west, so they will not worry. The Kazakh regime’s discourse 
is that the government will work alone to end corruption. This is different to Ukraine 
where the language speaks of tackling corruption using European examples. The media 
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variable tells a similar story. Television in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia is devoted to 
portraying leaders in a positive light. Russia and Belarus have copied China in harsh 
internet legislation. This is occurring in Ukraine. Kiev blocks and monitors the internet. 
As the media is subsidised by each regime, newspapers use self-censorship.  
By referring back to the hypotheses at the beginning of this chapter, I showed that discourse 
analysis provides comprehensive understanding of the research questions under 
investigation. Having offered analysis of aspects of the research questions in previous 
chapters, I set-out to answer ‘how do authoritarian regimes learn to consolidate’ and ‘to 
what extent do regimes learn from one another’. I analysed three hypotheses: ‘Do the case 
studies speak a similar language?’, ‘Do we ascertain a learning process?’ and ‘Do we see a 
difference in language and tactics that the Ukrainian regime uses?’ I found that three case 
studies have very similar language, with the Ukrainian regime as an outlier. Yet, in parts, its 
discourse corresponds to the other three cases. I contend that it is possible to see a learning 
process. Whilst, it is difficult to prove that learning occurs, the laws and tactics used by the 
four cases make a strong inference that learning and dialogue occur. The cases discourse 
espouses similar tactics and institutions used in consolidating their regimes. The dialogue of 
consolidation emphasises a process of comparison, dialogue and learning between them. 
Similarly, I argue that there are differences in the language of the Ukrainian regime. 
However, the tactics the regime uses are comparable to what occurred previously in the 
other regimes. The discourse emphasises that Kiev is copying and being taught authoritarian 
tendencies by the other cases. Another issue is the corroboration that the regimes are 
different in terms of authoritarianism. Academics should treat these nuances with 
consideration when analysing FSU regimes.  
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION  
 To be able to asseses the process of authoritarian learning the reader needs to 
use deductions. It remains difficult (if not impossible) to comprehensively prove the 
occurrence of learning. However, I feel that by using longitudinal and discourse analysis I 
made significant conjectures that learning occurs. Longitudinal analysis showed that the 
cases have become more authoritarian. Discourse analysis emphasised that the regimes 
had similar discourse. In analysing the cases political systems, opposition, corruption 
and NGOs I have shown significant likelihood of learning. It is unlikely that similar 
discourses, examples, tactics and institutions exist separately in four closely affiliated 
states without the probability of learning. Although learning cannot be categorically 
proven, it is highly plausible that states do learn examples from each other.  
 Chapter one set out research questions for analysis. The main research 
question was ‘how do authoritarian regimes learn to consolidate and if so, do they learn 
from other examples in their region’ and there were two sub-research questions ‘why, 
when and to what extent do regimes learn from one another’ and ‘does the regional 
hegemon instigate learning techniques, or is the process multi-linear?’ These research 
questions systematically provide analysis of authoritarian learning.  
 Chapter two provided in-depth analysis of authoritarianism allowing the study 
to assert that existing typologies (electoral, competitive and hegemonic 
authoritarianism) should only explain a few cases. It was necessary to investigate how 
authoritarian regimes use similar institutions. Authoritarian regimes twist democratic 
institutions for consolidation. I contend that the main reason these regimes use 
159 
 
democratic institutions is not mainly for democratic benefit, but because institutions 
allow regimes to bestow rents on supporters. This keeps regime supporters onside and 
consolidates the regime.  
 In chapter three to comprehend authoritarian learning further I investigated 
diffusion, linkage and leverage and soft power. I prefer to use linkage and leverage when 
analysing how regimes learn. I argue that diffusion uses inferences and counts these as 
scientific fact. It narrowly focuses on understanding events that lead to a culminating 
incident. Diffusion scholars have failed to adequately clarify past issues in the states 
which could explain regime instability leading to democratic protests prevailing. 
Diffusion scholars after the 2004 ‘Orange revolution’ did not assess domestic events that 
led to the weakening of the Kuchma. Linkage and leverage provides clearer analysis. It is 
not based on conjecture.  
 A wider analysis of Russian soft power and its linkage and leverage with other 
FSU states points to (partial) answers to the research questions. Chapter three provided 
an answer to the sub-research question ‘does the regional hegemon instigate learning 
techniques, or is the process multi-linear?’ Russia offers an authoritarian model for 
other states to copy. They take examples of tactics and institutions from Russia for 
domestic authoritarian consolidation. However, the Kremlin has taken examples of 
preventative counter revolution from Belarus primarily, but also from Armenia and 
Uzbekistan. How the Belarusian regime dispersed the 2006 demonstrations in Minsk 
was keenly watched by the Kremlin. It ascertained tactics to be used should protests 
occur in Russia. Institutionally, the Kremlin took ideas from Belarus and Kazakhstan, 
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such as, copying the example of Nur Otan. Although the Kazakh regime copied United 
Russia in building Nur Otan, the Kremlin has copied Kazakh tactics in building a party of 
power to control institutions. Belarus is a testing ground for authoritarian tactics, 
institutions and regime consolidation. I argue that the process of instigating learning 
techniques for authoritarian consolidation is multilinear. With regards the other 
research questions I could only make partial claims in proving them. In comprehending 
the main research question ‘how do authoritarian regimes learn to consolidate and if so, 
do they learn from other examples in their region’ I showed, through analysing FSU 
regional institutions that these allow for elite dialogue and potential learning. However, 
this can only be inferred and further study needs to occur. Similarly, as I contended, 
learning is difficult to categorically prove. I can only make strong deductions from 
existing data rather than scientific conclusions. I surmise that these regimes learn to 
consolidate authoritarianism through dialogue. This could be for future study too. I 
provided comprehension to the sub-research question ‘why, when and to what extent 
do regimes learn from one another’. Astana, Minsk and Moscow feared domestic ‘colour 
revolutions’ and so started authoritarian consolidation and learning from one another, 
which partially answers the ‘why’ and ‘when’ of this sub-research question.  
 The longitudinal analysis of the study investigated two arguments in chapter 
four. The first was that FSU regimes are becoming more authoritarian and the second 
was that there are different categories of authoritarian regime in the FSU. I gave two 
hypotheses to aid explanation of the sub-research question ‘why, when and to what 
extent do regimes learn from one another’? The two hypotheses were:  
‘authoritarianism is increasing in the FSU’ and ‘there are differences in authoritarian 
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levels between the FSU regimes’. Although there are issues with arbitrability, ideological 
concerns and the compilation of data, I contend that Freedom House comprehensively 
supplies conclusive data on growing FSU authoritarianism. I contended that FSU regimes 
are becoming more authoritarian and that existing rubrics should explain a few cases, 
rather than explaining all authoritarian regimes in-toto. The graphs mostly emphasised 
that FSU regimes are becoming more authoritarian, but also showed that they do not all 
homogeneously fit one rubric. This corroborates my belief that existing typologies 
should only explain a few cases, rather than be universal rubrics. Chapter four gave an 
answer to the sub-research question ‘why, when and to what extent do regimes learn 
from one another’ supporting the assertion that FSU regimes became more 
authoritarian after the ‘colour revolutions’. The graphs pointed to an explanation of 
‘why’ and ‘when’. Regimes became more authoritarian, due to their fear of potential 
‘colour revolutions’ particularly after the last ‘revolution’ in 2004. The graphs supplied a 
partial explanation of ‘to what extent’. Regimes do not have similar authoritarian levels 
and the graphs depicted the extent of individual regime authoritarianism. Chapter four 
could only provide partial explanations of ‘why’ and ‘to what extent’ due to statistical 
limitations of answering largely qualitative questions. However, it provides explanation 
to the ‘when’ section and answers the two hypotheses.  
 Chapter five investigated the sections ‘how do authoritarian regimes learn to 
consolidate’ and ‘to what extent do regimes learn from one another’ of the research 
questions. I used three hypotheses: ‘the case studies have a similar discourse to one 
another’, ‘there is a learning process’ and ‘there are differences in language and tactics 
used by the Ukrainian regime’. Analysing regime discourse offers in-depth analysis of 
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how regimes learn to consolidate, whether they learn from one another or not and if 
the Ukrainian regime has a different discourse. The findings made strong inference that 
learning occurs. If four cases have similar language on ideas, tactics and consolidation, 
then learning is probable if not proven. All the cases have similar discourse about 
stability. Analysis shows cases of copying and similar language. With regards electoral 
laws the Ukrainian regime has copied Russia’s electoral legislation. All four share 
similarities with discourse on civil society, media, corruption, NGOs and opposition. For 
instance, all argue that the regimes should build civil society and they believe that 
opposition and NGOs destabilise the state. Minsk wishes to copy Kazakhstan and 
Russia’s systemic opposition. NGOs should be monitored and reliant on state funding. 
However, Kiev is less vociferous than the others. Kazakhstan and Ukraine have similar 
discourse on corruption. They will tackle corruption to become democratic. The Kremlin 
and Minsk in contrast, contend that domestic corruption is lower than in the west and 
so changes are not required. With regards to media, all four states state that it should 
be controlled and operate in the state’s interests.  
 What I infer from the discourse is that (excluding the Kazakh corruption 
discourse), the Belarusian, Kazakh and Russian regimes have similar discourse. The 
Ukrainian regime has different discourse on some issues. However, Kiev has similar 
discourse to the others on a number of issues namely stability, oppositition and media. 
Kiev’s actions also belie the discourse undermining pro-democratic claims. The language 
may be different but chapter five showed that Kiev copies other states examples. The 
discourse analysis highlighted that the four regimes have different levels of 
authoritarianism, pointing to the contention of placing a small number of similar states 
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in one rubric. In analysing the hypotheses there is a learning process. Three cases have 
similar discourse and Ukraine’s actions do not correspond to its discourse. I strongly 
infer that there is a learning process. I argue that ‘how do authoritarian regimes learn to 
consolidate’ can be answered by stating that regimes are in dialogue with one another. 
This supposition is not strong, but as all four regimes have similar discourse on many 
variables, I believe that dialogue occurs. However, this could be analysed further.  
 I set out to confirm authoritarian learning through investigating the cases of 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine. The research questions provided strong 
inferences that this process occurs. The main research question ‘how do authoritarian 
regimes learn to consolidate and if so, do they learn from other examples in their region’ 
allowed the study to analyse if learning occurs and how regimes learn from one another. 
Learning cannot categorically be proven beyond measurable doubt. It is after all a 
slippery concept. Yet, through longitudinal analysis, discourse analysis, case studies and 
in-depth literature reviews there are strong suppositions that learning between regimes 
occurs. I assessed two sub-research questions. The first was ‘does the regional hegemon 
instigate learning techniques, or is the process multi-linear?’ In answering this I teased 
out that whilst the Kremlin provides an authoritarian model for other states it also 
learns from others. As seen with the preventative counter revolution, the Kremlin learnt 
tactics from Armenia, Uzbekistan and especially Belarus. I argue that learning is 
multilinear and techniques shared.  The second sub-research question asked ‘why, when 
and to what extent do regimes learn from one another’? Authoritarian learning was 
prevalent after 2004 when other FSU regimes feared domestic ‘colour revolutions’ and 
started to consolidate authoritarianism. This explains the why and when of the sub-
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research question. I argue that it can be deduced that regimes learn, but, because they 
fit different authoritarian typologies there are different levels of authoriarianism.  
 Further investigation is needed on two aspects of authoritarian learning.  
These are the wider authoritarian literature and the concept of authoritarian learning. 
Further expansion and critiquing of the wider authoritarian literature is required. A 
wealth of democratisation literature exists, but authoritarian literature remains 
underdeveloped. Pertinently, there are ony a few case studies on authoritarianism. 
What exists regarding the FSU is limited to Russia. Authoritarian learning and the 
concepts behind it have so far received negligible academic attention. One study 
(Ambrosio, 2009) analyses Russia, but more needs to be done to expand the literature. I 
have expnaded authoritarian learning literature through more cases. But, additional 
literature could ascertain how authoritarian learning occurs in other regions like the 
Middle East, East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Authoritarian linkage and leverage was an 
important aspect of this study. Although there is growing literature on this, more 
research needs to be done. I raised the possibility of studying the FSU’s regional 
institutions. I feel these regional institutions allow for dialogue. It is plausible that FSU 
regimes use these to promote authoritarianism, learn tactics and shape authoritarian 
institutions. I provided salient arguments to an underdeveloped literature and 
understanding of authoritarian learning. I have brought new conceptualisations to 
existing FSU political systems. I investigated how authoritarian regimes consolidate and 
learn from each other. I have expanded the literature on this important topic. Future 
work will enlarge this literature providing new comprehension on authoritarian learning, 
consolidation and the current FSU political systems. 
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 What can be said with certainty is that the FSU regimes will continue to learn 
from one another, consolidating their control and undermining protest. The FSU regimes 
consistently work with one another to strengthen authoritarianism through dialogue, 
institution building, learning and sharing tactics. This helps undermine democratic 
openings, limiting opposition avenues not controlled by the state, resulting in 
authoritarian reinforcement. Ukraine could plausibly integrate with Europe. But it is 
more likely to combine closer with other FSU states as authoritarian tactics and 
historical burdens of dictatorship remain. The FSU is likely to become more 
authoritarian with regimes usurping democracy for their own ends. Change is likely to 
be internal within the regimes. However, as Lukshenka, Nazarbayev and Putin are 
unwilling to step down, there is the possibility that should they become incapacitated 
infighting will occur. Such a circumstance is possible, but the Belarusian, Kazakh and 
Russian regimes are stable. The likelihood of regime collapse is wishful thinking. It is 
unlikely that in the short and medium term these regimes will collapse. 
 Understanding authoritarian learning is an integral aspect of conceptualising 
the FSU regimes. It is paramount that scholars, governments and international 
organisations better comprehend the intricacies of the political systems of FSU states. 
To do this an understanding of authoritarian learning is required. It allows 
comprehension of how regimes learn tactics, institutions building and consoldation 
techniques as well as counteracting external democracy initiatives. Authoritarian 
learning is thus an important topic of research. I feel that I have commenced a synopsis 
on a topic that will increasingly grow in importance as academics, governments and 
international organisations begin to try to understand growing FSU authoritarianism and 
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the political systems that have consolidated this phenomenon. More however needs to 
be done, but I have provided areas for future studies to tackle and begin an 
investigation on what will become a pertinent literature.  
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